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Co-Chairs: Stefan Nagel and Joel B. Slemrod
This dissertation comprises three research papers, each of which examines a public
policy.
Chapter 1. Many people who owe income tax fail to file a timely tax return.
In communication with these “ghosts,” what messages from the tax authority are
effective for eliciting a return? This is the first study to address message content in
communication with income tax nonfilers. I assess the efficacy of messages related
to penalty salience, punishment probability, compliance cost, and civic pride by
evaluating the response to experimental mailings distributed by Detroit to 7,142
suspected resident nonfilers. The penalty salience message was the most effective.
Relative to a basic mailing that requested a return, penalty salience mailings that
xi
stated the statutory penalty for failing to file a return tripled response rates from
3% to 10%, increased the number of back-year returns filed per response from 0.08
to 0.27, and raised the fraction of filed returns that admitted tax due from 39% to
52%. Compliance cost mailings that enclosed a blank tax return and punishment
probability mailings that stated the recipient’s federal income also raised response
rates relative to the basic mailing, but civic pride mailings did not. Mailings were
more effective in eliciting returns from older, higher-income, and first-time nonfilers.
I investigate the impact of treatment mailings on the behavior of untreated neighbors
and find no evidence of geographic network effects.
Chapter 2. Two peculiar features of the market for renewable fuel are essential
for understanding the welfare consequences of the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS).
First, the 10% limit on ethanol in E10 gasoline—the blendwall—makes the total
renewable fuel mandate more costly. Second, the linkage among prices of different
categories of renewable energy credits—RINs—makes the total renewable fuel man-
date less costly. I simulate policy experiments in a model that captures both of
these features. In the short run, I find that reducing carbon emissions using the RFS
imposes welfare costs of more than $300 per metric ton of CO2.
Chapter 3. The financial crisis focused attention on policies for managing sy-
stematic risk. One policy tool for managing systematic risk is bank leverage re-
quirements, yet existing models do not consider the contribution of leverage to the
frequency of financial crises. This paper develops a criterion for optimal leverage
requirements when bank leverage makes financial crises more likely. Despite the
contribution of leverage to systematic risk, it is optimal to tolerate leverage because
xii
it helps banks create liquidity. I provide illustrative calculations that show current
requirements are too low.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Ghostbusting in Detroit: Evidence on nonfilers
from a controlled field experiment
1.1 Introduction
Tax authorities want to know what messages induce compliance from noncompliant
taxpayers. Relative to other enforcement mechanisms like audits or site visits, the
marginal cost of written communication is low. Even better, the marginal cost of
making communication more effective is zero; the postage cost of mailing a letter
that gets filed in the dustbin is the same as the postage cost of mailing a letter that
induces additional timely compliance. Tax authorities want to send a message that
works.
One common form of noncompliance is failure to file a tax return. For the U.S.
federal individual income tax, Erard et al. (2014) estimate that 6.1% of required
tax year 2012 returns were not filed on time. Nonfiling is a much bigger problem
for Detroit’s individual income tax, for which I estimate that 48% of required tax
year 2014 returns were not filed on time. Controlled experiments are becoming more
common in the literature on the determinants of tax compliance, most of which exa-
mines underreporting or underpayment. Several papers have examined corporate tax
1
and profits tax nonfiling (Kettle et al. 2016; Brockmeyer et al. 2016), but individual
income tax nonfilers have been the focus of only one such empirical paper, which
examined the effect of repetition and reminders on filing rates (Guyton et al. 2016).
This paper provides the first evidence from a controlled experiment about message
content in communication with income tax nonfilers. The experiment was designed
and conducted by the author in collaboration with the City of Detroit. Detroit’s
income tax division sent mailings in April through June 2016 to 7,142 suspected
“ghosts”—people who owed tax but did not file a tax year 2014 return. Each mailing
contained one of several experimental messages, related variously to penalty salience,
punishment probability, compliance cost, or civic pride. From the population of
suspected ghosts with at least $350 in estimated tax liability, nonfilers were randomly
selected into experimental treatments and sent the same message in two mailings: a
postcard, and then a certified letter one week later.
I compare the effectiveness of the various experimental messages for inducing
taxpayer compliance. The main outcome of interest is the response rate, the rate at
which mailings elicited a tax return from suspected resident nonfilers in the sample.
I also evaluate response quality, including the amount of remittances, the likelihood
of claiming a refund rather than admitting tax due, and the number of back-year
returns accompanying the tax year 2014 return. I examine whether taxpayer behavior
differed across treatments in ways that can be attributed only to messages on the
postcard, such as the rate at which taxpayers accepted the letters, which required a
signature for delivery. I identify taxpayer characteristics, including age and income,
that were associated with higher response rates to the experimental messages. I
investigate geographic network effects—the response rates of untreated neighbors to
experimental mailings.
In communication with nonfilers, the penalty salience message was the most ef-
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fective at inducing compliance. Mailings that stated the statutory penalty for failing
to file elicited a tax return from 10.1% of intended recipients, more than triple the
response rate to the contact-only control mailings and more than any other treat-
ment mailings. Taxpayers in the penalty salience treatment were most likely to file
back-year returns, most likely to admit tax due, and most likely to remit payment.
Taxpayers responded more promptly to the penalty salience message, sometimes after
receiving just the postcard, before the letter was even delivered.
The compliance cost mailings were also effective at raising response rates relative
to a contact-only control, but the response quality was lower than the penalty salience
mailings. Whereas all other treatment mailings differed only by one or two sentences
in a prominent box on the postcard or letter, the compliance cost treatment letter also
enclosed a blank tax form and return envelope. The response rate to the compliance
cost mailings was 6.2%, double the response rate to the contact-only control mailings.
However, the returns that were filed in response to the compliance cost mailings were
more likely to claim refunds and less likely to admit tax due than the returns filed
in response to the penalty salience mailings. Taxpayers also filed fewer back-year
returns in response to compliance cost mailings.
Adding to the penalty salience message a punishment probability message that
informed nonfilers that the city tax authority knew their 2014 federal income dam-
pened response rates relative to the penalty salience message by itself. The idea
behind the punishment probability message is that revealing the nonfiler’s federal
income demonstrates that the tax authority has the ability to monitor taxpayer be-
havior and therefore raises the perceived probability of punishment. On its own, the
punishment probability message raised response rates relative to the contact-only
control. If the punishment probability and penalty salience messages both operated
exclusively through their intended channels, we would expect that including both
3
messages would raise response rates relative to one or the other by itself (Erard and
Ho 2001). However, when mailings included both the punishment probability mes-
sage and the penalty salience message, the response rate was lower than the response
rate to mailings with just the penalty salience message. This surprising result may be
a consequence of limited taxpayer attention, supporting the conclusions from prior
literature that simplicity is important in communication with taxpayers (Bhargava
and Manoli 2015).
This is the first controlled experiment to test the effectiveness of a civic pride
message on city taxpayers, and the response rate was statistically indistinguishable
from the contact-only control. The civic pride message reminded taxpayers that the
collection of taxes is essential to the successful resurgence of the City of Detroit.
Kettle et al. (2016) found no impact of a “national pride” message on payment
rates among Guatemala corporations. Prior tax experiments have tested the efficacy
of other moral appeals: public service, fairness, and compliant majority messages.
Consistent with the results of this experiment, most prior literature finds that moral
appeals are not as effective as messages about the probability of being caught and
the penalty if caught (Slemrod 2015).
I find no evidence of geographic network effects. Network effects can be im-
portant even when per-neighbor effects are very small because treated individuals
can have many neighbors. To investigate geographic network effects, I compute the
distance between every treated nonfiler and every untreated taxpayer who filed a
return within 90 days of the first postcard in the experiment. The effect of treat-
ment mailings on filing rates of taxpayers within 100 meters of treated nonfilers was
not statistically significant, and this finding was robust to alternative distances. If
there are network effects from treatment, they are likely through family or coworkers
rather than geographic neighbors.
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I assess the revenue and welfare effects of the experimental mailings. I estimate
that the penalty salience treatment raised marginal revenue net of administrative
costs by $8 per letter. A back-of-the-envelope application of marginal net revenue to
the population of 42,754 nonfilers who fit the sample selection criteria implies that the
penalty salience mailings could have generated net revenue of $342,000. Accounting
for the private costs to taxpayers of foregone consumption and compliance costs, the
baseline estimate finds that even the most effective treatment had a negative effect
on social welfare. However, the welfare estimate is sensitive to assumptions about
the social value of public spending and the cost of compliance.
If collecting revenue is valued highly relative to private compliance costs, then
net welfare can be improved relative to the penalty salience treatment by refining
the sample selection criteria. Taxpayers with higher income, older taxpayers, and
taxpayers who were identified as nonfilers for the first time in tax year 2014 were
more responsive to all treatments including penalty salience. The effects of age,
income, filing history, and treatment status appear to be positive even when they
are all at play. Higher income taxpayers are also likely to have larger tax liability
net of compliance costs. Relative to applying the penalty salience treatment to the
entire population of interest, net welfare could be improved by focusing on a smaller
population with higher response rates and higher expected liability net of compliance
costs.
Section 1.2 gives background on the income tax system, the decision to file, and
the estimated number of nonfilers in Detroit. Section 1.3 presents the design of a
controlled field experiment. Section 1.4 presents the results of the field experiment.
Section 1.5 conducts a normative analysis. Section 1.6 discusses the results in the




The City of Detroit levies an income tax on local residents and local workers. Re-
gardless of where they work, residents owe 2.4% of income, with an exemption of
$600 per filer, spouse, or dependent. People who work in Detroit but reside elsew-
here owe 1.2% of income earned in Detroit with the same exemption levels. Detroit
imposes other taxes such as property tax, but my focus here is on the income tax.1
Whether the worker or the firm remits income tax to Detroit depends on worker
classification and firm location. A firm must classify workers as either employees or
contractors.2 A firm located in the city must withhold from employees and remit
income tax to Detroit. However, a firm located outside the city is not required
to withhold Detroit income tax from employees, even if the employees owe Detroit
income tax because they are Detroit residents.3 A firm never remits income tax
on behalf of contractors, regardless of the firm’s location. City tax administrators
believe one reason remittances by firms have fallen is that an increasing share of the
workforce is classified as contractors.4
Reporting requirements also depend on worker classification and firm location.
Firms issue forms that summarize annual income to all workers—a Form W2 for
1Many localities levy income tax. Appendix Table 1.11 reports a count of localities by state.
2Generally, workers who receive benefits and over whom the firm has con-
trol are employees. The IRS has guidelines for distinguishing employees from
contrators: https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employed/
independent-contractor-self-employed-or-employee.
3State legislation may soon require firms outside the city to withhold and remit income tax on
behalf of Detroit residents. See House Bill 4829 of 2015: http://legislature.mi.gov/doc.aspx?
2015-HB-4829.
4“Detroit Chief Financial Officer John Hill blamed the [revenue] shortfall on a reduction in
income tax withholding by employers in the city. In February, he told the Financial Review Com-
mission, the state board overseeing Detroit’s fiscal affairs post-bankruptcy, that he believes a fair
number of the new workers downtown are contract workers.” Detroit Free Press, March 7, 2015.
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employees and a Form 1099 for contractors. A taxpayer must include a copy of W2s
and 1099s she received when she files a tax return with the city. A firm located in
Detroit must report to the city the income and withholding information from any
W2 or 1099 forms it issues. A firm located outside Detroit is not required to report
income earned by Detroit residents.
Tax enforcement in Detroit is severely limited by administrative capacity. Detroit
struggles just to process returns submitted on time by compliant taxpayers.5 Around
the time of Detroit’s bankruptcy in July 2013, lawyers for the city who wanted to
sue taxpayers with known tax due were limited by the court, which had insufficient
staff to process more than five such cases per week. Prior to tax year 2015, Detroit
did not accept electronic returns; taxpayers were required to mail a paper return to
a post office box or deliver a paper return in person to the municipal center.6
Within these limits, Detroit does audit tax returns, but not the same way as the
IRS. For tax year 2014, Detroit contracted with Chase Bank to scan and manually
key tax returns into a data file, which was then loaded into proprietary software
called CityTax. City auditors can check information from returns in CityTax against
information on federal income tax returns that are shared with Detroit by the IRS.7
Whereas IRS audits often independently verify information supplied by a taxpayer,
the vast majority of Detroit audits currently go no further than comparing the in-
formation in the city return to the information in the federal return. Information on
5“Taxpayers often wait months or even years before their refund checks arrive.” Detroit Free
Press, March 7, 2015.
6Detroit’s tax administration is changing. In recognition of capacity constraints, Detroit turned
over primary responsibility for processing city returns to the state beginning with tax year 2015.
Even as Detroit ceded some responsibility to Michigan, the city maintained its own compliance and
enforcement apparatus. The sample in this paper is for tax year 2014, for which the city retained
full responsibility.
7The IRS shares federal tax information with state and local governments for the purpose of
tax enforcement. Third party information reporting is an important mechanism of tax enforcement,
as noted by, for example, Erard and Ho (2004) and Pomeranz (2015). This context is somewhat
unusual because the “third party” is another level of government.
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the federal return is treated as verification.
Michigan gives cities legal tools for income tax enforcement. A city tax authority
is permitted to examine records that will help it to assess tax liability, including
the tax liability of individuals who did not file a return but are believed to owe
income tax. The city does not have automatic subpoena power over records, but it
can sue noncompliant individuals in court to compel documents. Willful failure to
file a return, remit tax owed, or permit the tax authority to examine records is a
misdemeanor.8
Detroit has two available pathways for pursuing identified individuals who have
not filed a tax return. The first pathway is to send a “proposed assessment” to the
taxpayer based on the city’s belief of what the taxpayer owes. If the taxpayer receives
and does not dispute the proposed assessment, the tax debt becomes official. If the
taxpayer then does not remit the tax debt, Detroit sends the debt to a collection
agency. The second pathway is a criminal procedure. The city can charge an indi-
vidual who fails to file a tax return with a misdemeanor. For many years, Detroit
has used the first pathway exclusively—issuing proposed assessments and forwarding
unpaid tax debt to a collection agency.
As part of the proposed assessment pathway, the city must be able to prove that
the taxpayer received the proposed assessment in order for the tax debt to become
official. There is no such notification requirement for the city to charge taxpayers with
a misdemeanor. To be courteous and reduce enforcement costs, city administrators
prefer to communicate with taxpayers prior to charging them with a misdemeanor,
but Detroit is under no legal obligation to do so. The city’s burden of ensuring the
taxpayer is notified when it pursues the proposed assessment pathway may have led
8City Income Tax Act of 1964, Act 284 at 141.673 and 141.699: https://legislature.mi.
gov/documents/mcl/archive/2014/May/mcl-Act-284-of-1964.pdf.
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taxpayers to believe that they could avoid getting in trouble by refusing to accept the
treatment letter, which was sent via certified mail and therefore required a signature
for delivery.
1.2.2 Filing decision
The logic of the standard model of income reporting can be naturally extended to the
decision whether to file a return. In the standard model of Allingham and Sandmo
(1972), taxpayer reports depend on the probability of audit and the penalty for a false
report. In an extension by Erard and Ho (2001), taxpayer choice of whether to file
a return depends on the probability of detection and the penalty for nonfiling. One
suspects that Detroit residents and workers correctly perceive that the probability
of punishing nonfilers is low. However, the statutory penalty for failing to file an
income tax return is substantial: a fine of up to $500 and up to 90 days in jail.
The extended model of filing a return includes compliance costs, which appear to
be important in Detroit. Many workers who are owed a refund from the city, because
they have income tax withheld from their paychecks exceeding tax liability, still fail
to file a return. The standard model cannot explain this behavior. It is possible that
some of these workers decide not to claim a refund as a form of “donation” to the
city, but it seems likely that compliance costs are more important. Compliance costs
should be at least as large for taxpayers with tax due as it is for taxpayers who are
owed a refund. So taxpayers with tax due are discouraged from filing a return both
by the prospect of remitting tax and by the compliance costs.
There may also be nontax reasons to avoid truthfully reporting residence. For
instance, car insurance rates are particularly high in Detroit, higher than in districts
immediately adjacent to the city.9 A resident of downtown Detroit would save money
9According to carinsurance.com, the average annual auto insurance rate was $1,400 higher
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on car insurance by claiming residence at a suburban address. Workers may believe
their true residence is more likely to be detected by the car insurance company if
it is truthfully reported on an income tax return. To the extent that truthfully
reporting residence is necessary for renters or homeowners insurance, desire for those
insurance services could act in the opposite direction. So the decision not to file a
return may be jointly determined by considerations of the probability of detection
by the tax authority, the penalty for detection, compliance costs, and nontax reasons
for claiming residence in a particular location.
It is also possible that failure to file a return is not the result of a conscious decision
or optimizing behavior. Some taxpayers may mistakenly believe that they filed a city
return electronically. Many taxpayers file federal and state returns electronically,
but Detroit did not accept city tax returns electronically prior to tax year 2015. If
taxpayers use tax preparation software, they may think they are done with all of
their federal, state, and local returns when they click the submit button, but that is
not true if they owe Detroit income tax. Detroit only processes income tax returns
that are mailed to a post office box or hand delivered. Furthermore, some Detroit
residents and workers, especially those new to the area, may honestly be unaware
that Detroit has an income tax.10
in central Detroit than in selected suburbs adjacent to Detroit. Reported auto insurance rates are
averages by zip code for a 2014 Honda Accord for a single 40-year-old male with a clean record and
good credit. The average rates in central Detroit were $4,846 in Downtown (zip code 48226), $5,025
in Midtown (48201), $4,945 in New Center / North End (48202), $4,827 in Downtown (48207), and
$4,636 in Corktown / Woodbridge (48216). The average rates in selected suburbs were $3,491 in
Southfield (48075), $3,489 in Oak Park (48237), $2,621 in Ferndale (48220), $3,139 in Grosse Pointe
(48230), and $4,256 in Dearborn (48126).
10Awareness of Detroit’s income tax seems comparable to awareness of city income tax in Ohio
cities Cincinnati and Columbus, judging by an index of search interest from Google Trends. See
Appendix Figure 1.7. Hoopes, Reck, and Slemrod (2015) discuss tax enforcement with uninformed
taxpayers.
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1.2.3 Nonfiler population size
In designing a tax enforcement approach to nonfilers, it would be helpful to know how
many nonfilers there are. That would be easy for a tax administrator to calculate if
she knew who is in the tax base and who filed tax returns. The identity of filers is
known, but the identity and size of the tax base is unknown. Detroit’s income tax
base consists of residents and workers whose income exceeds the exemption amount.11
I estimate the number of people who owed Detroit income tax for tax year 2014
to be approximately 387,000. To calculate this figure, I use the Current Employment
Statistics (CES) program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics to estimate the number
of people who work in Wayne County and the number of employed Wayne County re-
sidents. I then utilize Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Origin-
Destination Employment Statistics from the Census Bureau to estimate Detroit’s
share of workers in Wayne County and Detroit’s share of employed residents of
Wayne County. Table 1.1 shows that the estimated income tax base of Detroit was
387,000 people when these shares from LEHD are applied to the workforce of Wayne
County from CES.
For a given tax year, the population of nonfilers shrinks over time because many
individuals file city tax returns months or years late. The population of nonfilers for
a given tax year is thus a moving target. For example, Detroit received 155,000 tax
year 2011 returns on time by April 2012, 42,000 additional tax year 2011 returns over
the next 12 months by April 2013, 12,000 additional tax year 2011 returns by April
2014, and 3,000 additional tax year 2011 returns by April 2015. Filing patterns are
similar for other tax years. For the purpose of cross-year comparisons, it is therefore
important to specify the date on which the population is being measured.
11The exemption amount is $600 per filer, spouse, and dependent.
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2012 68,970 191,878 121,542 382,389
2013 66,468 191,176 123,256 380,901
2014 67,562 194,144 125,398 387,103
Note: Estimates of Detroit resident-workers, nonresident workers, and worker nonresidents are
obtained by applying Detroit shares of Wayne County workers and employed residents to the work-
force of Wayne County. Detroit shares of Wayne County workers and employed residents are from
the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) Origin-Destination Employment Statis-
tics from the Census Bureau. Wayne County workforce is from the Current Employment Statistics
(CES) program of the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
As of April 2016, when the field experiment began, I estimate the number of
people who were Detroit nonfilers for tax year 2014 to be 179,000. The estimate
comes from subtracting the actual number of people in the tax base who filed returns
from the estimated total number of people in the tax base. That estimate implies
that 46% of individuals who were required to file Detroit tax returns failed to file a
return. Assuming 40% of joint returns have two earners, as in Table 1.2, and that
17.3% of nonfilers would file joint returns, there were 167,000 missing returns, equal
to 48% of required returns.12
A notable source of uncertainty is the number of joint filers who earned income.
When all income is reported by third parties to the tax authority on Form W2 for
employees and Form 1099 for contractors, then the tax authority knows whether one
or both individuals in a couple filing jointly are among the 387,000 individuals in
the tax base. However, for income with no third-party reporting, there is no way to
know whether each individual is in the tax base. Table 1.2 shows the computation
of nonfilers by subtracting the number of people in the tax base who filed returns
12Erard et al. (2014) estimate there were 7.6 million federal individual income tax nonfilers in
2012 (6.1% of required returns). Among suspected resident nonfilers identified from federal income
tax returns, 17.3% filed joint federal returns.
12
from the number of people in the tax base.
This section provided context for the controlled field experiment by describing
the income tax system in Detroit, identifying factors that influence the failure of a
taxpayer to file a return, and estimating the size of Detroit’s nonfiler population.
The next section explains the design of the experiment.
1.3 Design of a controlled field experiment
1.3.1 Sample
A sample of 9,523 individuals for the field experiment was randomly selected from
the population of 42,754 suspected nonfilers who met the following sample selection
criteria: (1) The IRS identified the individual as a federal taxpayer with a Detroit
residence and income taxable to Detroit in tax year 2014. (2) Detroit had no record
of the individual filing a 2014 city income tax return as of April 2016. (3) Detroit
estimated the individual had 2014 tax due to the city of at least $350. (4) Detroit
had no record of the individual passing away or filing for bankruptcy. (5) The
individual’s address appeared to be valid.13 Of the 185,137 taxpayers who met the
first two criteria, approximately 135,000 were eliminated from consideration by the
third criterion because Detroit estimated the individual had 2014 tax due to the city
of less than $350.
Detroit estimates tax due from nonfilers using an algorithm that includes federal
income information from the IRS and local withholding information from city em-
ployers. The city’s algorithm for estimating tax due is correct within $15 of reported
tax due for 70% of taxpayers who file both local and federal returns. Incomplete
13To avoid pursuing individuals who were not actually Detroit residents, addresses were excluded
if they had a zip code that is shared between Detroit and another city (e.g. Highland Park). To
reduce the nondelivery rate, addresses were excluded if they had a street name that was not shared
by other federal taxpayers, on the grounds that it was likely to be an erroneous address.
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2012 382,389 205,275 82,046 32,135 144,979
2013 380,901 193,455 77,084 31,133 156,313
2014 387,103 178,859 72,843 28,847 179,397
Note: Individuals in Detroit tax base (column 2) is author’s estimate explained in the text and
Table 1.1. Returns filed (column 3) includes resident, non-resident, and partial-year returns. A
return is considered to be a joint return (column 4) if it was marked as such by the taxpayer. A
return is considered to be a joint return with two earners (column 5) if there was a W2 associated
with the “secondary” social security number. Nonfilers (column 6) is equal to the size of the tax
base (column 2) less the number of returns (columns 3) and the number of joint returns with two
earners (column 5).
withholding information from employers causes discrepancies between Detroit’s es-
timation of tax due and actual tax due. Detroit’s estimation of tax due is too high
for nonfilers with employers who did not submit W2s to the city electronically.14
Two sources of income—active duty military pay and pension income—also cause
discrepancies between Detroit’s estimation of tax due and actual tax due. Detroit’s
estimation of tax due is too high for nonfilers with these types of income.15
Detroit excluded taxpayers with addresses that were likely to be invalid. For
prior tax years, Detroit sent tens of thousands of letters to nonfilers, thousands of
14Detroit accepts W2s from employers in electronic (online or CD) and paper format. Around
4% of the 12,700 employers who file an annual report with individual income tax withholding do
so electronically. If an employer submitted a W2 electronically, then Detroit used the withholding
amount for the nonfiler to estimate tax due. W2s that were submitted in paper form only were
not digitized or used to estimate individual income tax due. By dollar value, around 20% of tax
prepayments reported on city returns, including employer withholding and estimated payments
from business income, are visible to the tax division and able to be connected to the taxpayer
before receiving the city return.
15Active duty military pay appears as wage (W2) income on a federal 1040. It is taxable income
to the federal government, but it is not taxable income to Detroit. Detroit cannot systematically
distinguish between active duty military pay and other wage income, although it can request that
information for individual taxpayers. Similarly, pension income appears as other (1099-MISC)
income on a federal 1040. It is taxable income to the federal government, but it is not taxable
income to Detroit. As with military pay, Detroit cannot systematically distinguish between pension
income and other income from a 1099-MISC, although it can request that information for individual
taxpayers.
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which were returned as undeliverable. For tax year 2014, Detroit used a filter on
addresses that marked about 7% of IRS addresses as likely to be invalid prior to
sample selection. The United States Postal Service contracts with private vendors
to offer paid address verification services, but Detroit does does not pay for those
services.
Table 1.3 reports summary statistics for individuals who filed a federal return
in tax year 2014 with a Detroit address by local filing status, sample eligibility, and
sample selection. Among federal filers, individuals who failed to file a city return were
younger on average and more likely to file as a head of household. Local nonfilers
had lower income, and they were much more likely to have been identified by Detroit
as a nonfiler for a tax year prior to 2014. Around 84% of nonfilers in the sample
were also identified as a nonfiler for a prior year.
1.3.2 Experimental treatments
Taxpayers in the sample were sent two separate mailings in sequence, one week apart.
The first mailing was a postcard, and the second mailing was a letter.16 The postcard
listed the types of income that are taxable by Detroit and directed taxpayers where
to find tax forms and filing instructions. The letter informed the nonfiler that Detroit
believes they had taxable income and failed to file a city tax return for tax year 2014.
Taxpayers were randomly assigned to a treatment status, which varied the content of
a prominent box in both the postcard and the letter. Table 1.4 reports the message
associated with each treatment status. Examples of postcards and letters are in
Appendix Figure 1.8.17
16To track delivery, the letters were sent via United States Postal Service certified mail. Certified
mail requires a signature for delivery, either in person or on a card left by the letter carrier.
17This study was submitted for approval to the University of Michigan Health Sciences and
Behavioral Sciences Institutional Review Board. The IRB determined that this study had a status
of “Not Regulated”.
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Table 1.3: Summary Statistics (TY 2014)
Filer Nonfiler Population Sample
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Age 50.2 15.4 44.8 17.5 39.6 12.0 39.6 12.0
FS = single (%) 46.4 49.9 43.4 49.6 39.4 48.9 39.2 48.8
FS = married filing jointly (%) 26.9 44.3 17.3 37.8 10.6 30.8 10.8 31.0
FS = head of household (%) 24.3 42.9 37.9 48.5 48.6 50.0 48.6 50.0
Years identified as nonfiler 3.5 2.2 4.1 2.4 4.3 2.5 4.3 2.5
Filed in 2012 or 2013 (%) 82.4 38.1 15.2 35.9 23.3 42.2 22.4 41.7
Total income ($ 000s) 57.0 91.6 40.1 175.3 33.9 42.6 33.4 24.7
Wage income ($ 000s) 44.4 61.3 27.5 80.2 31.4 23.3 31.3 23.7
Log total income 10.3 0.7 10.0 0.5 10.3 0.5 10.3 0.5
Nonzero nonwage income (%) 36.4 48.2 42.9 49.5 29.5 45.6 29.5 45.6
Observations 61,632 185,342 42,754 9,523
Note: This table reports means and standard deviations of taxpayer characteristics from administrative tax data.
“Filers” are taxpayers identified by the IRS as Detroit residents who filed both a federal return and a city return for tax
year 2014. “Nonfilers” are taxpayers identified by the IRS as Detroit residents who filed a federal return but not a city
return for tax year 2014. “Population” is the subset of Nonfilers who met all five sample selection criteria, including
estimated tax due of at least $350. “Sample” is the subset of Population that was randomly selected for the experiment.
Penalty salience. One treatment status tested whether penalty salience affects tax
compliance. The boxed message stated that failure to file a tax return is a misdemea-
nor, and the statutory penalty for the misdemeanor is a fine of up to $500 and 90 days
in jail. Absent this treatment, the statutory penalty was almost certainly unknown
by the vast majority of Detroit residents. The city had not prosecuted anyone under
the misdemeanor provision for many years. The message in this treatment status
was not phrased as a threat, but it is comparable to other field experiments that test
“threats” of various sorts.18
Punishment probability. Another treatment status was intended to affect the per-
ceived probability of punishment. The boxed message revealed that Detroit knew the
recipient’s total federal income, which is among the information provided by the IRS
to Detroit. The rationale for this treatment is that a taxpayer will feel punishment
is more likely if the tax authority reveals that it has relevant information. Revealing
this information is intended to raise the perceived probability of punishment, rela-
18The “threat” treatment in Chirico et al. (2015) actually uses threatening language. Most other
threat treatments are based on the threat of auditing a return, rather than the threat of punishment
if no further action is taken.
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Table 1.4: Experimental treatments
Treatment Intervention Message in prominent box on lettera
Penalty salience Postcard and
letter
Failure to file a tax return is a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of $500 and 90 days in
jail.
Punishment probability Postcard and
letter
Our records indicate you had federal total







For your convenience, City Income Tax
Form D-1040(R) is enclosed with this letter.a
Civic pride Postcard and
letter
Detroit’s rising is at hand. The collection of





Our records indicate you had federal total
income of $X for tax year 2014. Failure to
file a tax return is a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of $500 and 90 days in
jail.a
Contact-only (control) Postcard and
letter
None
No-contact (control) None N/A
Note: This table describes the experimental treatments. 1,200 taxpayers were assigned to each
experimental treatment other than the no-contact control, to which 2,400 taxpayers were assigned.
a The boxed message was exactly the same on the postcard and the letter within each treatment
other than the punishment probability treatments and the compliance cost treatment. In the
punishment probability treatments, the boxed message on the postcard was, “The letter you receive
will indicate how much taxable income you had in tax year 2014.” In the compliance cost treatment,
the boxed message on the postcard was, “For your convenience, City Income Tax Form D-1040(R)
will be enclosed with the letter.”
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tive to the letters that do not reveal that Detroit has information about the taxpayer
other than name and address.
Compliance cost. The cost to the taxpayer of filing a return was reduced by
a treatment status that enclosed a blank tax form and a return envelope. The
enclosed return was for Detroit residents for tax year 2014, Form D-1040(R).19 The
boxed message referred to the tax form as being provided for the convenience of
the recipient. Although the monetary cost of the form and envelope is small, the
nonmonetary cost could be substantial, including the time and effort to find the
form online or retrieve it from the Coleman A. Young Municipal Center in downtown
Detroit.
Civic pride. One set of mailings tested the effect of an appeal to civic pride.
The boxed message proclaimed the importance of tax collection to the resurgence of
Detroit. This is the first moral appeal of its kind, but it is not the only type of moral
appeal that is potentially relevant in communication with taxpayers. In similar tax
enforcement field experiments, moral appeals to taxpayers have (1) reminded taxpay-
ers of services provided by tax dollars, (2) informed taxpayers about the compliance
rate of their neighbors, and (3) referred to a general principle of equity or fairness.
Penalty salience × punishment probability. The messages in the penalty salience
treatment status and the punishment probability treatment status were combined in
a separate treatment group. The boxed message stated the taxpayer’s income first,
then the penalty. Standard theory about the decision to file suggests that the inte-
raction between penalty salience and punishment probability should be important.
If the other treatments are effective and operate through the intended channel of
raising the perceived penalty and probability of punishment, then we would expect
19The individual income tax form for nonresidents, Form D-1040(NR), was sent to some nonfilers
in the experiment in place of the tax form for residents.
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the interaction treatment to elicit a higher response than either by itself.
Control. Two groups of nonfilers were assigned to “control” groups. One group
received no contact at all, and the other group was sent mailings with the prominent
box omitted from both the postcard and the letter. There is considerable evidence
that taxpayers respond to any kind of contact from the tax authority, probably
because it alerts the taxpayer that the tax authority can monitor their behavior, so
it is important to isolate the effect of the contact-only mailings from the effect of the
particular messages in the other treatment groups.20
From the population of 42,754 nonfilers that met the sample selection criteria,
1,200 individuals were randomly selected for each of the 6 treatment groups that
received letters (including the contact-only control group), and 2,400 individuals
were randomly selected to be in a no-contact control group. To stay within the
limits of the Detroit tax division’s administrative capacity, the postcards and letters
were sent in staggered batches.21 Each batch had an approximately equal number
of nonfilers from each treatment group. Individuals in the no-contact group were
assigned to batches as if they were being sent postcards and letters. There were 119,
581, 2,160, 2,160, and 2,160 individuals in batches one through five, respectively.22
The treatment groups are not exactly the same size because the city’s address filter
was refined shortly before sending the second batch. Also, individuals were removed
from the sample if they filed a city tax return between the time the sample was
selected and the time the postcards were mailed. Individuals removed from the
20Chirico et al. (2015) and Fellner, Sausgruber, and Traxler (2013) describe field experiments that
used similar contact-only letters to isolate the response to particular messages from the response
to contact from the tax authority.
21The tax division reports that it was unable to handle the phone calls that resulted from large
batches (tens of thousands) of similar letters to nonfilers in past years. That likely dampened
response rates and the effectiveness of contact. Therefore, in this field experiment, postcards and
letters were dispersed in batches.
22Postcards were sent on April 18, May 2, May 16, June 1, and June 13-15. Letters were sent
on April 25, May 9, May 24-26, June 9, and June 23.
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sample were replaced with other individuals randomly selected from the population
of nonfilers whenever possible. Appendix Table 1.12 reports summary statistics by
treatment status.
This field experiment was accompanied by another change that may have affected
response rates. The State of Michigan took responsibility for processing individual
City of Detroit income tax returns for tax year 2015. The state did not take any
responsibility for past returns, so there is no direct impact on tax year 2014 returns.
The shift to processing tax returns by the state was not directly related to this
experiment, although both were motivated by a desire by city administrators to
improve the efficiency of tax enforcement. There is no reason to think that nonfilers
in one treatment status had a different level of exposure to this change than nonfilers
with a different treatment status.
1.4 Results
Table 1.5 summarizes the response of nonfilers to mailings in the field experiment. Of
the 7,142 taxpayers in the sample to whom mailings were sent, 450 taxpayers (6.3%)
responded by filing a return within 75 days of the initial mailing. Even though the
mailings only mentioned tax year 2014 specifically, many taxpayers filed returns for
multiple years, such that the number of returns per filer was 1.16.23
Inclusion in the sample was conditional on the city estimating tax due above $350,
but 34% of returns nevertheless claimed a refund.24 Of returns claiming refunds, the
average refund size was $75. About half of the returns that were filed admitted tax
23When a taxpayer calls or visits the tax division, staff instruct the taxpayer to file returns for
all missing years.
24The most common discrepancy between estimated and actual tax due is withholding that
Detroit did not connect with an individual taxpayer. However, many individuals claimed a refund
without enclosing a W2 to prove withholding, and without a W2 the city does not issue a refund.
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Sample size 1,185 1,191 1,191 1,189 1,195 1,191 7,142 2,381
Filers 36 120 58 74 46 116 450 7
Returns filed 39 153 69 83 50 129 523 7
Claiming refund 16 44 19 34 21 41 175 5
Admitting tax due 15 80 37 30 18 62 242 2
Remitting payment 10 44 19 16 10 36 135 1
Total claimed ($) 758 3,092 834 3,367 1,276 3,782 13,109 297
Total admitted ($) 6,183 33,413 11,494 9,388 11,804 19,360 91,642 1,720
Total remitted ($) 5,046 17,237 4,353 2,157 4,278 9,641 42,712 1,690
Filed % of sample 3.0 10.1 4.9 6.2 3.8 9.7 6.3 0.3
Returns per filer 1.08 1.27 1.19 1.12 1.09 1.11 1.16 1.00
Refund % of returns 41.0 28.8 27.5 41.0 42.0 31.8 33.5 71.4
Tax due % of returns 38.5 52.3 53.6 36.1 36.0 48.1 46.3 28.6
Payment % of returns 25.6 28.8 27.5 19.3 20.0 27.9 25.8 14.3
Avg refund claimed ($) 47.38 70.27 43.89 99.03 60.76 92.24 74.91 59.40
Avg due ($) 412.20 417.66 310.65 312.92 655.78 312.26 378.68 860.00
Avg remittance ($) 504.60 391.75 229.11 134.81 427.80 267.81 316.39 1690.00
Claim per letter ($) 0.64 2.60 0.70 2.83 1.07 3.18 1.84 0.12
Due per letter ($) 5.22 28.05 9.65 7.90 9.88 16.26 12.83 0.72
Remit per letter ($) 4.26 14.47 3.65 1.81 3.58 8.09 5.98 0.71
Note: This table reports summary statistics for responses within 75 days of sending the postcard. It includes information
from returns received through the income tax division’s post office box and returns processed by Chase Bank. Initially,
1,200 taxpayers were selected to be sent each of the treatment mailings. A few taxpayers were removed without being
replaced because the city refined its address validity criteria, and a few taxpayers were removed without being replaced
because they filed a tax return shortly before the postcard would have been sent.
due, and on returns that admitted tax due the average due was $379. Taxpayers
are instructed to remit payment along with the return, but only 56% of returns that
admitted tax due were accompanied by a remittance. The average remittance was
$316. The sum of refunds claimed by taxpayers who received mailings was $13,109,
the sum of tax due admitted was $91,642, and the sum of payments remitted was
$42,712.
1.4.1 Response to mailings
Figure 1.1 shows the fraction of sampled suspected resident nonfilers who filed a
return within 75 days of the initial mailing. The penalty salience mailing elicited the
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Figure 1.1: Response rate by treatment status
Note: This figure shows response rates by treatment status, where a response is filing a return
within 75 days of the initial mailing. Standard error bars show 95% confidence intervals. Appendix
Table 1.12 reports summary statistics by treatment status.
highest response rate (10.1%), followed by penalty salience × punishment probability
(9.7%), compliance cost (6.2%), punishment probability (4.9%), civic pride (3.8%),
and contact-only (3.0%) mailings. The individuals in the no-contact control group,
of course, did not receive a letter, and the “response” rate of filers as a percent
of the no-contact sample was 0.3%. Each individual in the no-contact control was
assigned to a batch of outgoing postcards, so a return from a no-contact individual is
considered to be a response if it is received within 75 days of the date the postcards
were sent to that batch, just as if the individual had been sent a postcard.
Table 1.6 reports the estimated effects of sending experimental mailings on re-
sponse rates. In this experiment, estimating the effect of sending experimental mai-
lings on filing behavior is straightforward because suspected resident nonfilers were
randomly selected into treatments. To control for other characteristics that may
impact response rates, treatment effects are estimated using the linear probability
22
model
P[responsei = 1] = α +
∑
βjtreatmentji + γXi, (1.1)
where indicator variables denoting treatment status j (treatmentji ) predict the pro-
bability that taxpayer i filed a return, with responsei equal to one if the taxpayer
filed a return and zero otherwise. A vector of taxpayer characteristics Xi includes
age, filing status, filing history, log income, and a dummy indicator for the presence
of nonwage income. Treatment effects are estimated relative to the excluded no-
contact control condition, in which taxpayers were not sent any mailings. In Table
1.6, the dependent variable is scaled by a factor of 100 so that coefficients can be
read in percentage points.
Column 5 of Table 1.6 reports the response rate to treatment mailings with
the full set of controls. A mailed penalty salience letter raised response rates by
9.9 percentage points relative to the no-contact control, about 3.5 times the effect
of the contact-only letter, which raised response rates by 2.8 percentage points.
A mailed penalty salience × punishment probability letter raised response rates
by 9.5 percentage points, the compliance cost letter by 5.8 percentage points, the
punishment probability letter by 4.6 percentage points, and the civic pride letter by
3.4 percentage points.
Filing history was a significant determinant of response rates. Taxpayers who
had filed a tax year 2012 or 2013 return were 6.5 percentage points more likely
to respond to treatment mailings by filing a return. However, taxpayers who had
previously been identified as suspected resident nonfilers were less likely to respond to
treatment mailings. For each additional year of identification as a suspected resident
nonfiler, the conditional expectation of the response rate was 0.5 percentage points
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Table 1.6: Response by experimental intervention, linear probability model
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Filed Filed Filed Filed Filed
Treatments
Penalty salience 9.78∗∗∗ 9.78∗∗∗ 9.96∗∗∗ 9.76∗∗∗ 9.94∗∗∗
(0.88) (0.87) (0.86) (0.87) (0.86)
Punishment probability 4.58∗∗∗ 4.70∗∗∗ 4.55∗∗∗ 4.57∗∗∗ 4.66∗∗∗
(0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63)
Compliance cost 5.93∗∗∗ 5.92∗∗∗ 5.83∗∗∗ 5.97∗∗∗ 5.86∗∗∗
(0.71) (0.70) (0.70) (0.71) (0.70)
Civic pride 3.56∗∗∗ 3.64∗∗∗ 3.34∗∗∗ 3.60∗∗∗ 3.43∗∗∗
(0.57) (0.57) (0.56) (0.56) (0.56)
Penalty X punishment 9.45∗∗∗ 9.46∗∗∗ 9.46∗∗∗ 9.52∗∗∗ 9.49∗∗∗
(0.87) (0.86) (0.85) (0.86) (0.85)
Contact only 2.74∗∗∗ 2.80∗∗∗ 2.81∗∗∗ 2.79∗∗∗ 2.84∗∗∗




FS = single 2.59∗∗∗ 1.47∗∗∗
(0.45) (0.47)
FS = married filing jointly 4.75∗∗∗ 2.60∗∗∗
(0.92) (0.97)
Years nonfiler -0.38∗∗∗ -0.52∗∗∗
(0.08) (0.09)
Filer in 2012 or 2013 7.98∗∗∗ 6.35∗∗∗
(0.70) (0.69)
Log income 4.32∗∗∗ 1.65∗∗∗
(0.55) (0.58)
Nonwage income dummy 1.64∗∗∗ 0.93∗
(0.50) (0.50)
Mean of dependent variable 4.80 4.81 4.80 4.80 4.81
Observations 9,523 9,508 9,523 9,523 9,508
R2 0.027 0.048 0.056 0.040 0.072
Batch fixed effects X X X X
p-value of F -test on:
Civic pride = Contact only 0.28 0.26 0.47 0.27 0.42
Penalty salience = Sal x Prob 0.78 0.79 0.67 0.84 0.70
Fixed effects joint significance 0.16 0.09 0.14 0.08
Note: This table estimates the response of nonfilers to experimental treatments using ordinary least squares regres-
sions. The dependent variable is a dummy indicator (scaled by 100) for whether the suspected resident nonfiler filed
a city income tax return within 75 days of the initial mailing. Mailings were sent in five batches in April–June 2016.
Age is not observed for 0.2% of taxpayers in the sample. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses.
Coefficients are significantly different from zero at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% significance level.
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lower.
Income was positively associated with response rates. For each point of log in-
come, taxpayers were 1.6 percentage points more likely to respond. Taxpayers with
nonzero nonwage income were 0.9 percentage points more likely to respond. Because
a large portion of tax liability attributable to wage income had withholding, taxpay-
ers with nonwage income are more likely to have net liability substantially different
from zero. Taxpayers with negative nonwage income are likely to be owed a refund,
and taxpayers with positive nonwage income are likely to have tax due. A higher re-
sponse rate of taxpayers with nonzero nonwage income is consistent with an attitude
that filing taxes is more important when there is a substantial net obligation.
1.4.2 Letter delivery and response to postcard
Many intended recipients never received the treatment letter. Table 1.7 reports the
delivery status according to the USPS tracking website six months after the letters
were sent. Across all treatments, 55.3% of letters had a status of delivered, 25.8%
were listed as unclaimed, 11.5% were listed as undeliverable, and 7.3% were listed
as in transit. The volume of letters that were still listed in some stage of transit six
months after the letters were sent is an indication of reporting error. Letters with a
status of delivered or unclaimed had valid addresses or active forwarding addresses
and were capable of being delivered. Letters with a status of undeliverable had
invalid addresses or inactive forwarding addresses.
A potentially interesting treatment effect is the impact of receiving a treatment
message, but estimation of this effect is not straightforward. Because the letter was
sent via certified mail, we know the subsample of taxpayers to whom the letter was
reported on the USPS tracking website as delivered. However, treated taxpayers
were first sent a postcard and then a letter via certified mail, so they had an oppor-
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Table 1.7: Nonfiler letter delivery rates
Delivery status
Treatment status Delivered Unclaimed Undeliverable In transit Total
Contact only 662 55.9% 285 24.1% 149 12.6% 89 7.5% 1,185 100.0%
Penalty salience 670 56.3% 294 24.7% 136 11.4% 91 7.6% 1,191 100.0%
Punishment probability 658 55.2% 334 28.0% 132 11.1% 67 5.6% 1,191 100.0%
Compliance cost 621 52.2% 311 26.2% 168 14.1% 89 7.5% 1,189 100.0%
Civic pride 643 53.8% 343 28.7% 128 10.7% 81 6.8% 1,195 100.0%
Salience X probability 697 58.5% 279 23.4% 110 9.2% 105 8.8% 1,191 100.0%
Total 3,951 55.3% 1,846 25.8% 823 11.5% 522 7.3% 7,142 100.0%
Note: This table reports the delivery status of certified letters according to the USPS tracking website. The F-
statistic for equality of delivery rates (delivered % of sample) is 2.24, which is significant at the 5% level. Appendix
Table 1.13 reports summary statistics by delivery status.
tunity to decline to authorize delivery of the letter after viewing the postcard, which
also had the treatment message and may have induced selection into the delivered
subsample. The F-statistic for equality of delivery rates is 2.24, rejecting the null
of equal delivery rates at the 5% level. In consideration of possible selection into
receipt of the treatment letter, I focus on the effect of an intent to treat, meaning
the response rate among the entire sample of suspected resident nonfilers. This can
be interpreted as a lower bound on the effect of receiving a treatment message.
In addition to its influence on the rate at which taxpayers authorized delivery of
the treatment letter, the postcard also influenced taxpayer behavior directly. The
cumulative response rate over time in Figure 1.2 shows that some taxpayers respon-
ded to the postcard by filing a return almost immediately, even before the letter was
sent a week later. Most returns were filed between 15 and 60 days after the postcard
was sent, and very few returns were filed after 75 days. The time pattern of responses
was similar across treatment groups, except for the returns filed in response to the
compliance cost mailings. The cumulative response rate to the compliance cost mai-
lings was the lowest of all treatment mailings until about 30 days after the postcard
was sent, then it rose over the following 15 days to be the third highest response rate.
This is likely because the compliance cost postcard announced that the letter would
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Figure 1.2: Cumulative response by treatment status
Note: These graphs show the cumulative percent of taxpayers who filed returns. The vertical axis
is percent of sample, and the horizontal axis is days elapsed since the date on which the postcard
was sent.
enclose a blank tax form, and some taxpayers waited for the blank tax form to be
delivered before taking action to respond. The contact-only response rate was zero
until a full two weeks after the postcard was sent. This suggests people may not have
read or seen the postcard, because the only responses were after the letter arrived.
That was the only treatment without a boxed message on the postcard and letter,
so it is possible that the box itself, regardless of the content, attracted attention.
1.4.3 Response quality
Some types of responses are better than others from an enforcement perspective. For
example, a filed return accompanied by a remittance is better for net revenue from
enforcement efforts than a filed return that claims a refund. This section reports
treatment effects along several dimensions of response quality: the propensity of a
filed return to claim a refund or admit tax due, the number of returns per filer, and
the dollar amount of net tax due.
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Figure 1.3 decomposes cumulative response rates by treatment according to whet-
her the taxpayer had negative or positive net tax due. For the subgroup with positive
net tax due, there is a large gap between the two treatments that included the penalty
salience message and the four treatments that did not. However, for the subgroup
that claimed a refund, the compliance cost treatment elicited nearly the same re-
sponse rate as the penalty salience treatments. This was likely a composition effect:
The compliance cost treatment was as effective as the penalty salience treatment
among taxpayers who were owed a refund, but the compliance cost treatment was
no more effective than the punishment probability treatment among taxpayers who
had tax due.
The penalty salience mailings elicited more returns per filer and more remitted
dollars than other treatments. Table 1.5 shows that the penalty salience mailing
elicited 1.27 returns per filer, whereas the other mailings elicited just 1.08 to 1.19
returns per filer. The number of returns per filer may have been mediated by direct
contact with the tax authority. Taxpayers in the penalty salience treatment group
were relatively more likely to call or visit the tax division, and taxpayers who called or
visited the tax division were instructed by staff to file all delinquent returns including
for tax years other than 2014.
Table 1.5 also shows that taxpayers admitted tax due of $28.05 on average in
response to the penalty salience mailings but just $5.22 to $16.26 in response to the
other mailings. Similarly, taxpayers remitted $14.47 on average in response to the
penalty salience mailings but just $1.81 to $8.09 in response to the other mailings.
The difference in remittances and admitted tax due is largely attributable to the
difference in response rates. However, the penalty salience × punishment probability
mailings elicited nearly the same response rate as the penalty salience mailings but
still had substantially lower remittances. The average dollar figures are sensitive to
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Figure 1.3: Cumulative response by treatment status and net tax due
(a) Claiming refunds
(b) Admitting tax due
These graphs show the cumulative response rate. The vertical axis is percent of sample, and the
horizontal axis is days elapsed since the date on which the postcard was sent. Panel (a) shows the
cumulative percent of taxpayers who filed returns claiming a refund. Panel (b) shows the
cumulative percent of taxpayers who filed returns admitting tax due.
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outliers, so the response rates are measured more precisely.
1.4.4 Heterogeneity of response
A particular treatment message could be effective for eliciting a return from some
taxpayers and not others. Similarly, nonfiler letters overall could be well-suited as
an enforcement tool for some taxpayers and poorly-suited for others. To inform
the welfare and policy discussion, this section examines heterogeneous response to
treatment with respect to filing history, age, and income.25
Taxpayers who were identified as nonfilers from federal returns in more years were
less likely to respond to experimental mailings. Figure 1.4 shows that this pattern
holds across treatments, and it is more pronounced in the treatments that elicited
higher response rates.
Older taxpayers responded to experimental mailings at higher rates than younger
taxpayers. This was true across all treatments, and the gap was larger for the more
effective mailings. To examine the heterogeneity by age, Figure 1.5a plots a fractional
polynomial regression of response rate on age within each treatment.26 Taxpayers
under age 40 had a response rate below 10% for the penalty and penalty salience ×
punishment probability treatments and below 5% for the other treatments. Response
rates appear to be convex in age, such that response rates increase from age 40 to
50 and increase by even more from age 50 to age 60. By age 70, more than 20% of
mailings elicit a return.27
Income is highly correlated with age, so it is not surprising that response rates
25Appendix Table 1.14 reports response rates by history, age, income, filing status, and treatment
batch.
26Fractional polynomial regressions find the best fitting polynomial from a predefined set of
powers that includes noninteger powers (Royston and Altman 1994). I use the predefined set of
powers {-2, -1, -.5, 0, .5, 1, 2, 3}.
27Pension income is not taxable for Detroit city income tax. Some taxpayers over age 65 are
pensioners, but others are among the highest active earners.
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Note: This figure estimates response rate by income using a fractional polynomial regression of
response on income.
are higher for taxpayers with higher incomes. This is again true across treatment
groups but more pronounced in the more effective treatments. Figure 1.5b plots
response rates by income for each of the mailing treatments. The penalty and penalty
salience× punishment probability treatments elicited higher response rates even from
taxpayers earning less than $30K, whereas most of the gains from the compliance
cost and punishment treatments came among taxpayers earning more than $40K,
and the civic pride treatment only raised response rates considerably above $50K.
The contact-only letter was not much more effective with higher-income taxpayers
than with lower-income taxpayers.
The penalty salience message was the most effective overall, and it was also the
most effective within most identifiable subgroups. Figure 1.6 compares the response
rates to the penalty salience mailings with the response rates to the penalty salience×
punishment probability mailings within age-income-filing history bins. The penalty
salience message tended to elicit higher response rates in the same bins as the penalty
salience × punishment probability message. A bubble above the 45 degree line
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Figure 1.5: Heterogeneity of response
(a) Age
(b) Income
This figure shows heterogeneity of response rates with respect to age and income. Panel (a) plots
a fractional polynomial regression of response rate on age within each treatment. Panel (b) plots
a fractional polynomial regression of response rate on income within each treatment. The
fractional polynomial regressions find the best fitting polynomial from the predefined set of
powers {-2, -1, -.5, 0, .5, 1, 2, 3}.
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Figure 1.6: Response rate by age-income-filing history bin
Note: This figure compares response rates to the penalty salience mailings with response rates
to the penalty salience × punishment probability mailings within age-income-filing history bins.
Appendix Figure 1.10 shows the analogous comparison with other treatments. Appendix Table
1.15 reports response rates by treatment and age-income-filing history bin. For defining bins, the
three age categories are below 30, 30–50, and above 50. The four income categories are below $25K,
$25K–$35K, $35K–$50K, and above $50K. The three filing history categories are 1–2 years, 3–5
years, and 6–9 years identified as a suspected resident nonfiler.
indicates a bin for which the penalty salience × punishment probability message
was more effective than the penalty salience message. Those bins are candidates for
message targeting by demographics. However, the bins for which the response rate
is substantially above the 45 degree line are small and thus less precisely measured.
The large bins above the 45 degree line are still pretty close to the 45 degree line,
so there is not a strong case for using the interaction message with some bins rather
than the penalty salience message. The analogous comparisons in Appendix Figure
1.10 lead to the same conclusion, that the penalty salience message is better with
most bins and never substantially worse than any of the other treatment messages.
The effects of age, income, filing history, and treatment status appear to be
positive even when they are all at play. The response rates by age-income-filing
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history bin reported in Appendix Table 1.15 are higher for older taxpayers, higher-
income taxpayers, and taxpayers with less history of nonfiling. The highest response
rate by a bin to a treatment, 39% to the penalty salience treatment, was by the bin
of taxpayers with all three of those characteristics: over age 50 with more than $50K
income who had been identified as a suspected resident nonfiler fewer than three
times. The tax authority could thus raise response rates above what was achieved in
the sample for any experimental treatment by refining the criteria it uses to contact
nonfilers.
1.4.5 Network effects
This section investigates behavioral responses of untreated taxpayers to the expe-
rimental mailings. The mailings could have influenced the behavior of untreated
taxpayers if, for example, recipients of experimental mailings told their neighbors,
relatives, or coworkers that they had been contacted by Detroit’s income tax divi-
sion. Even a small effect per neighbor can add up to a substantial impact if treated
taxpayers have many network connections. In other enforcement contexts, network
effects like this appear to be important.28
I find weak evidence of a negative geographic spillover effect from penalty sa-
lience and punishment probability mailings. For each treated nonfiler, including the
no-contact control group, I calculate the number of untreated neighbors within 50
meters who filed a return between May 2 and August 27, from 15 days after the
first experimental postcard was sent until 75 days after the final experimental pos-
tcard was sent. I geocoded the addresses of all treated taxpayers and all untreated
28Drago, Mengel, and Traxler (2015) find that, when a sample of potential evaders of TV license
fees were sent a letter, their untreated neighbors who did not receive a letter were more likely to
comply with the fee. Boning et al. (2016) examine network effects of enforcement letters and site
visits among firms, where the networks are defined by geography or common tax preparers.
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Table 1.8: Untreated neighbor responses to treatment
(1) (2) (3)
<25m <50m <100m
Contact only 0.036 0.021 0.041
(0.154) (0.120) (0.083)
Penalty salience -0.097 -0.122 -0.025
(0.158) (0.123) (0.085)
Punishment probability -0.124 -0.117 0.074
(0.163) (0.126) (0.084)
Compliance cost 0.060 0.017 0.009
(0.153) (0.120) (0.084)
Civic pride 0.076 0.049 -0.027
(0.157) (0.121) (0.086)
Salience × probability -0.302∗ -0.221∗ -0.129
(0.165) (0.127) (0.087)
Pseudo-R2 0.0015 0.0010 0.0005
Observations 9,274 9,274 9,274
Note: This table reports results from a negative binomial regression of the number of untreated
neighbors who filed a return from an address within x meters of an individual in the sample on
the treatment dummies. Heteroskedasticity robust standard errors in parentheses. Coefficients are
significantly different from zero at the *10%, **5%, or ***1% significance level.
taxpayers who filed a return during the relevant time period, then computed the
distance between every treated nonfiler-untreated taxpayer pair. I then regress the
count of untreated taxpayers who filed during the relevant time period on treatment
dummies, where an observation is a treated nonfiler. Table 1.8 shows that most
of the estimated coefficients on treatment dummies were not statistically different
from zero. The penalty salience × punishment probability treatment is significant at
the 10% level, but significance is not robust to alternative distances. I repeated the
procedure for a variety of distances, including 25, 50, and 100 meters. If taxpayers
told their neighbors that they received mailings from the tax division, neighbors may
have interpreted that as a sign that they would be warned by mail prior to receiving
any sort of punishment.
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1.5 Normative analysis
Would it be worthwhile for Detroit to send mailings to one additional suspected
resident nonfiler? In this section I estimate that the direct expected welfare effect
of nonfiler mailings is negative for all treatments, conditional on the exact selection
criteria in the experiment. I then discuss the sensitivity of the direct welfare estimate
to parameter assumptions and identify modifications to the selection criteria that
would make mailings welfare-enhancing.
A tax authority that aims to maximize welfare should consider the effect of en-
forcement actions on the private well-being of individual taxpayers. Tax revenue
is assumed to be spent on public goods that are valued by individual taxpayers.
However, when the tax authority collects tax from an individual taxpayer, that tax-
payer faces private compliance costs and also loses the ability to use the collected
tax for private consumption. The tax authority should compare the expected mar-
ginal benefit of public goods to taxpayers with the expected marginal private costs
to individual taxpayers. This welfare analysis therefore combines three components:
expected marginal revenue net of administrative costs, expected marginal private
cost, and the marginal social value of public spending.
Adapting the optimal enforcement condition from Keen and Slemrod (2016) to
the present context, a tax authority should send mailings to a nonfiler if the expected





−∆Private cost > 0 (1.2)
The expression inside the brackets is expected marginal revenue net of administrative
costs. The marginal social value of public spending, expressed by the parameter
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φ, converts tax-authority dollars to privately-held dollars. If collecting tax is ever
worthwhile, then one dollar held by the tax authority has more social value than
one dollar held by an individual taxpayer, so φ > 1. The expression for net welfare
therefore weights administrative costs more heavily than private costs. Note that
foregone consumption appears twice—once as revenue and once as a component of
private cost.
One assumption in this framework is that the individual marginal utility per
dollar is constant across individual taxpayers. It would be natural to consider an
alternative model with heterogeneous individual marginal utility per dollar, for exam-
ple with high marginal utility per dollar for low income taxpayers and low marginal
utility per dollar for high income taxpayers. However, such a model would require
additional assumptions to map income onto marginal utility. Furthermore, if the
tax base and rates were chosen optimally, then they would already incorporate con-
siderations of heterogeneous marginal utility. For transparency and simplicity this
welfare analysis equates marginal utility per dollar across taxpayers.
A second assumption is that the marginal social value of public spending is con-
stant. The social value of spending is the sum of the valuations of individual tax-
payers. Again, there is a natural alternative assumption, that there are diminishing
marginal returns to public spending, i.e. that the social value of spending is concave.
Constant marginal social value of public spending is a reasonable local approximation
that simplifies the analysis.
Expected net welfare per mailing is estimated in Table 1.9 separately for each
experimental treatment. Remittances are a large and important part of marginal
revenue, but not the only part. They are offset by refunds, which are issued when
withholding exceeds tax liability. Also, some tax debt which is not remitted with a
tax return will eventually be recovered as a result of these mailings. Overall, marginal
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Remit per letter [1] 4.26 14.47 3.65 1.81 3.58 8.09
Tax debt recovered [2] 0.19 2.72 1.20 1.22 1.26 1.63
Refund issued [3] 0.51 2.08 0.56 2.27 0.85 2.54
Marginal revenue [4] = [1] + [2] - [3] 3.94 15.11 4.29 0.76 3.99 7.19
Cost of mailings [5] 4.70 4.70 4.70 4.70 4.70 4.70
Processing responses [6] 0.73 2.41 1.17 1.49 0.92 2.33
Net revenue [7] = [4] - [5] - [6] -1.49 8.00 -1.57 -5.43 -1.64 0.15
Social value [8] = φ× [7] -2.23 12.00 -2.36 -8.14 -2.45 0.23
Private cost [9] 7.74 27.71 10.38 8.54 8.80 19.36
Net welfare [10] = [8] - [9] -9.97 -15.71 -12.74 -16.68 -11.25 -19.13
Note: All units are dollars per mailing. Refunds that are claimed are not always paid, e.g. if the taxpayer does not
submit a W2, so refund issued is assumed to be 80% of claimed refund per letter. Similarly, admitted tax debt is
not always collected, so tax debt recovered is assumed to be 20% of admitted due per letter that is not remitted with
the return. Marginal revenue is equal to remit per letter plus tax debt recovered minus refund issued. Net revenue
is equal to marginal revenue minus the cost of mailings per nonfiler ($4.70, details in Appendix Table 1.16) and the
cost of processing responses (one hour per taxpayer valued at $23.95 per hour). Social value of spending is equal to
the marginal value of public spending (φ) times net revenue, with φ = 1.5 in the baseline estimate. Private cost is
calculated as foregone private consumption (equal to marginal revenue) plus compliance costs of $125 per filer. Net
welfare is social value minus private cost.
revenue is equal to remittance plus recovered tax debt minus refunds issued.
Marginal administrative costs include (1) the cost of mailings and (2) the cost of
processing responses. The marginal cost of mailings per nonfiler is estimated to be
$4.70. Appendix Table 1.16 shows the components of the marginal cost of mailings,
including materials, time, and postage. The administrative cost of processing returns
is assumed to be one hour per taxpayer who files a return, with time valued at $23.95
per hour, the hourly equivalent of the top annual salary of a Detroit tax examiner.29
The postage and staff time required for sending the letters via certified mail was
about 80% of the marginal cost of mailings per nonfiler.
Marginal net revenue per nonfiler is positive in the penalty salience treatment
and the penalty salience × punishment probability treatment. The row of Table 1.9
labeled net revenue subtracts the marginal cost of mailings per nonfiler from col-
29The amount of processing time per taxpayer is based on conversations between the author
and tax division staff. The salary of a Detroit tax examiner is from the following publication:
White Book, 2016-2017 Salary and Wage Adjustments, March 2016, page 63, available at http:
//www.detroitmi.gov/how-do-i/view-city-of-detroit-reports.
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lections net of administrative costs. Net revenue is $8.00 per nonfiler in the penalty
salience treatment, $0.15 per nonfiler in the penalty salience × punishment probabi-
lity treatment, and negative for the other treatments.
The marginal social value of public spending φ is the economic return to pu-
blic spending, excluding administrative and compliance costs. Cellini, Ferreira, and
Rothstein (2010) estimate this parameter is 1.5 for infrastructure spending in public
school districts in California, arguing that school infrastructure is a local public good
that ought to be reflected in home prices. In a jurisdiction with limited fiscal capacity
such as Detroit, the marginal social value of public spending could be much higher
if budget constraints force the city to forego projects that would be highly valued
by constituents. I use 1.5 in my baseline estimate of welfare and perform alternative
calculations with 1.1 and 4.5.
Marginal private cost includes foregone private consumption and compliance
costs. Foregone private consumption is equal to net revenue, which is positive for a
taxpayer who remits tax, negative for a taxpayer who receives a refund, and positive
on average for all treatments. Compliance costs are not directly observed. The city
income tax form for Detroit residents, Form D-1040(R), is comparable in length and
complexity to federal Form 1040EZ, which the IRS estimates imposes an average
burden of 5 hours and $40 per taxpayer.30 The baseline estimate of welfare assumes
the compliance costs for the city income tax form are equal to that IRS estimate of
compliance costs for Form 1040EZ: $125 per taxpayer who files a return, equal to 5
hours at $17 per hour—the hourly equivalent of the average annual income in the
sample—plus $40.
The baseline estimate of $125 per taxpayer could overstate or understate true
30The IRS burden estimate is in 1040a Instructions 2015, available at https://www.irs.gov/
pub/irs-pdf/i1040a.pdf.
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compliance costs. The $125 estimate would overstate compliance costs if income is
earned at a lower wage rate by working more hours, or if the marginal compliance
burden is lower because there is a fixed cost of tax preparation that was already paid
in order to file a federal return. The $125 estimate would understate compliance costs
if income is earned by a part-time worker or if preparing tax forms is more unpleasant
and psychologically costly than typical work, as argued by Benzarti (2015) in the
context of itemizing federal deductions. In addition to the $125 per taxpayer baseline,
I perform alternative welfare calculations with $25 and $250 as the compliance cost
per taxpayer who files a return.
Net welfare is estimated to be negative for all treatments under the baseline as-
sumptions. The net effect was between minus $10 and minus $20 per letter. The
social value of net revenue is not large enough to offset foregone private consump-
tion and compliance costs. If compliance costs are truly as large as in the baseline
estimate, then even for an average taxpayer who responds by filing a return, the net
effect on welfare is negative. The welfare effect estimated here is direct in the sense
that it considers mailings in isolation rather than simultaneously with other enfor-
cement tools and in the sense that it does not consider specific or general deterrence
effects.
The effect of mailings on net welfare is sensitive to assumptions about certifica-
tion, the marginal social value of public spending, and compliance costs. Certification
may have raised response rates if recipients took the letter more seriously, but cer-
tification may have reduced response rates if fewer intended recipients received the
letter. It is therefore informative to consider a scenario in which certification was
neutral and the same response rates could be obtained at lower cost without certifica-
tion. Table 1.10 reports welfare calculations per letter for each treatment excluding
the cost of certification and using alternative assumptions about the marginal social
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φ = 1.1 $25 -2.23 -4.71 -3.13 -4.18 -2.63 -5.34
φ = 1.1 $125 -5.27 -14.79 -8.00 -10.40 -6.47 -15.08
φ = 1.1 $250 -9.07 -27.37 -14.09 -18.19 -11.28 -27.26
φ = 1.5 $25 -1.33 -0.02 -2.27 -4.85 -1.79 -3.78
φ = 1.5 $125 -4.37 -10.09 -7.14 -11.08 -5.63 -13.52
φ = 1.5 $250 -8.17 -22.68 -13.23 -18.87 -10.43 -25.70
φ = 4.5 $25 5.42 35.20 4.21 -9.92 4.54 7.89
φ = 4.5 $125 2.38 25.13 -0.66 -16.15 0.70 -1.85
φ = 4.5 $250 -1.42 12.54 -6.75 -23.94 -4.10 -14.03
Note: This table reports welfare estimates in units of dollars per mailing using the procedure from Table 1.9 with
alternative parameter assumptions. Three assumptions are changed. First, the cost of certification is removed from
the cost of mailings, so that the cost of mailings is $0.96. Second, the marginal social value of spending is assumed
to be 1.1, 1.5, or 4.5, as indicated in column 1. Third, the compliance cost per taxpayer is assumed to be $25, $125,
or $250, as indicated in column 2.
value of public spending (φ = 1.1, 1.5, 4.5) and compliance costs ($25, $125, $250).
In the most optimistic scenario, with φ = 4.5 and compliance costs of just $25, each
penalty salience mailing raised welfare by $35.20.
This analysis omits two potentially important channels by which nonfiler mailings
could affect welfare. First, sampled taxpayers may comply at a higher rate in the
future (specific deterrence). Second, other taxpayers may comply at a higher rate if
they infer that Detroit is increasing its enforcement capability (general deterrence).
If the mailings have a specific or general deterrence effect, then the estimates of
marginal revenue and marginal compliance cost are too low.
If the most effective treatment, the penalty salience treatment, had been applied
to the entire population of nonfilers that fit the sample selection criteria, then the city
would have collected net revenue of $342,000. This is inferred from a simple back-
of-the-envelope calculation multiplying the number of taxpayers who fit the sample
selection criteria (42,754) by the net revenue per letter ($8.00). If the marginal
social value of public spending is sufficiently high, then mailings sent to nonfilers
who fit the selection criteria also improve welfare. Under the baseline assumptions,
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nonfiler mailings using the selection criteria from this experiment did not improve
welfare. However, the income threshold can be refined such that mailings would
generate expected marginal revenue that is high enough to outweigh administrative
and compliance costs and thereby to improve welfare.
Large administrative and compliance costs set a high bar for the expected mar-
ginal revenue required for a worthwhile intervention. Suppose that all suspected
resident nonfilers respond to nonfiler mailings by filing a return. Rearranging Equa-
tion 1.2 and substituting the baseline assumptions, a welfare-improving enforcement










> (3)(4.70 + 23.95) + (2)(125) = 335.95.
This condition provides a benchmark expected marginal revenue threshold for welfare-
improving nonfiler mailings. Adjusting the benchmark for a 10% response rate, so
that the administrative cost also includes the cost of mailings that do not elicit
responses, the expected marginal revenue threshold is $462.85.
Under these assumptions, nonfiler mailings sent to taxpayers with sufficiently high
income improve welfare. The income level that corresponds to the expected marginal
revenue threshold is higher to the extent that taxpayers remit only a fraction of
net liability and to the extent that withholding is imperfectly observed. For most
taxpayers, Gross liability = t(Y − 600 · Exemptions), where Y is income and t is a
tax rate of 2.4% for residents. If withholding is zero, then net liability is equal to
gross liability, and net liability of $463 corresponds to an income level of $20,492 for
a taxpayer with two exemptions. Among taxpayers who filed a return in response to
treatment mailings, marginal revenue was 64% of net liability, so income of $32,019
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would be required to generate expected marginal revenue of $463. For welfare-
improving mailings, this would be a reasonable income threshold for taxpayers with
only nonwage income and no withholding.
However, taxpayers with wage income are likely to have withholding, so a lar-
ger income threshold is required to generate the same level of expected marginal
revenue. Among taxpayers who filed a return in response to treatment mailings
and had only wage income, net liability was 22% of gross liability. For suspected
resident nonfilers with only wage income, an income level of $145,540 would the-
refore correspond to expected marginal revenue of $463. The decomposition here,
Expected marginal revenuei = Marginal revenueNet liability ·
Net liability
Gross liability · t(Yi − 600 · Exemptionsi),
highlights the difference between net and gross liability for taxpayers who earned
wage income and were likely to have unobserved withholding.
Response rates are an important component of administrative costs with addi-
tional potential for refining selection criteria. As noted earlier in the discussion of
the expected marginal revenue threshold, the administrative cost of sending letters is
effectively higher if many letters go unanswered. When letters elicit a 10% response
rate, eliciting one response requires postage for sending 10 letters. The population
examined by the field experiment included taxpayers who the city estimated owed at
least $350, without regard to age, income level, income composition, or filing history.
My analysis suggests that the city could reduce administrative costs by focusing on
higher-yield demographics. Older taxpayers, higher-income taxpayers, and taxpayers
who had been identified fewer times as nonfilers had higher response rates. These
effects appear to operate even when they are all present, such that taxpayers with
all of the higher-response characteristics have particularly high response rates.
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1.6 Discussion
This paper is part of a rapidly expanding literature that uses controlled field ex-
periments to improve tax compliance.31 These experiments are motivated by the
twin recognitions that (1) rationality is limited in its ability to describe actual hu-
man behavior (DellaVigna 2009; McCaffery and Slemrod 2006) and (2) controlled
field experiments are the best available method for understanding tax compliance
behavior (Angrist and Pischke 2010; Slemrod and Weber 2012; Hallsworth 2014).
Deterrence parameters. Traditional deterrence parameters are the basis for many
tax experiment treatments, yet even those treatments are behavioral. In the cano-
nical model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), taking the tax rate as given, the tax
authority needs only to set a penalty and a probability. However, in addition to
those deterrence parameters, actual taxpayer behavior is mediated by the salience
of the tax (Finkelstein 2009; Chetty, Looney, and Kroft 2009), the salience of the
penalty, and beliefs about the probability of being caught (Alm 2012). Furthermore,
nonfinanicial penalties like shaming are clearly grounded in the traditional deter-
rence parameters but rely on social preferences that are outside the scope of strict
rationality (Perez-Truglia and Troiano 2015).
The response to the penalty salience message in this experiment suggests that
compliance can be induced by a threat even if that threat is merely implicit. Based on
evidence that taxpayers in other contexts—filers, delinquents, corporations—respond
to threats, it would have been reasonable to guess that income tax nonfilers would
respond to a message about the penalty for failing to file a tax return. The penalty
salience message in this experiment is typically understood as an implicit threat: If
you do not file a return, you will be fined or sent to jail. However, the message
31Mascagni (2016) reviews tax experiments and develops a taxonomy of tax treatments which I
adopt.
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itself did not actually promise any action; it stated a fact about a legal statute that
had not been enforced in many years. That contrasts with “threat” treatments in
other recent experiments that explicitly promise action against the taxpayer (Fellner,
Sausgruber, and Traxler 2013; Castro and Scartascini 2015; Chirico et al. 2015). Tax
administrators might prefer the somewhat more “courteous” frame of information
salience if the two messages are equally effective, although the potency of the message
may depend on whether the information is perceived as a threat.
Information reporting. The second deterrence parameter, the probability of being
caught, is closely linked with third-party information reporting. In Detroit, the “third
party” that enabled the tax authority to tailor the punishment probability message
with information about the individual nonfiler’s federal income was the Internal
Revenue Service. Information reporting has been linked to the ability of taxpayers
to evade and the effectiveness of enforcement (Kleven et al. 2011; Naritomi 2013;
Pomeranz 2015).
This experiment is one of a handful that attempts to influence the perceived
probability of punishment by referring to information the tax authority has about
the taxpayer. Brockmeyer et al. (2016) and Bott et al. (2014) both found that in-
forming taxpayers—nonfiling firms or individuals with misreported foreign income,
respectively—that the tax authority uses third-party information to identify sources
of income had a positive effect on compliance even when the information itself was
not revealed. It is possible that the punishment probability message in this experi-
ment could have been even more effective by referencing the existence and source of
information—the taxpayer’s federal income according to the IRS—rather than revea-
ling the information. Haynes et al. (2013) found that text messages to a fine-owing
delinquent were more effective with an amount than just a reminder, but that inclu-
ding the delinquent’s name in the text message was even better than the name and
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amount together. This is in some ways parallel to the results from this experiment in
Detroit, where the penalty salience message elicited a response rate that was above
but not statistically different from the penalty salience and punishment probability
messages combined.
Compliance costs. Compliance costs are almost certainly large (Benzarti 2015;
Guyton et al. 2003) and just as closely related to traditional economic incentives
as deterrence parameters (Erard and Ho 2001), but they have not received much
experimental attention. Hasseldine et al. (2007) found no effect of offering assistance
to sole proprietors, which they attribute to the fact that most sole proprietors use
paid tax preparers. The finding in Detroit that providing a blank tax form and
return envelope raises response rates of nonfilers, but with lower quality responses
than other treatments, is the first of its kind. However, several tax experiments have
attempted to reduce compliance costs in other ways. Guyton et al. (2016) found that
reminders raise compliance rates. Bhargava and Manoli (2015) found that reducing
the complexity of informational mailings improved takeup of the Earned Income Tax
Credit, but attempts to reduce program stigma failed to improve takeup.
Moral appeals. This experiment adds to the bulk of the evidence against the ef-
fectiveness of moral appeals. I include in this category messages about a “compliant
majority” of other taxpayers, messages about the “public services” that taxes fund,
and messages that refer to general principles of equity or fairness. Most of these
messages do not appear to be as effective as messages related to deterrence para-
meters. The only similar message to the civic pride message in this experiment was
a “national pride” message tested by Kettle et al. (2016) on corporate and profits
nonfilers in Guatemala. They also found no impact on the rate of payment. Perhaps
people with whom a message about civic pride would succeed had already filed their
tax returns. Against accumulating evidence to the contrary, Hallsworth et al. (2014)
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find that certain moral appeals do enhance tax compliance. With the benefit of a
very large sample, they tested many fairly similar messages. I interpret their findings
as strong evidence that small changes in wording—seemingly insignificant, with no
relationship to traditional economic incentives—can have a surprisingly large impact
on behavior, probably through framing or reference effects. For instance, Hallsworth
et al. (2014) found that, all else equal, replacing “nine out of ten” with “88%” raised
a response rate to a compliant majority message by two percentage points.
Social learning. The social learning literature has provided ample theoretical and
empirical grounds for expecting diffusion of technology and allocation of jobs (Glaeser
1999; Conley and Udry 2010; Mobius and Rosenblat 2014), but there is relatively
little evidence of social learning about tax. Drago, Mengel, and Traxler (2015) found
that letters about television license fees to households in rural Austria improved
compliance behavior of geographically proximate untreated households. Failure to
find spillover effects in Detroit could be attributed to differences in rural and urban
communication norms; people in an urban setting like Detroit might learn from
coworkers, friends and family rather than geographic neighbors. Or Detroit residents
might not be discussing tax at all. Social workers and journalists seem to think it
is self-evident that people are reluctant to discuss money (Trachtman 1999; Taylor
2014; Kadlec 2016), although Duflo and Saez (2003) do find social learning through
coworkers in the context of retirement saving. There could be stigma associated with
failure to pay income tax that is not present for retirement saving.
Fiscal capacity. The success of targeted messaging for improving tax compliance
would be particularly helpful for tax authorities like Detroit with constrained fiscal
capacity. Constrained fiscal capacity is particularly common in developing economies
(Besley and Persson 2013). Finding effective, low-cost enforcement tools, like the
penalty salience message in this experiment, could be a boon to tax administration
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with constrained fiscal capacity. However, it is possible that the lessons learned in
Detroit might not be generalizable to all taxpayers or all fiscally constrained tax aut-
horities. The City of Detroit has unusual challenges of tax administration, including
with income tax and also property tax (Hodge et al. 2016). The fact that higher-
income taxpayers in Detroit had higher response rates in the experiment suggests
that the lessons learned here may be more applicable to taxpayers in higher-income
jurisdictions than in fiscally-constrained jurisdictions with lower-income taxpayers.
1.7 Conclusion
This paper tested the efficacy of messages related to penalty salience, punishment
probability, compliance cost, and civic pride for improving tax compliance among
income tax nonfilers. Informing taxpayers of a statutory penalty for failing to file a
return elicited higher filing rates, more returns per filer, more admitted tax due, and
more remittances than any other message. Even though both penalty salience and
punishment probability were individually effective relative to the contact-only mai-
lings, interacting these two treatments was no more effective, indeed less effective,
than the penalty salience message by itself. This is inconsistent with the theoretical
prediction that penalty salience and punishment probability should have a positive in-
teraction. The interaction may have exhibited no improvement over penalty salience
by itself because (1) the effectiveness of the penalty salience message depended on its
simplicity, or (2) the penalty salience message had already exhausted the channel of
affecting taxpayer behavior through perceived probability of punishment. Enclosing
a blank tax form and return envelope was effective in eliciting higher response rates,
but the quality of responses to the compliance cost treatment was lower in the sense
that taxpayers were more likely to claim a refund and less likely to admit tax due.
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The response rate to the civic pride treatment was not statistically different from
the contact-only control group.
Controlled experiments are the best available method for evaluating behavioral
responses to tax enforcement. Many tax experiments have attempted to influence
the perception of standard deterrence parameters: penalty and probability. The con-
trolled experiment described in this paper tested the response to similar deterrence
parameter treatments by income tax nonfilers, who have received relatively little
attention in the literature. This experiment provides the first evidence about civic
pride among city taxpayers, and it tests a novel approach to addressing compliance
costs—providing a blank tax form.
I find that a single sentence, strategically placed in mailings to attract attention,
can have an economically meaningful impact on tax filing behavior. Tax experiments
like this one are helping to build an understanding of compliance behavior. However,
even subtle treatment differences can affect taxpayer responses, and techniques that
are individually effective can interact in surprising ways. Building experimental
variation into tax enforcement is a valuable way of exploring compliance behavior
and making enforcement more efficient, which should be particularly helpful for tax
authorities with limited fiscal capacity.
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1.8 Appendix
Figure 1.7: Google Trends search index for Detroit, Columbus, and Cincinnati income
tax
Source: Google Trends.
Note: This figure compares search interest in “Detroit income tax” to corresponding search
terms for Columbus and Cincinnati. Columbus has approximately the same population as
Detroit but a much smaller metropolitan area. Cincinnati has a larger population in the city
proper and about half of the population in the metropolitan area.
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PERMIT NO. XXXX 
CITY OF DETROIT 
OFFICE OF THE CFO 
OFFICE OF THE TREASURY 
INCOME TAX BRANCH 
COMPLIANCE UNIT 
2 WOODWARD AVE 
SUITE 130 







DETROIT MI 48226-0000  
In a few days, you will receive a letter about filing a tax return 
with the City of Detroit. The following income is taxable by the 
City: wages, salaries, business income, capital income. 
 
Tax forms and filing instructions may be found in Room 130 at the 




Failure to file a tax return is a misdemeanor punishable by a 




  CITY OF DETROIT COLEMAN A. YOUNG 
  OFFICE OF THE CHIEF FINANCIAL OFFICER MUNICIPAL CENTER 
  OFFICE OF THE TREASURY 2 WOODWARD AVENUE, SUITE 130 
  INCOME TAX BRANCH DETROIT, MICHIGAN 48226 
  COMPLIANCE & ENFORCEMENT UNIT PHONE 313-224-3315 
 
 







DETROIT MI 48226-0000 
 
 
FAILURE TO FILE AN INCOME TAX RETURN 
 
Dear FIRSTNAME LASTNAME : 
 
Our records indicate you were a resident of Detroit and did not file a City income tax return for tax year 2014. 










Tax forms and filing instructions may be found in Room 130 at the Coleman A. Young Municipal Center or on 
the City's website at www.detroitmi.gov/How-Do-I/File. 
 
Make checks payable to:  Treasurer, City of Detroit 
 
Mail checks and returns to: City of Detroit 
    Income Tax 
    P.O. Box 33530 
    Detroit, Michigan 48232 
 
If you have any questions, please contact us at (313) 224-3315 or see Frequently Asked Questions about income 




Debra N. Pospiech, Esq., Deputy Treasurer for Tax 
  
 
Failure to file a tax return is a misdemeanor punishable by a fine 
of $500 and 90 days in jail. 
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Figure 1.9: Response rates by treatment status
Note: This figure shows response rates by treatment status. The left panel restricts attention to
taxpayers for whom the treatment letter was listed as delivered on the USPS tracking website.
The right panel restricts attention to taxpayers for whom the treatment letter was listed as
delivered or unclaimed on the USPS tracking website. Standard errors show 95% confidence
intervals.
Figure 1.10: Response rates by age-income-filing history bin
Note: This figure compares response rates to the penalty salience mailings (horizontal axis)
with response rates to other treatments (vertical axis) within age-income-filing history bins.
Appendix Table 1.15 reports the raw response rates by treatment and age-income-filing history
bin.
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Table 1.11: States with local income tax
State Localities State Localities
Alabama 4 Michigan 22
California 1 Missouri 2
Colorado 3 New Jersey 1
Delaware 1 New York 4
Indiana 91 Ohio 774
Iowa 297 Oregon 2
Kansas 535 Pennsylvania 2,961
Kentucky 218 West Virginia 3
Maryland 24
Source: Tax Foundation
Note: The types of localities that levy income tax vary widely. In Michigan the
localities that levy income tax are cities. In Maryland all 23 counties and one city,
Baltimore, levy income tax. In Pennsylvania 2,492 municipalities and 469 school
districts levy income tax.
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Civic pride Salience ×Probability No contact
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Age 39.7 12.2 39.8 11.9 39.5 12.0 39.7 12.0 39.6 12.1 39.7 12.0 39.5 11.9
FS = single (%) 40.6 49.1 38.8 48.7 40.1 49.0 41.1 49.2 38.9 48.8 38.7 48.7 38.5 48.7
FS = joint (%) 10.3 30.4 10.9 31.2 10.4 30.5 10.0 30.0 10.9 31.2 10.5 30.7 10.9 31.2
FS = Head of household (%) 47.6 49.9 49.1 50.0 48.1 50.0 47.2 49.9 48.8 50.0 49.5 50.0 49.1 50.0
Years identified as nonfiler 4.3 2.5 4.3 2.4 4.2 2.4 4.2 2.5 4.2 2.4 4.3 2.5 4.3 2.5
Filed in 2012 or 2013 (%) 22.8 42.0 23.2 42.2 23.4 42.4 23.6 42.5 23.7 42.5 23.0 42.1 23.2 42.2
Total income ($ 000s) 33.7 28.8 33.5 22.6 33.7 23.6 33.7 24.8 34.1 42.8 33.6 25.3 34.3 69.1
Wage income ($ 000s) 31.3 26.9 31.4 21.6 31.4 22.0 31.1 21.6 31.2 23.8 31.4 22.8 31.6 23.5
Log total income 10.3 0.5 10.3 0.5 10.3 0.5 10.3 0.5 10.3 0.5 10.3 0.5 10.3 0.5
Nonzero nonwage income (%) 29.5 45.6 29.2 45.5 30.3 46.0 29.9 45.8 29.3 45.5 29.7 45.7 29.1 45.4
Observations 5,399 5,274 5,350 5,313 5,476 5,342 10,617
Note: This table reports means and standard deviations of taxpayer characteristics from administrative tax data.
Table 1.13: Summary Statistics (TY 2014) by delivery status
Delivered Unclaimed Undeliverable Transit
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev
Age 40.3 12.2 38.7 11.4 37.4 11.2 39.8 11.7
FS = single (%) 39.7 48.9 41.6 49.3 36.5 48.2 39.3 48.9
FS = married filing jointly (%) 12.8 33.4 8.4 27.7 6.2 24.1 11.6 32.1
FS = head of household (%) 46.3 49.9 48.4 50.0 56.3 49.6 47.1 50.0
Years identified as nonfiler 4.2 2.5 4.3 2.4 4.3 2.5 4.2 2.4
Filed in 2012 or 2013 (%) 25.0 43.3 20.8 40.6 14.6 35.3 24.2 42.9
Total Income ($ 000s) 34.3 27.4 32.9 20.3 28.9 16.1 35.2 24.6
Wage Income ($ 000s) 31.8 24.5 31.4 19.6 27.1 16.7 33.0 22.7
Log total income 3.4 0.5 3.4 0.5 3.3 0.4 3.4 0.5
Nonzero nonwage income (%) 31.9 46.6 27.6 44.7 24.8 43.2 29.6 45.7
Observations 3,980 1,852 824 524
Note: This table reports means and standard deviations of taxpayer characteristics from administrative tax data.
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Age <= 30 0.9% 4.8% 2.1% 3.8% 1.8% 6.9% 3.3% 1,919
30 < Age <= 40 0.9% 8.3% 3.9% 2.7% 3.5% 8.3% 4.6% 2,042
40 < Age <= 50 3.5% 10.0% 4.8% 7.9% 4.0% 8.2% 6.5% 1,704
50 < Age <= 60 5.1% 20.4% 8.6% 8.2% 6.9% 14.3% 10.7% 1,061
60 < Age 15.9% 16.7% 15.2% 23.3% 7.8% 23.1% 17.1% 403
Filing status
Single 4.5% 9.6% 5.0% 6.6% 5.4% 13.3% 7.3% 2,846
Joint 4.4% 23.1% 13.8% 11.1% 3.7% 15.6% 12.3% 765
Head of Household 1.4% 7.5% 2.5% 4.8% 2.7% 5.7% 4.1% 3,434
Other 7.7% 0.0% 11.1% 8.7% 0.0% 13.3% 7.2% 97
Years nonfiler
1 year 3.3% 12.2% 5.8% 7.2% 7.7% 14.6% 8.3% 1,115
2 years 4.8% 15.5% 8.3% 6.8% 7.2% 13.7% 9.5% 1,116
3 years 4.6% 11.5% 5.5% 7.9% 2.3% 11.9% 7.2% 937
4 years 1.4% 10.7% 6.5% 4.4% 3.9% 8.3% 6.0% 873
5 years 1.4% 9.0% 3.5% 5.0% 2.2% 5.5% 4.2% 756
6 years 3.4% 7.5% 3.6% 7.1% 1.6% 8.2% 5.4% 747
7 years 1.7% 5.6% 1.7% 4.8% 2.3% 3.7% 3.3% 646
8 years 4.7% 3.3% 1.8% 8.1% 1.1% 10.5% 5.0% 581
9 years 0.0% 8.0% 3.4% 1.5% 0.0% 1.7% 2.7% 371
City returns filed
Filed 2012 2.0% 18.3% 6.5% 4.7% 7.8% 14.9% 8.8% 605
Filed 2013 6.7% 29.9% 6.5% 10.2% 8.6% 11.7% 12.3% 446
Both 14.3% 35.7% 16.8% 22.3% 16.1% 36.2% 23.2% 547
Neither 1.9% 5.8% 3.3% 4.2% 1.7% 6.4% 3.9% 5,544
Income ($ 000s)
Income <= 20 2.2% 4.3% 1.7% 5.2% 1.9% 5.9% 3.5% 1,846
20 < Income <= 30 1.9% 8.5% 5.2% 3.3% 3.6% 8.6% 5.2% 2,557
30 < Income <= 40 4.2% 13.6% 2.9% 8.5% 2.4% 9.7% 6.8% 1,157
40 < Income <= 50 2.6% 14.9% 9.4% 8.6% 4.2% 15.0% 9.2% 612
50 < Income <= 60 6.3% 11.8% 10.7% 11.5% 10.0% 16.4% 11.0% 353
60 < Income 6.7% 21.7% 8.8% 11.5% 10.4% 16.5% 12.6% 617
Treatment batch
Batch 1 0.0% 15.0% 0.0% 15.0% 0.0% 10.0% 6.7% 119
Batch 2 2.1% 16.5% 11.2% 7.1% 3.1% 11.6% 8.6% 580
Batch 3 2.8% 9.5% 6.7% 7.0% 4.2% 8.4% 6.4% 2,151
Batch 4 3.6% 11.5% 3.4% 5.0% 3.9% 10.3% 6.3% 2,149
Batch 5 3.1% 7.3% 3.1% 5.9% 3.9% 10.1% 5.6% 2,143
Total 3.0% 10.1% 4.9% 6.2% 3.8% 9.7% 6.3% 7,142
Note: This table shows heterogeneity in response.
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age <= 30, inc <= 25K
1-2 years (N = 867) 0.0% 5.2% 1.8% 2.9% 4.3% 8.7% 3.8%
3-5 years (N = 618) 0.0% 0.0% 5.2% 3.8% 0.0% 6.5% 2.6%
6-9 years (N = 186) 0.0% 3.6% 0.0% 7.4% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0%
Total 0.0% 3.2% 2.8% 3.8% 2.3% 6.8% 3.1%
age <= 30, 25K < inc <= 35K
1-2 years (N = 273) 6.5% 8.3% 2.6% 0.0% 0.0% 10.0% 4.0%
3-5 years (N = 218) 0.0% 3.8% 0.0% 4.2% 0.0% 4.3% 1.9%
Total 3.4% 6.0% 1.5% 1.5% 0.0% 7.5% 3.1%
age <= 30, 35K < inc <= 50K
1-2 years (N = 110) 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 16.7% 6.9%
Total 0.0% 20.0% 0.0% 8.3% 0.0% 16.7% 6.9%
30 < age <= 50, inc <= 25K
1-2 years (N = 401) 3.8% 12.2% 9.3% 4.8% 1.8% 9.4% 6.9%
3-5 years (N = 730) 2.6% 7.6% 2.6% 2.7% 5.0% 6.1% 4.5%
6-9 years (N = 973) 0.0% 4.0% 1.8% 0.0% 1.7% 6.4% 2.3%
Total 1.7% 6.8% 3.7% 1.7% 3.0% 6.9% 4.0%
30 < age <= 50, 25K < inc <= 35K
1-2 years (N = 273) 0.0% 14.7% 5.0% 5.9% 9.1% 17.5% 9.0%
3-5 years (N = 470) 0.0% 15.7% 1.4% 4.2% 4.6% 9.1% 5.4%
6-9 years (N = 564) 1.9% 4.5% 2.4% 2.9% 1.4% 6.7% 3.4%
Total 0.8% 10.6% 2.5% 4.0% 4.2% 10.0% 5.3%
30 < age <= 50, 35K < inc <= 50K
1-2 years (N = 208) 0.0% 18.2% 7.7% 12.5% 4.2% 16.7% 10.3%
3-5 years (N = 290) 0.0% 15.2% 5.1% 13.9% 0.0% 5.6% 6.2%
6-9 years (N = 349) 4.4% 7.5% 4.7% 2.6% 0.0% 5.1% 4.4%
Total 1.9% 12.0% 5.6% 9.3% 1.0% 8.6% 6.5%
30 < age <= 50, 50K < inc
1-2 years (N = 221) 14.3% 14.7% 16.7% 8.3% 20.0% 10.0% 13.9%
3-5 years (N = 264) 0.0% 12.8% 8.0% 10.0% 6.5% 13.8% 8.6%
6-9 years (N = 221) 3.7% 0.0% 0.0% 15.6% 0.0% 3.1% 4.1%
Total 5.7% 9.8% 8.4% 11.2% 9.1% 8.6% 8.9%
50 < age, inc <= 25K
1-2 years (N = 158) 4.5% 20.0% 18.8% 4.3% 13.3% 23.8% 13.4%
3-5 years (N = 229) 6.9% 13.0% 3.6% 16.1% 0.0% 10.7% 8.0%
6-9 years (N = 240) 11.1% 12.5% 4.5% 11.5% 0.0% 4.2% 7.5%
Total 7.7% 14.3% 7.6% 11.3% 2.5% 12.3% 9.2%
50 < age, 25K < inc <= 35K
1-2 years (N = 117) 9.1% 23.5% 15.4% 13.0% 16.7% 6.7% 14.3%
3-5 years (N = 177) 4.3% 23.8% 6.3% 4.8% 10.0% 11.5% 10.2%
6-9 years (N = 201) 12.0% 3.4% 3.7% 16.7% 0.0% 4.2% 7.1%
Total 8.5% 14.9% 7.1% 12.2% 7.7% 7.7% 9.9%
50 < age, 35K < inc <= 50K
1-2 years (N = 101) 0.0% 21.4% 20.0% 22.2% 14.3% 33.3% 19.7%
3-5 years (N = 132) 16.7% 12.5% 20.0% 0.0% 6.7% 25.0% 13.5%
6-9 years (N = 128) 0.0% 16.7% 11.1% 5.9% 0.0% 16.7% 9.7%
Total 7.9% 16.7% 16.3% 9.8% 7.7% 23.9% 14.0%
50 < age, 50K < inc
1-2 years (N = 165) 19.0% 39.1% 17.6% 23.5% 30.0% 32.0% 27.6%
3-5 years (N = 174) 7.7% 25.9% 26.3% 8.3% 0.0% 23.5% 15.2%
6-9 years (N = 179) 0.0% 33.3% 0.0% 10.0% 8.7% 22.2% 10.7%
Total 8.7% 32.3% 12.7% 14.3% 11.9% 26.1% 17.7%
Note: This table shows response rate by age, income, and filing history. Only age-
income-history bins with at least 100 observations are shown. The three age categories
are below 30, 30–50, and above 50. The four income categories are below $25K, $25K–
$35K, $35K–$50K, and above $50K. The three filing history categories are 1–2 years,
3–5 years, and 6–9 years identified as a suspected resident nonfiler.
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Table 1.16: Marginal cost of mailings per nonfiler
Dollars Source / Description
Materials
Card stock 0.017 $17250 sheets ×
1 sheet
4 postcards
Envelopes 0.044 $22500 envelopes
Ink 0.040 pcworld.com estimate
Paper 0.014 $7500 sheets
Time
Printing 0.033 3 hours2,160 letters ×
$23.95
hour
Stuffing 0.033 3 hours2,160 letters ×
$23.95
hour
Certifying 0.444 40 hours2,160 letters ×
$23.95
hour




Postcard 0.270 USPS permit imprint
Letter 0.465 USPS metered postage
Certification 3.300 USPS metered postage
Total 4.698
Note: Staff time is valued at $23.95 per hour, the hourly equivalent of the top annual salary of a Detroit tax
examiner. White Book, 2016-2017 Salary and Wage Adjustments, March 2016, page 63, available at http://www.
detroitmi.gov/how-do-i/view-city-of-detroit-reports. Marginal cost of mailings per nonfiler was a bit higher
for the compliance cost group because the compliance cost letters enclosed a blank tax form and a return envelope.




Breaching the blendwall: RINs and the market for
renewable fuel
2.1 Introduction
The Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS) is one of many potential policy tools for fighting
climate change. The RFS requires American drivers to consume a minimum amount
of renewable fuel as a method of displacing petroleum-based fuel with biomass-based
fuel and thereby reducing carbon emissions. The RFS minimum volume requirement
that was scheduled by law in 2007 is reevaluated annually by the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA). The EPA can stick with the original RFS schedule or
reduce the RFS volumes by some amount.
This paper simulates policy alternatives with a real-world policy tool controlled
by the EPA—the RFS minimum volume requirement—in a model that captures two
important features of the market for renewable fuel: the blendwall, and the RFS
linkage between ethanol and biodiesel. These two features are typically absent from
welfare analysis of renewable fuel mandates.1 With the linkage between ethanol and
1De Gorter and Just (2009), Lapan and Moschini (2012), Cui et al. (2011), Holland et al.
(2013), and Chen et al. (2014) all performed welfare analysis on renewable fuel mandates without
incorporating the blendwall or the RFS linkage between ethanol and biodiesel.
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biodiesel, marginal increases in the RFS mandate beyond the blendwall are filled by
a combination of biodiesel and E85. I find that both biodiesel and E85 are expensive
methods of reducing carbon emissions.
Through its implementation of the RFS, the EPA currently requires American
drivers to consume more renewable fuel than can be blended into the most common
gasoline blend. The 10% limit on ethanol in E10 gasoline is called the blendwall.
The infrastructure for distributing and consuming regular gasoline cannot accommo-
date a blend with more than 10% ethanol because ethanol is more corrosive than
petroleum-based gasoline. When the RFS minimum volume requirement was below
the blendwall, meeting the requirement was easy because it could be done simply by
adding more ethanol to E10 gasoline.
Now that the RFS requirement exceeds the blendwall, the only way to meet the
requirement is by increasing consumption of renewable fuels other than ethanol in
E10 gasoline. The RFS makes distinctions among good and better renewable fuels. It
sets minimum volumes in four separate categories, each of which has its own renewa-
ble energy credit (RIN). The RFS allows “better” renewable fuels—like biodiesel—to
satisfy requirements in place of “good” renewable fuels—like corn ethanol. So even
though the minimum volume requirement for ethanol exceeds 10% of E10 gasoline,
that requirement can be met with biodiesel or other gasoline blends.
The model includes salient features of markets related to renewable fuel. Con-
sumers demand diesel, gasoline, and nonfuel corn. Producers supply renewable and
nonrenewable blending components for gasoline and diesel. Fuel blenders combine
blending components into blended fuel. The RFS requirements are modeled by in-
corporating RIN prices into the decision problem of blenders. I solve for a perfectly
competitive equilibrium.
I calibrate the model to make the simulations empirically relevant. I use supply
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and demand elasticities estimated from prior literature, and I use data to calibrate
remaining parameters. The calibrated model does a good job matching untargeted
moments.
The simulation indicates the RFS is a costly method of reducing carbon emissions
in the short run. I find that reducing carbon emissions using the RFS imposes welfare
costs of more than $300 per metric ton of CO2. The linkage between ethanol and
biodiesel mitigates the cost of reducing emissions with the RFS relative to a world in
which the entire reduction occured through E85. However, both biodiesel and E85
are expensive ways to reduce carbon emissions.
Biodiesel is an expensive way to reduce carbon emissions because (1) it has a steep
supply curve and (2) as an input it is a very good substitute with petroleum-based
diesel. The blender cost of petroleum diesel must rise along with the blender cost of
biodiesel in order for biodiesel to remain competitive as an input, and the blender cost
of petroleum diesel is not easily moved. E85 is an expensive way to reduce carbon
emissions because (1) consumers require a substantial discount to substitute E85 for
E10 consumption and (2) ethanol is a modest reduction in emissions relative to BOB,
the fuel it displaces. Corn ethanol emits almost as much carbon as petroleum-based
gasoline, so the reduction in carbon emissions is small relative to the welfare loss
from distorting consumption of food and fuel.
The RFS is not a good tool for reducing carbon emissions in the short run, but
it might be a good tool in the long run. Legislators hoped the RFS would support a
massive expansion in cellulosic ethanol, which is a large reduction in carbon emissions
relative to petroleum-based gasoline. The RFS could be useful as a tool for developing
cellulosic ethanol technology and expanding infrastructure for consuming cellulosic
ethanol in E85. However, the dynamic effects of the RFS are beyond the scope of
this paper.
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Section 2.2 gives background on the institutional features of the RFS and the
markets for blended fuel. Section 2.3 presents a model that incorporates those featu-
res. Section 2.4 tests price predictions of the model. Section 2.5 calibrates the model.




Transportation fuel is a blend of renewable and nonrenewable fuel. Gasoline is a
blend of ethanol (renewable) and petroleum-based gasoline (nonrenewable). Simi-
larly, diesel is a blend of biodiesel and petroleum-based diesel. Blenders combine
these blending components into blended fuels. Three blended fuels are important for
understanding the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS): E10 gasoline, which contains
0% to 10% ethanol; E85 gasoline, which contains 51% to 85% ethanol; and blended
diesel.2
Gasoline—Ethanol is an imperfect substitute for petroleum-based gasoline, also
called blendstock for oxygenate blending or BOB when it is an input into blended
gasoline, because it has a lower energy content and a higher octane rating. Octane
is a measure of the compression a fuel can withstand before detonating. If two
fuels have equal energy content but one has a higher octane rating, the one with a
higher octane rating performs better, in the sense that it gets more miles per gallon.
2It would be more precise to say that E85 contains at most 83% ethanol, because in high blends
at least 2% of the ethanol portion must be denaturant (Alternative Fuels Data Center 2013b).
According to the EPA, the average ethanol fraction in E85 is 71%. In some seasons and regions of
the country, the practical limit on ethanol is substantially below 85% to avoid cold start problems.
Other blends of gasoline exist but are unlikely to be relevant to policy in the near term. For
example, E15 gasoline contains 15% ethanol. As of January 2014, there were only 59 stations in
the United States vending E15 (Renewable Fuels Association 2014).
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Octane improves fuel performance with diminishing returns. Adding ethanol into a
gasoline blend with low octane improves performance because the high-octane effect
dominates the low-energy effect. Adding ethanol into a gasoline blend with high
octane hinders performance because the low-energy effect dominates the high-octane
effect. Gasoline is required to have an octane rating above the octane rating of BOB.
If BOB is not blended with ethanol, other octane-boosting liquids must be added to
BOB in order to comply with the minimum octane rating.3
Ethanol is also different from BOB because ethanol is more corrosive. Containers
designed for petroleum gasoline, including underground tanks at gas stations and
gas engines in light-duty vehicles, do not need to be modified to use E10. E85 can
damage those containers and cause leaks.
Demand for E85 and demand for E10 are derived from demand for vehicle miles
traveled. The relative demand for E85 depends on the rate at which drivers substitute
E85 for E10. This substitution can be made safely by drivers of flex fuel vehicles
(FFVs). FFVs accept a wide range of gasoline blends including both E10 and E85.
Most gasoline-powered vehicles can be converted to accept E85 for $200-$400,4 but
the current fleet of 226 million vehicles includes just 12 million FFVs.5 As a result of
the differences in octane and energy content between ethanol and BOB, a car travels
farther on one gallon of E10 than on one gallon of E85.
All else equal we expect consumers to choose the blend that enables more miles per
dollar, but miles per dollar is not the only consideration. The lower energy content
of E85 requires drivers to fill their tanks more frequently. The three thousand E85
3In the 1990s and early 2000s, many suppliers raised the octane rating of gasoline by adding
methyl-tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). Because ethanol also raises the octane rating of gasoline, it
is a substitute for the energy content of BOB and the octane rating of MTBE. Ethanol blending
jumped in 2006 as a result of the ban on MTBE (Anderson and Elzinga 2014).
4Change2e85.com sells conversion kits for 4- and 6-cylinder engines for $199 and $325.
5Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Outlook, 2013, Table 58: “Light-Duty
Vehicle Stock by Technology Type”.
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stations in the United States are much sparser than the hundreds of thousands of E10
stations, so filling a gas tank with E85 is often inconvenient. Some FFV owners are
not even aware their vehicles accept E85. Yet drivers purchased E85 in small volumes
even when E85 was more expensive than E10 per gallon and far more expensive per
mile.
Diesel—Biodiesel is an excellent substitute for petroleum-based diesel. The
energy content of biodiesel is nearly as high as the energy content of petroleum-
based diesel. Biodiesel may reduce performance if it is stored in high blends for long
periods in cold weather, but for most drivers, the performance of blends with 5%
biodiesel or less is the same as 100% petroleum-based diesel. The average blend of
biodiesel in diesel has always been below 3%.
Biodiesel production is limited by competition with petroleum-based diesel as an
input into blended diesel. Diesel blenders choose a blend composition that minimizes
cost. Because blends with low biodiesel content are nearly perfect substitutes and the
average blend of 2% in 2013 includes both biodiesel and petroleum-based diesel, the
blender cost of biodiesel must nearly equal the blender cost of petroleum-based diesel.
The blender cost of components includes explicit and implicit taxes and subsidies,
including those from the RFS.
2.2.2 The Renewable Fuel Standard
The Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 (EISA) set a schedule of aggre-
gate minimum volume requirements for annual consumption of renewable fuel. The
minimum volumes in EISA and their implementation by the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) are called the Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). Every year,
the EPA translates the RFS minimum volume requirement into an obligation on
individual refiners in proportion to the volume of nonrenewable fuel they refine. For
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example, if the RFS minimum renewable volume was 10 billion gallons, and non-
renewable fuel consumption was expected to be 100 billion gallons, then the EPA
would require refiners to prove use of 0.1 gallon of renewable fuel for every gallon of
nonrenewable fuel they refined.6 That fraction, 0.1, is the policy tool controlled by
the EPA. It expresses the obligation faced by a refiner per gallon of nonrenewable
fuel.
To keep track of RFS compliance, the EPA created Renewable Identification
Numbers (RINs). RINs are renewable energy credits “generated” when renewable
fuel is added to a fuel blend, meaning the EPA gives RINs to the blender. RINs
generated by blenders are the supply of RINs, and RFS obligations on refiners are
the demand for RINs. A blender who generates RINs can sell them to a refiner, who
must submit RINs to the EPA to prove compliance with the RFS. Thus a RIN is
received from the EPA by a blender, sold to a refiner, and submitted back to the
EPA. Figure 2.1 illustrates the flow of blending components to the blender, the flow
of blended fuel to the consumer, and the flow of RINs.
The treatment of a gallon of renewable fuel under the RFS depends on the raw
material—feedstock—that is used to produce that gallon. There are four renewable
fuel categories under the RFS: cellulosic, biodiesel, advanced, and renewable. The
eligibility of a feedstock for a RIN category depends on the EPA’s assessment of the
life cycle greenhouse gas emissions of renewable fuel produced from that feedstock
relative to the nonrenewable fuel it displaces.7 There are four categories of RINs
corresponding to the four categories of renewable fuel under the RFS. One ethanol-
6In the example, the fraction 0.1 is equal to 10 billion gallons of renewable fuel100 billion gallons of nonrenewable fuel .
7The EPA determined that the life cycle greenhouse gas emissions from grain corn ethanol are
20% below petroleum-based gasoline, so grain corn ethanol is eligible to produce renewable RINs.
The reduction thresholds for the EPA to allow an ethanol feedstock to generate advanced and
cellulosic RINs are 50% and 80% relative to petroleum-based gasoline. To produce a biodiesel RIN,
a biodiesel feedstock must reduce life cycle greenhouse gas emissions 50% relative to petroleum-
based diesel.
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Note: Renewable fuel includes ethanol and biodiesel. Nonrenewable fuel includes BOB and
petroleum-based diesel. Blended fuel includes E10, E85, and B5. The EPA gives RINs to a blender
when the blender adds renewable fuel to a blend. The blender sells RINs to a refiner. The refiner
submits RINs back to the EPA to demonstrate compliance with the RFS.
equivalent gallon is the standard unit of RINs. For one gallon of grain corn ethanol,
the blender generates one RIN. Other renewable fuels generate different volumes of
ethanol-equivalent gallons; one gallon of biodiesel produces 1.5 ethanol-equivalent
RINs. Cellulosic and biodiesel are mutually exclusive subsets of advanced, and ad-
vanced is a subset of renewable.
A gallon of petroleum-based gasoline incurs the same obligation as a gallon of
petroleum-based diesel. For each gallon of nonrenewable fuel, a refiner must submit
a fraction of a RIN from all four RIN categories: a fraction of a cellulosic RIN (ρ3), a
fraction of a biodiesel RIN (ρ4), a fraction of an advanced RIN (ρ5), and a fraction of
a renewable RIN (ρ6). Because cellulosic and biodiesel are subsets of advanced, the
fraction ρ5 is the residual fraction of an advanced RIN. If a refiner submits biodiesel
RINs in excess of the biodiesel fraction, it has less residual obligation. Similarly,
ρ6 is the residual fraction of a renewable RIN. The subscripts on the ρ fractions
correspond to the labels typically used by the EPA to denote the four renewable fuel
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categories.
The mandate fractions (ρ3, ρ4, ρ5, ρ6) are the policy tool controlled by the EPA.
In an RFS rule released annually, the EPA calculates the mandate fractions as the
renewable volume requirements in EISA divided by total nonrenewable volume fo-
recast by the Energy Information Administration. EISA grants waiver authority to
the EPA to adjust this calculation under some circumstances.8 The main policy
adjustment I consider is the renewable volume requirement (ρ6).
RINs can be traded and stored, but there are some constraints on storage. An
RFS obligation may only be filled with RINs generated in the same year and one
year prior, and at most 20% may be filled with prior-year RINs. However, the
aggregate stock of RINs is estimated to be around 2.6 billion, well below 20% of the
total renewable mandate, so the restriction to prior-year RINs just means that the
existing stock of prior-year RINs should be used for compliance and exhausted before
tapping into current-year RINs. RINs of different vintages are thus good substitutes.
The RFS minimum volumes are based on the 2007 law and adjusted by the EPA
to accomodate unforeseen circumstances. In 2013, the EPA reduced the cellulosic
volume from 1 billion gallons, as scheduled back in 2007 by EISA, to 6 million
gallons in recognition of inadequate supply. The capacity to produce cellulosic fuel
has lagged far behind the timetable set in EISA.
The EPA computes the RIN obligation per gallon of nonrenewable as a fraction,
where the numerator is the minimum renewable volume and the denominator is the
expected volume of nonrenewables forecast by the Energy Information Administra-
tion (EIA). In 2013, the EPA set the minimum total renewable volume (including
cellulosic, biodiesel, and advanced) at 16.55 billion ethanol-equivalent gallons. The
8In the past, some RFS rules exempted certain nonrenewable producers from obligations un-
der the mandate. Other RFS rules reduced the cellulosic volume requirement in recognition of
inadequate domestic supply.
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Table 2.1: Renewable fuel mandated by RFS
RIN obligation per gallon of nonrenewable
Year Cellulosic Biodiesel Advanced Subtotal Renewable Total
2010 0.00% 0.62% 0.00% 0.63% 7.62% 8.25%
2011 0.00% 0.69% 0.08% 0.78% 7.24% 8.01%
2012 0.00% 0.91% 0.30% 1.21% 8.02% 9.23%
2013 0.00% 1.12% 0.48% 1.60% 8.03% 9.63%
2014 0.01% 1.16% 0.16% 1.33% 7.87% 9.20%
Note: This table shows the fraction of a RIN an obligated party must submit per gallon of nonrenewable. The fraction
for advanced is a residual eligible to be filled by non-cellulosic, non-biodiesel advanced. Similarly, the fraction for
renewable is a residual eligible to be filled by non-advanced renewable. Fractions for 2013 and earlier are from final
EPA rules. 2014 fractions are from the EPA notice of proposed rulemaking. The 2012 cellulosic fraction was reduced
to zero by court order. The biodiesel fraction from the final 2010 rule is distributed partially to 2009. Schnepf and
Yacobucci (2013).
EIA forecast nonrenewable volume of 172 billion gallons. So the total renewable
mandate fraction was 9.63% (= 16.55172 ), which is the fraction of ethanol-equivalent
RINs that must be submitted by a refiner for each gallon of nonrenewable.9 Table
2.1 shows the actual RFS fractions from 2010 to 2013 and the proposed fractions for
2014.
2.2.3 RIN prices
The prices of the four categories of RINs are related through several mechanisms. The
price of an advanced RIN should be at least as high as the price of a renewable RIN.
This is because, under the RFS, an advanced RIN can be used to satisfy the renewable
obligation. If advanced RINs were cheaper than renewable RINs, an obligated party
would be better off purchasing advanced RINs to satisfy its renewable obligation.
Similarly, the price of an advanced RIN should be no higher than the price of a
biodiesel RIN. This inequality is not an explicit rule; it is a logical consequence. The
RFS places complex constraints on the price of cellulosic RINs. They are usually
9In 2013, a refiner that produced 100,000 gallons of BOB would be in compliance with the
RFS mandate if it submitted 3 cellulosic RINs generated from 3 gallons of switchgrass ethanol;
1,120 ethanol-equivalent biodiesel RINs generated from 747 gallons of biodiesel; 480 advanced RINs
generated from 480 gallons of sugarcane ethanol; and 8,030 renewable RINs generated from 8,030
gallons of grain corn ethanol.
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pinned to the price of advanced RINs plus 25 cents.
Most renewable RINs are produced by blending domestic corn ethanol. Most
advanced RINs are produced by blending sugarcane ethanol from Brazil. Brazilians
are indifferent between sugarcane ethanol and corn ethanol because the performance
of fuel made from the two feedstocks is identical, but American blenders are not
indifferent because the price of a sugarcane ethanol RIN can differ from the price of
a corn ethanol RIN. The transportation cost of a round trip to exchange American
corn ethanol for Brazilian sugarcane ethanol is around 40 cents per gallon. Therefore,
arbitrage constrains the amount by which the price of advanced RINs can exceed the
price of renewable RINs to 40 cents.
The price of RINs changes the blender cost of components. When a blender
purchases a gallon of ethanol, it also gets to sell the RIN it generates from blending
that gallon. The blender cost of ethanol is the price the blender pays for the ethanol
minus the price it receives for selling the RIN. In this way, RINs act like a subsidy
to renewable fuel because a blender earns revenue from selling a RIN. Similarly, the
blender cost of BOB is higher than the world price of BOB because RINs act like a
tax on BOB in the United States.10
2.2.4 The blendwall
I will use the term “blendwall” to mean 10% of blended gasoline. This differs slig-
htly from the typical meaning of blendwall—the volume of ethanol that “can” be
10Lade, Lin, and Smith (2015) explain the following benchmark for RIN prices: “RIN prices
equal the weighted difference between the cost of the marginal ... renewable fuel used to meet each
mandate and the marginal cost of the cheaper fossil fuel it displaces.” This benchmark for RIN prices
can be violated through the linkage between the price of a cellulosic RIN and an advanced RIN,
the arbitrage relationship between the price of an advanced RIN and the price of a conventional
RIN, and the technical constraint on blending ethanol into E10.
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incorporated into the fuel supply as a component of blended gasoline.11 This typi-
cal meaning of blendwall is not well defined. The volume that is incorporated into
blended gasoline is sensitive to prices and infrastructure, both of which are changing
in response to the RFS. Expectations about the RFS influence the decision to vend
E85 at a gas station or to buy a flex fuel vehicle.12 This definition of blendwall thus
depends on the policy we are trying to analyze. A benchmark of 10% of gasoline
consumption provides a stable point of reference, so I use this definition of blendwall.
In 2013, the minimum RFS volume exceeded the blendwall.13 Until 2013, RFS
compliance could be achieved by increasing the fraction of ethanol in E10 gasoline.14
That method of compliance has reached its limit; renewable fuel must be added to
the fuel supply in some way other than increasing the fraction of ethanol in E10.
There are four options for generating additional RINs once the ethanol fraction of
E10 gasoline has reached its limit: increase the volume of E10 gasoline, increase the
ethanol fraction in E85 gasoline, increase the volume of E85 gasoline, and increase
the biodiesel fraction in blended diesel.
The response of the market to the tension between the blendwall and RFS volumes
hinges on demand for E85 gasoline and supply of biodiesel. We know a little bit
about the demand for E85 from prior literature.15 However, the quantity of E85
11A less common meaning of blendwall is the highest EPA-permitted blend fraction, which the
EPA lifted from 10% to 15% in 2010 for most vehicles. Qiu, Colson, and Wetzstein (2014) use this
definition.
12Babcock (2013) simulates the response of investment in E85 infrastructure to the RFS. Du and
Carriquiry (2013) examine the impact of expanding the share of FFVs on ethanol price dynamics.
Du and Li (2015) examine the impact of E85 fueling stations on the market share of FFVs.
1314.63 billion gallons were eligible to be satisfied by ethanol. Even if the 132.8 billion gallons of
gasoline consumption forecast by the EIA included 10% ethanol, the volume of ethanol consumed
would still fall 1.35 billion gallons short of satisfying the mandate.
14Appendix Table 2.6 shows that from 2006 to 2013, the average blend in E10 increased from
4% to 10%. Appendix Figure 2.8 shows that the mandate schedule passes the blendwall because it
follows the trajectory of gasoline consumption that was expected when the law passed in 2007.
15Du and Carriquiry (2013) and Du and Li (2015) examine the impact of expanding the share
of FFVs and the number of E85 fueling stations. Anderson (2012) uses fuel-station level data in
Minnesota to estimate a discrete choice model in which consumers value E85 directly in addition to
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and the quantity of biodiesel are in uncharted territory, and if the mandate increases
according to its schedule, they will continue to break new ground.
2.3 Model
I build a model to serve as a laboratory for experimenting with policy options availa-
ble to the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) for implementing the Renewable
Fuel Standard (RFS). The blender buys blending components from suppliers and
sells blended fuel to consumers. The RFS mandate is incorporated into the blender’s
decision problem.
There is one biofuel in the model for each of the three categories of RINs that are
produced in quantities large enough to affect the blendwall: biodiesel generates bio-
diesel RINs, sugarcane ethanol generates advanced RINs, and corn ethanol generates
renewable RINs. The price of cellulosic RINs is set equal to the price of advanced
RINs plus 25 cents.
2.3.1 Consumers
Utility is quasilinear in three goods: gasoline miles (G), diesel miles (BX), and
bushels of nonfuel corn (C), each of which has a constant elasticity of demand (εi).
Consumers have a standard budget constraint with income Y , and the price of the
numeraire (Z) is normalized to 1. Diesel miles are traveled using a single average
diesel blend. Gasoline miles are traveled using a combination of E10 gasoline and
E85 gasoline. The elasticity of substitution between E10 and E85 is σ1−σ , and the
demand share of E10 is α.
its use for vehicle miles traveled. Liu and Greene (2013) and Pouliot and Babcock (2014) estimate































s.t. PE10QE10 + PE85QE85 + PBXQBX + PCQC +QZ = Y (2.1)
Because there is a numeraire good, there is no income effect of price changes in
fuel and nonfuel corn. The first order conditions imply the relative demand of E85
is a function of the relative price of E85. Consumers demand more E85 when it is



















Nonfuel corn is included in the model to facilitate calibration. It permits use of
outside estimates of the elasticity of supply for corn and the elasticity of demand
for corn, so that the elasticity of supply for corn as fuel arises endogenously through
the decision of the corn producer.16 In the model, nonfuel corn is sold directly by
the corn producer to consumers, whereas fuel passes through blenders of E10, E85,
and diesel. The first order conditions imply demand curves for gasoline, diesel, and
16An alternative approach would be to leave nonfuel corn out of the model and use an outside
estimate of the elasticity of ethanol supply, such as by Luchansky and Monks (2009). Because corn
ethanol is such a large part of the RFS and the market for corn, I believe the benefit of explicitly
modeling the tradeoff with nonfuel corn is worth the added complexity. Several studies have gone
further in this direction to examine the effect of the biofuel mandates on food and fuel prices. Wu
and Langpap (2015) find that the RFS raised corn prices substantially with a small positive impact
on food prices overall and a small negative impact on gasoline prices. McPhail and Babcock (2012),





















Supply of corn ethanol and nonfuel corn—The corn producer maximizes profit
by choosing ethanol (E100) and nonfuel corn (C). Nonfuel corn can be converted to
ethanol at a fixed ratio µ. Costs are an increasing function of the number of bushels
of corn required to produce the ethanol and nonfuel corn (QC + µQE100). The first
order condition for corn gives the corn supply curve with constant supply elasticity
ηC. The first order condition for ethanol implies a relationship between the price of
ethanol and nonfuel corn.
max
QC ,QE100






FOCs imply: PC = θC(QC + µQE100)
1
ηC (2.6)
PE100 = µPC + νC (2.7)
νC is the markup of the price of ethanol over the price of corn inputs. It reflects the
cost of distillation and the revenue received from byproducts of distillation like dried
distillers grains.
Supply of petroleum-based gasoline and diesel—The petroleum gasoline
refiner chooses the quantity of gasoline blendstock for oxygenate blending (E0) to
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maximize profit. The first order condition implies a supply curve with intercept θG














The diesel refiner’s problem is parallel to the gasoline refiner’s problem. The petro-
leum diesel refiner chooses the quantity of petroleum-based diesel (B0) to maximize
profit. The first order condition implies a supply curve with intercept θD and con-
stant elasticity ηD.
Supply of biodiesel—The biodiesel refiner chooses the quantity of biodiesel
(B100) to maximize profit. The biodiesel refiner pays a constant marginal cost
(νB) for the biodiesel feedstock, and faces increasing marginal costs of refining. The
biodiesel refiner’s first order condition implies a supply curve.
max
QB0











Supply of sugarcane ethanol—The sugarcane ethanol supplier chooses the
quantity of sugarcane ethanol (QSE100) to maximize profit. The sugarcane ethanol
















The blender of E10 gasoline chooses the quantity of E10 gasoline and the fraction of
ethanol in each blended gallon (FE10) to maximize profit. I use the shorthand ρ as
a row vector of mandate fractions and PRIN as a column vector of RIN prices such










− (1− FE10)(PE0 + ρPRIN)
]
s.t. 0 ≤ FE10 ≤ 0.1
Profit is equal to the volume of E10 gasoline times the difference between the price
received by the blender (PE10) and the blender cost of components. The wholesale
price of ethanol is offset by the generation and sale of a RIN, so the blender cost of
ethanol is PE100−PR6. The wholesale price of BOB is augmented by the cost of RFS
compliance, so the blender cost of BOB is PE0 + ρPRIN .
The quantity first order condition expresses an arbitrage condition that relates
the price of blended E10 gasoline to the cost of components.18 The fraction first
order condition says that, if the blend fraction is at an interior solution above 0% and
below 10%, then the blender cost of ethanol must equal the blender cost of BOB. The
blender of E85 gasoline and blended diesel face analogous problems. Their quantity
and fraction first order conditions express parallel relationships between price and
17Fractions and RIN prices are indexed by numbers 3 to 6, which the EPA associates with
cellulosic, biodiesel, advanced, and renewable RINs.
18When the model is calibrated in Section 2.4, the arbitrage condition will also include a wedge
between the price of blended fuel and the blender cost of components to account for transportation
costs and taxes.
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blender cost, and between the cost of one component and the other.19
PE10 = FE10(PE100 − PR6) + (1− FE10)(PE0 + ρPRIN) (2.11)
PE100 − PR6 = PE0 + ρPRIN (2.12)
If biodiesel and petroleum-based diesel are both included in the diesel blend, then
the blender cost of biodiesel and the blender cost of petroleum-based diesel must be
equal.
Gasoline blenders have a third choice variable, the fraction of ethanol that is su-
garcane ethanol. This term was omitted from the profit function above for simplicity.
It results in the following condition relating the blender cost of corn ethanol to the
blender cost of sugarcane ethanol. The price of cellulosic RINs is set equal to the
price of advanced RINs plus 25 cents.
PE100 − PR6 = P SE100 − PR5 (2.13)
2.3.4 Market clearing conditions
The market-clearing condition for renewable RINs is that the generation of corn
ethanol RINs, sugarcane ethanol RINs, and ethanol-equivalent biodiesel RINs equals
RFS obligations. For each gallon of BOB or petroleum diesel, a refiner must submit
19Appendix section 2.8.2.2 includes the E85 and diesel blender quantity and fraction conditions,
as well as a more precise statement of the blender’s problem including the choice of sugarcane
ethanol.
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RINs from all four RIN categories.
QE100 +QSE100 + 1.5QB100 = (QE0 +QB0)(ρ3 + ρ4 + ρ5 + ρ6) (2.14)
QSE100 + 1.5QB100 ≥ (QE0 +QB0)(ρ3 + ρ4 + ρ5) (2.15)
1.5QB100 ≥ (QE0 +QB0)(ρ4) (2.16)
The volume of ethanol in gasoline (QE100 + QSE100) is equal to the volume of RINs
generated by blending ethanol into gasoline. The lefthand side of equation 2.14 is
thus the supply of RINs, including 1.5 ethanol-equivalent RINs per gallon of biodie-
sel. Current RFS obligations are the volume of nonrenewable fuel times the RIN
obligation per gallon. Nonrenewable fuel is the sum of petroleum-based gasoline
(QE0) and petroleum-based diesel (QB0). The market-clearing conditions for advan-
ced RINs and biodiesel RINs are similar. These are inequality constraints because
excess advanced RINs can be used to meet the renewable mandate.
When markets clear, the production volume of blending components will be equal
to the volume used by blenders in blended fuel. The market clearing conditions for
blending components—ethanol, blendstock for oxygenate blending, biodiesel, and
petroleum diesel—are:
QE100 +QSE100 = FE10QE10 + FE85QE85 (2.17)
QE0 = (1− FE10)QE10 + (1− FE85)QE85 (2.18)
QB100 = FBXQBX (2.19)
QB0 = (1− FBX)QBX (2.20)
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2.4 Testing and estimating price relationships
The model is designed for performing policy experiments with RFS minimum vo-
lumes, and it also makes predictions about the relationships among prices of RINs,
blending components, and blended fuels. This section has two goals. One goal is to
show that the predicted price relationships are observed in the data, as a method
of supporting the empirical relevance of the model. The other goal is to inform the
calibration of model parameters for taxes and transportation costs.
RIN prices—The model predicts a hierarchy of RIN prices: in descending order,
biodiesel, advanced, renewable (PR4 ≥ PR5 ≥ PR6). Figure 2.2 shows that this has
been the case. For most of 2011 and 2012, there were large gaps between the three
prices, and then in 2013 the prices converged. The model predicts that the prices will
converge if excess biodiesel RINs are being used to satisfy the renewable mandate.
RIN price changes should be attributed to changes in expectations, which I do not
explicitly model.20
Price and blender cost of E10—The model predicts that the retail price of E10
will equal the blender cost (BC) of components.21 For the empirical test, I include
the cost to the blender of octane-boosting additives (OBA), which was omitted from
the exposition of the model for simplicity. I assume that octane-boosting additives
are added in proportion to BOB above 90% at a price equal to 15% of the price of
BOB.22
Figure 2.3 shows that the retail price of E10 exceeds the blender cost of com-
ponents. This makes sense because the retail price includes components that were
20Lade, Lin, and Smith (2014) examine RIN prices in a dynamic context.
21BCE10 = FE10(PE100 − PR6) + (1− FE10)(PE0 + ρPRIN ) + (.1− FE10)(νOBAPE0)
22Babcock, Moreira, and Peng (2013) posit an ethanol demand curve which is elastic for low
ethanol volumes at a price ratio relative to BOB of 1.2 (νOBA = 0.20). As the ethanol volume
approaches the blendwall in their demand curve, the price ratio decreases, so I assume a lower price
ratio (νOBA = 0.15).
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Figure 2.2: Monthly RIN prices
Note: This figure shows the monthly RIN prices calculated from Bloomberg. RIN prices are
reported in separate vintages depending on the year in which the RIN was generated. A monthly
average within vintage is calculated as a simple average of available daily prices. Missing months,
which occur mostly in the earlier years of the mandate when RIN prices were near zero, are linearly
interpolated. The price is then taken as the maximum among all reported vintages.
not in the model like transportation costs and taxes. When I simulate the model,
I add a wedge between the retail price and the blender cost. I allow the wedge to
include an ad valorem component νG1 and a per unit component νG2 because some
gasoline taxes are ad valorem and others are expressed per unit volume. Equation
2.11 becomes: RPE10 = BCE10νG1 + νG2. I estimate both components empirically,
and use the estimates for calibrating the model.
The parameter νG2 expresses a constant markup per gallon. To estimate the
constant markup per gallon νG2, I regress the retail price of E10 on the blender
cost of components.23 Table 2.2 shows that the retail price exceeds the blender cost
of components by about 72 cents.24 I use this estimate for the parameter νG2 in
23The equation is: RPE10,t = νG2 + β1BCE10,t + u.
24This is very close in concept and magnitude to the “wholesale-to-retail price markup” of 75
cents reported by Pouliot and Babcock (2014).
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Figure 2.3: E10 retail price and blender cost
Note: The left panel compares the retail price of E10 with the blender cost of E10. The right panel
compares the blender cost of ethanol to the blender cost of BOB. Retail price is the U.S. city average
retail price of unleaded regular gasoline, from EIA. Blender cost (BC) is calculated according to the
following equation: BCE10 = FE10(PE100−PR6)+(1−FE10)(PE0+ρPRIN )+(.1−FE10)(νOBAPE0).
Ethanol fraction FE10 is ethanol share of finished gasoline consumption, from EIA. Ethanol price
PE100 is blender cost of ethanol with credit, from U.S. Bioenergy Statistics. The vector of RIN
prices PRIN includes renewable PR6, advanced PR5, and biodiesel PR4 RIN prices, from Bloomberg.
BOB price PE0 is generic RBOB gasoline (XB1), from Bloomberg. The vector of RFS fractions ρ
is from past EPA rules. The cost of octane-boosting additives is assumed to be proportional to the
price of BOB, νOBA = 0.15.







Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: This table reports regression results of retail price on blender cost of E10 using monthly data. See note on
Figure 2.3.
simulations.
The parameter νG1 expresses the passthrough of blender costs to the retail price
of E10. In the model, arbitrage is instantaneous, but in data cost changes may not
be passed through right away or at all. As a simple exercise, I regress retail price
on a distributed lag of the blender cost. The regression will be endogenous if there
is reverse causality from retail prices to blender costs. Table 2.3 shows the results
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Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: This table reports regression results of a change in retail price on a distributed lag of blender cost of E10 using
monthly data. See note on Figure 2.3.
of the regression.25 A price change in the blender cost of components is followed by
a price change in the retail price of E10. I use the three-month estimate that 109%
of a change to the blender cost of components is reflected in the retail price for the
parameter νG1 in simulations. An effect larger than 100% is consistent with passing
through ad valorem taxes.
Blending components of E10—The model predicts that the blender cost of
ethanol will equal the blender cost of BOB whenever the blend fraction is interior,
i.e. not at the 0% or 10% boundaries.26 This relationship is expressed by equation
2.12. Figure 2.3 shows that this prediction fails—the blender cost of ethanol is in
general not equal to the blender cost of BOB. I attribute this to regional variation
that is not captured by the model. Individual blenders in Minnesota face a blender
cost of ethanol below the national average because of local subsidies and proximity to
ethanol distilleries. Minnesota blenders are therefore more likely to be at the corner
25The regression equation is ∆RPE10,t = β0 +
∑2
i=0 βi−1∆∆BCE10,t−i + νG1∆BCE10,t−3 + u.
See Knittel, Meiselman, and Stock (2015) for a more thorough treatment of passthrough under the
RFS.
26Salvo and Huse (2011) observe this link between the price of ethanol and the price of BOB in
Brazil.
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solution, blending in the maximum 10% ethanol into E10 gasoline, when blenders in
other states like Mississippi still observe a cost of ethanol above the cost of BOB.27
Even though the blender cost of ethanol is not equal to the blender cost of BOB
nationally, the model can still be a good description of local choices.
Retail price and blender cost of diesel and E85—The model’s predictions
for diesel prices are supported by the data.28 The predictions for diesel are parallel
to the predictions for E10: retail price is equal to blender cost of components (with a
stable wedge), and the blender cost of one component is equal to the blender cost of
the other component at interior blends. For diesel, an “interior blend” corresponds
to the situation in which both unblended petroleum-based diesel and a diesel blend
with 5% biodiesel are being consumed.
The model’s predictions for E85 prices are not supported by the data. This is
not surprising because E85 volumes are low and E85 price data are less reliable than
E10 and diesel price data. National prices for E85 are biased downward relative to
the blender cost of components because they are weighted by sales volume, which is
highest in regions of the country where the price is lowest. Furthermore, demand for
E85 is not large enough to impose a relationship between the blender cost of ethanol
and the blender cost of BOB. In simulations, I use the estimated E10 price wedges
for all blends of gasoline.
27Appendix Figure 2.20 illustrates regional variation in ethanol blending. States are shaded
according to the fraction of ethanol in blended gasoline from 2003 to 2011. Minnesota, Illinois,
and California stand out as having relatively high fractions, while Texas and the Southeast have
relatively low fractions.
28Appendix Section 2.8.3 illustrates the price relationships for diesel and E85 and estimates a
price wedge between the retail price and blender cost of diesel.
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Table 2.4: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Symbol Value Source/Target
nonfuel corn demand elasticity εC -0.25 Babcock, Barr, and Carriquiry (2010)
gasoline demand elasticity εG -0.20
Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling
(2008) and Coglianese et al. (2016)
diesel demand elasticity εB -0.07 Dahl (2012)
corn supply elasticity ηC 0.05 Roberts and Schlenker (2013)
bushels of corn per gallon of ethanol µ 0.361 Westhoff (2006)
ethanol wedge over nonfuel corn νC 0.76 average wedge 1982 to 2013
petrogas supply elasticity ηG 10 assumption
petrodiesel supply elasticity ηD 10 assumption
energy-equivalent e10 gallons per e85 γ 0.86 EPA BTU/barrel: 3.6 E100, 5.3 E0
gasoline price wedge per unit value νG1 1.09 Section 2.4
gasoline price wedge per unit volume νG2 0.72 Section 2.4
diesel price wedge per unit value νB1 1.07 Section 2.4
diesel price wedge per unit volume νB2 0.81 Section 2.4
gasoline demand elasticity of substition σ1−σ -7.6 Salvo and Huse (2013)
gasoline demand share α 0.65 0.3 bgals E85
sugarcane ethanol supply intercept log(θS) 1.23 280 mgals net imports
sugarcane ethanol supply elasticity ηS 35.1 Babcock, Moreira, and Peng (2013)
biodiesel refining supply intercept log(θB) 0.43 1.28 bgals B100
biodiesel refining supply elasticity ηB 1.37 Babcock, Moreira, and Peng (2013)
soy input cost per biodiesel gallon ψB 3.6 price of soy oil
Note: This table omits some parameters. Mandate fractions (ρ) are listed in Table 2.1. The demand and supply
intercepts at the calibrated point are in Appendix Table 2.7.
2.5 Calibration
The calibration is designed to permit policy experiments for 2014. Table 2.4 shows
the values used for model parameters, and I discuss the parameters using the table
as a guide.
RFS fractions—The RFS renewable fraction is calibrated to the blendwall and
the other RFS fractions to the 2014 Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Environmental
Protection Agency 2013). This is appropriate because the goal of the calibration is
to perform policy experiments for 2014. In the policy experiment, I will increase the
renewable RFS fraction and observe the equilibrium response as the RFS obligation
exceeds the blendwall.
Demand elasticities and income—Values for demand elasticity parameters
are based on estimates in the literature. Babcock, Barr, and Carriquiry (2010)
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construct several demand curves for nonfuel corn products. I use their estimated
elasticity for corn feed -0.25. Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling (2008) estimate a range
for gasoline demand elasticity in the 2000s of -0.034 to -0.077. However, Coglianese et
al. (2016) argue that gasoline demand elasticity estimates that use contemporary tax
changes as an instrument are too low, and they offer a much higher point estimate
of -0.368. In my base case I use a gasoline demand elasticity between these two
estimates (-0.20), and the results are robust to alternative simulations with a lower
elasticity (-0.03) and a higher elasticity (-0.37). I use a diesel demand elasticity of
-0.07 from Dahl (2012).
Corn supply—Values for three corn supply parameters are from various sources.
For corn supply elasticity (ηC = 0.05), I rely on Roberts and Schlenker (2013),
who identify supply elasticities of storable commodities with the express purpose
of evaluating the RFS. For the bushels of corn input into one gallon of ethanol
(µ = 0.361), I use the ratio in a briefing from the Food and Agricultural Policy
Research Institute (Westhoff 2006). For the difference between the price of ethanol
and the price of corn inputs into ethanol (νC = 0.76), I use the average of the
observed difference from 1982 through 2013.29
Petroleum-based blending components—I assume a supply elasticity for
BOB and diesel. The market for these products is sufficiently global that small
changes in the United States are unlikely to have a large impact on the global price.
If a refiner can sell BOB outside the United States at some global price without
paying the cost of RFS compliance, then the price the refiner receives in the United
States must exceed the global price by the cost of RFS compliance. So PUS =
PWORLD + RFS COST. In my base case I use an elasticity of 10, and the results are
29The price of ethanol reflects the cost of the corn input, the cost of the refining process, and
the revenue from distillers grains, a valuable byproduct of ethanol production.
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robust to alternative choices of 5 or 20.
Energy-equivalence factor—The E10-E85 energy-equivalence factor is com-
puted using EPA assumptions about the energy content of ethanol and BOB. In
the 2014 proposal, the EPA assumes 3.561 million British thermal units (BTU) per
barrel for ethanol and 5.253 million BTU per barrel for BOB. I assume the fraction
of ethanol in E10 is 10% and the ethanol fraction in E85 is 51%, and I use an energy-
equivalence factor of 0.86 in my base case. The results are robust to assuming the
ethanol fraction in E85 is 85%, which implies an energy-equivalence factor of 0.75.
Blended fuel price wedge and regional variation—Section 2.4 describes
estimation of price wedges for gasoline and diesel. The gasoline markup per gallon
is 72 cents, and the gasoline passthrough of blender costs is 1.09. The diesel markup
per gallon is 81 cents, and the diesel passthrough of blender costs is 1.07.
The model does not make regional distinctions even though there is substantial
regional variation.30 There are state-specific taxes and subsidies on biofuel, gasoline
and diesel. The cost of transporting ethanol distilled in Minnesota to Wisconsin is
considerably different than the cost of transporting it to Alabama. The aggregate
price relationship between blender cost and retail price is likely to be noisier than
the model predicts due to regional variation. The main regional-related shortcoming
of the model is the need to choose a single national blender cost of ethanol. Ethanol
transportation costs vary widely by region. Variation in the price of BOB is likely
to be less severe because it is often transported through low-cost pipelines.
E85 demand—The elasticity of substitution between E10 and E85 is inferred
from the behavior of drivers switching between ethanol and gasoline. For tractability,
I assume a constant elasticity of substitution. Salvo and Huse (2013) find that 20%
30Pouliot and Babcock (2014) also do not distinguish among regions, and their wholesale-retail
price wedge is 75 cents. That is similar to my estimate of 72 cents. Liu and Greene (2013) compute
region-specific E85 demand intercepts to account for such differences.
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of Brazilian FFV drivers choose ethanol even when it is 20% more expensive per mile,
and 20% of FFV drivers choose gasoline even when ethanol is 20% less expensive per
mile. From these points, I calculate an elasticity of -7.6. I also solve the model with
a higher elasticity and a lower elasticity. For each elasticity, the E10 demand share
α is calculated such that the E85 demand curve passes through 300 million gallons
at a price of $3.50.31
There are two significant differences between what Salvo and Huse measure and
what I model. First, they measure the elasticity of substitution between 100% ethanol
and 100% petroleum gasoline, whereas the relevant elasticity in my model is between
E85 and E10. This difference in fuel blends should lead their estimate to understate
the elasticity in my model because whatever non-performance factors consumers take
into account are reduced for less extreme blends. Second, they measure the elasticity
for FFV drivers only, whereas my model has a representative consumer, and FFVs
are only about 5% of the fleet. This difference in fleet composition should lead their
estimate to overstate the elasticity in my model, although drivers may convert their
non-flex fuel vehicles to become FFVs.
Biofuel supply—I assume biofuel supply elasticities based on discussion by
Babcock, Moreira, and Peng (2013). They argue that the supply of sugarcane ethanol
from Brazil should be very elastic because Brazil’s flexible infrastructure—FFVs
and fueling stations—facilitates substitution between ethanol and gasoline.32 I use
a sugarcane ethanol supply elasticity of 35 in the baseline calibration. I choose
the sugarcane ethanol supply intercept such that consumption will be equal to 280
million gallons at the calibrated point. I use a biodiesel supply elasticity of 1.37 in the
31See Appendix Section 2.8.4 for a comparison to E85 demand estimated by Pouliot and Babcock
(2014)
32Figure 15 in Babcock, Moreira, and Peng (2013) illustrates a supply curve that passes through
0 volume at a price of $2.70 and 1.8 billion gallons at a price of $3.10. In my model, this corresponds
to a supply elasticity of about 35.
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baseline calibration.33 I choose the supply intercept such that biodiesel production
will be equal to 1.28 billion gallons at the calibrated point. The results are robust
to alternate sugarcane ethanol supply elasticities and to alternate biodiesel supply
elasticities.
Supply and demand intercepts—The model has 26 equations and 26 endo-
genous variables. All but six of the parameters are discussed above. The remaining
six parameters are the demand intercepts for nonfuel corn, gasoline, and diesel, and
the supply intercepts for corn, BOB, and petrodiesel. Six endogenous variables are
chosen based on projections or recent history, and the model is solved as if the six
unknown parameters were endogenous variables.
I set the quantity of BOB and petrodiesel to the quantities assumed in the 2014
proposal, 119.5 bgals and 45.7 bgals. I set the quantity of nonfuel corn to 6 billion
bushels and the price of petrodiesel to $3.00, in line with their recent observed values.
At the blendwall, the model requires the blender cost of ethanol to equal the blender
cost of BOB. In order to calibrate the model at the blendwall, price of BOB must
be below the price of ethanol, so I set the price of BOB to $2.50 and the price of
ethanol to $3.00.
Because six “endogenous variables” are chosen and six “parameters” are permit-
ted to take on any value, the model still describes a system with 26 equations and
26 unknowns. I solve the system and retain the parameter values for the demand
and supply intercepts for use in simulation. For robustness checks using alternative
elasticities, I recalibrate these six intercepts.
33This elasticity is based on Babcock, Moreira, and Peng (2013), who estimate that the quantity
supplied of biodiesel is 1.28 billion gallons when price exceeds variable cost by 43 cents per gallon
and 1.85 billion gallons when price exceeds variable cost by one dollar.
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Table 2.5: Empirical verification of endogenous variables
Actual
Variable 2012 2013 Calibration Unit Description
FBX 1.7% 2.4% 2.7% % fraction of biodiesel in diesel
FE10 9.7% 9.9% 9.9% % fraction of ethanol in E10 gasoline
FE85 71% 71% 51% % fraction of ethanol in E85 gasoline
PBX 3.95 3.94 4.04 usd/gal price of diesel
PE10 3.69 3.62 3.51 usd/gal price of E10 gasoline
PE85 3.33 3.23 3.67 usd/gal price of E85 gasoline
QBX 53.0 54.5 47.0 bgal quantity of diesel
QE10 133.7 133.2 132.5 bgal quantity of E10 gasoline
QE85 0.2 0.2 0.3 bgal quantity of E85 gasoline
PB0 3.11 3.02 3.00 usd/gal price of petroleum-based diesel
PB100 4.51 4.76 4.44 usd/gal price of biodiesel
PE0 3.03 2.97 2.50 usd/gal price of BOB
PE100 2.58 2.40 3.00 usd/gal price of corn ethanol
QB0 52.1 53.2 45.7 bgal quantity of petroleum-based diesel
QB100 0.9 1.3 1.3 bgal quantity of biodiesel
QE0 121.2 120.7 119.5 bgal quantity of BOB
QE100 12.7 12.7 13.0 bgal quantity of ethanol
QSE100 0.32 0.20 0.28 bgal quantity of sugarcane ethanol
PC 6.67 6.47 6.21 usd/bsh price of nonfuel corn
QC 7.6 6.9 7.0 bbsh quantity of nonfuel corn
PR3 0.89 0.95 1.05 usd/gal price of cellulosic RINs
PR4 1.12 0.76 0.95 usd/gal price of biodiesel RINs
PR5 0.64 0.70 0.41 usd/gal price of advanced RINs
PR6 0.04 0.59 0.10 usd/gal price of renewable RINs
Note: Quantities in the model are expressed in billions of dollars, gallons, or bushels. Prices are expressed in dollars
per gallon or bushel. Calibrated values for six variables (PB0, PE0, PE100, QB0, QE0, QC) are chosen; the remaining
values and six demand and supply intercepts are solved using the model system of equations.
2.5.1 Empirical verification
The model is a good description of the market for renewable fuels because, at the
calibrated point, endogenous variables are near their observed values in 2012 and
2013. Table 2.5 lists the endogenous variables in the model, their observed values in
2012 and 2013, and their calibrated values. For calibrating price of renewable RINs
at the blendwall, 2012 is more informative. For most other variables, 2013 is more
informative.
The discrepancy between calibrated and actual diesel volume comes from the
EPA’s 2014 proposal, which reports a projected diesel volume of 47 billion gallons.
I do not know why this projection is so low. However, I defer to the EPA on this
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point. The effect of this deference is that the blended diesel demand intercept is
lower than it would otherwise be. The results are robust to alternative assumptions
about the blended diesel demand intercept.
I attribute deviations in the fraction of ethanol in E85 gasoline and the price of
E85 to regional variation. Real gasoline blenders have costs that differ by region. In
the model, there is just an average national cost, so the calibrated fraction of ethanol
in E85 is more likely to be exactly 51% or exactly 85%. E85 prices are more likely
to be reported in regions with lower E85 prices.
2.6 Results
I simulate policy alternatives by solving the system of equations numerically for a
range of possible values for the renewable fuel mandate. This is represented by the
parameter ρ6 in the model, which I vary exogenously. A key parameter in the model
is the elasticity of substitution between E10 and E85, so I report results for the
base case, a higher alternative and a lower alternative. Figure 2.4 shows simulation
results for many endogenous variables. In each graph, the horizontal axis is the total
RFS volume obligation for all four RIN categories combined, expressed in ethanol-
equivalent gallons. The RFS fractions for cellulosic, biodiesel, and advanced are held
constant, so the only change is in the renewable fraction. The dashed vertical line
in each graph is the blendwall.
These results tell a story of how the market responds to increasing the RFS in
light of the blendwall and the linkage among RIN prices. When the RFS is at the
blendwall, the fraction of ethanol in E10 is below 10% and the fraction in E85 is
above 10%. The first response of the market is to increase the fraction of ethanol in
E10 to the 10% limit. When this is no longer possible, the price of renewable RINs
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increases rapidly until the blender cost of ethanol reaches the blender cost of BOB.
At that point blenders are indifferent between adding BOB and ethanol to E85, and
the blend fraction in E85 increases from 51% to 85%. When the maximum E85 blend
is reached, the price of renewable RINs continues increasing, which is passed through
to consumers in the form of a lower price of E85. Consumers shift from E10 toward
E85 until the price of renewable RINs reaches the price of biodiesel RINs. From then
on, both biodiesel production and E85 consumption rise.
The price of blended diesel responds to the mandate even though the price of E10
does not. This is because the blended fuels respond differently to a change in the
price of renewable RINs. As the price of renewable RINs rises, the blender cost of
petrodiesel and the blender cost of BOB rise by the same amount. The cost of BOB
is offset by a decline in the blender cost of ethanol, but the blender cost of biodiesel
is unchanged.
2.6.1 Welfare analysis
I estimate the welfare effects of an increase in the RFS volume by calculating the
change in emissions, the change in producer and consumer surplus, and cost per ton
of emissions reduction. I compare the cost per ton of emissions reduction to the
social cost of carbon.
I choose measures of life cycle emissions that are likely to be seen as most rele-
vant by the EPA.34 I assume CO2 emissions for petroleum-based gasoline and diesel
are 16.8 and 15.8 kilograms per million British thermal units of energy.35 I assume
34There is not a consensus on these life cycle emissions measures. Some analysts have claimed
that the life cycle emissions from corn ethanol actually exceed life cycle emissions from petroleum-
based gasoline. I use estimates from the Department of Energy and the EPA because they are most
likely to be used in evaluating policy alternatives.
35Regulatory Impact Analysis, Environmental Protection Agency, EPA-420-R-10-006, February
2010, page 467.
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blending components have the following energy content: 0.124 million British ther-
mal units per gallon of petroleum gasoline, 0.137 mmbtu/gal of petroleum diesel,
0.128 mmbtu/gal of biodiesel, and 0.085 mmbtu/gal of ethanol.36 I assume the fol-
lowing emissions reductions per unit energy relative to the petroleum baseline: a
52% reduction for biodiesel, 19% for corn ethanol, and 78% for sugarcane ethanol.37
These assumptions imply life cycle carbon emissions are 2.09, 2.17, 0.97, 0.31, and
1.15 kg/gal for BOB, petrodiesel, biodiesel, sugarcane ethanol, and corn ethanol.
To calculate total emissions, I multiply the consumption volume of each blending
component by its life cycle emissions.
Figure 2.5 shows that increasing the mandate from 15 to 16 billion EEGs reduces
emissions by about 1 million metric ton. Around the blendwall, the marginal rene-
wable volume is corn ethanol, which is only a small reduction in emissions relative
to BOB. Emissions decline mostly through the channel of substituting ethanol for
BOB until the price of renewable RINs rises enough to meet the price of biodiesel
RINs. Biodiesel is a larger reduction in emissions relative to petroleum diesel, but
the RFS generates 1.5 ethanol-equivalent RINs for each gallon of biodiesel. When
marginal increases in the mandate are also met by biodiesel, the pace of emissions
changes but not by much.
Increasing the mandate from 15 to 16 billion EEGs reduces total surplus by about
$800 million. Consumer surplus declines are offset by an increase in producer surplus.
Producer surplus increases because the price of corn and the price of biodiesel rise,
so there is a larger return to inframarginal production. The change in consumer
surplus and producer surplus does not include private valuation of environmental
36The energy content is the higher heating value reported in Alternative Fuels Data Center
(2013a), which is consistent with values reported in the 2014 RFS proposal.
37Biodiesel reduction is from Alternative Fuels Data Center (2014a) and ethanol reductions are
from Alternative Fuels Data Center (2014b).
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quality. Total surplus declines at a slower pace once adjustment to the mandate
is achieved through both biodiesel and ethanol. Marginal cost of reducing carbon
emissions rises as the RFS volume increases. I find that the average cost of reducing
carbon emissions by increasing the mandate from 15 to 16 billion gallons is about
$800 per metric ton. This is much larger than the social cost of carbon used by
policymakers.38
2.7 Conclusion
This paper shows that the cost of reducing carbon emissions using the RFS is high in
the short run. The cost of shifting behavior is relatively high because the blendwall
limits the extent to which the mandate can be met through regular gasoline. The
cost of shifting behavior is mitigated by the linkage among the different categories
of renewable fuel; the renewable mandate can be met by shifting consumption from
E10 to E85 and also shifting the blend composition of diesel towards biodiesel. The
benefit of shifting consumption from E10 to E85 is relatively low because the life cycle
carbon emissions of conventional ethanol are nearly as high as the life cycle carbon
emissions of petroleum-based gasoline. The benefit of shifting the blend composition
of diesel towards biodiesel is more substantial, but biodiesel is expensive to produce.
In the long run, the RFS could still be beneficial. The Renewable Fuel Standard
was built to support investment in production technology for cellulosic fuel, which
emits around one fifth as much greenhouse gas as petroleum-based gasoline for the
same energy output. The RFS pushes refiners to develop technology, blenders to
invest in infrastructure, and consumers to drive FFVs. Whether those investments
are worthwhile is beyond the scope of this analysis, as are the long term costs of
38The social cost of carbon for 2014 is estimated to be $36. See Interagency Working Group on
Social Cost of Carbon (2013).
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devoting more agricultural land to corn production and integrating the supply of
food with the supply of fuel. Policymakers should consider both the short run and
the long run tradeoffs.
2.8 Appendix
2.8.1 Institutions
Table 2.6: Transportation fuel volume, billions of gallons
Gasoline Ethanol Ethanol/ Diesel Biodiesel Biodiesel/
Year bgals bgals Gasoline bgals bgals Diesel
2005 140.4 4.1 2.9% 54.6 0.1 0.2%
2006 141.8 5.5 3.9% 56.7 0.2 0.4%
2007 142.4 6.9 4.8% 56.7 0.5 0.9%
2008 138.2 9.7 7.0% 53.8 0.7 1.3%
2009 138.0 11.0 8.0% 49.4 0.5 1.1%
2010 137.8 12.9 9.3% 52.6 0.3 0.6%
2011 134.1 12.9 9.6% 54.3 0.9 1.6%
2012 133.4 12.9 9.7% 53.2 0.9 1.7%
2013 133.8 13.2 9.9% 54.0 1.3 2.4%
Note: By 2013, the ethanol fraction rose to the 10% limit in E10 gasoline. The biodiesel fraction was substantially
below the 5% limit in B5 diesel. Short Term Energy Outlook.
2.8.2 Model
This appendix includes the full set of equations in the single-period model described
in Section 2.3. For the list of variables see Table 2.5. For the list of parameters see
Table 2.7.
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Table 2.7: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Symbol Value Source/Target
mandate fraction for D3 RINs ρ3 0.0001 NPRM 2014
mandate fraction for D4 RINs ρ4 0.0116 NPRM 2014
mandate fraction for D5 RINs ρ5 0.0016 NPRM 2014
mandate fraction for D6 RINs ρ6 0.0787 blendwall
nonfuel corn demand elasticity εC -0.25 Babcock, Barr, and Carriquiry (2010)
gasoline demand elasticity εG -0.20
Hughes, Knittel, and Sperling
(2008) and Coglianese et al. (2016)
diesel demand elasticity εB -0.07 Dahl (2012)
corn supply elasticity ηC 0.05 Roberts and Schlenker (2013)
bushels of corn per gallon of ethanol µ 0.361 Westhoff (2006)
ethanol wedge over nonfuel corn νC 0.76 average wedge 1982 to 2013
petrogas supply elasticity ηG 10 assumption
petrodiesel supply elasticity ηD 10 assumption
energy-equivalent e10 gallons per e85 γ 0.86 EPA BTU/barrel: 3.6 E100, 5.3 E0
income Y 17000 GDP
gasoline price wedge per unit value νG1 1.09 Section 2.4
gasoline price wedge per unit volume νG2 0.72 Section 2.4
diesel price wedge per unit value νB1 1.07 Section 2.4
diesel price wedge per unit volume νB2 0.81 Section 2.4
gasoline demand elasticity of substition σ1−σ -7.6 Salvo and Huse (2013)
gasoline demand share α 0.65 0.3 bgals E85
sugarcane ethanol supply intercept log(θS) 1.23 280 mgals net imports
sugarcane ethanol supply elasticity ηS 35.1 Babcock, Moreira, and Peng (2013)
biodiesel refining supply intercept log(θB) 0.43 1.28 bgals B100
biodiesel refining supply elasticity ηB 1.37 Babcock, Moreira, and Peng (2013)
soy input cost per biodiesel gallon ψB 3.6 price of soy oil
nonfuel corn demand intercept log(φC) 37.8 calibration
gasoline demand intercept log(φG) 224.5 calibration
diesel demand intercept log(φB) 193.9 calibration
corn supply intercept log(θC) -45.4 calibration
BOB supply intercept log(θG) 0.21 calibration
petrodiesel supply intercept log(θD) 0.72 calibration
Note: This table reports the full list of calibrated parameters.
2.8.2.1 Consumers































The consumer’s budget constraint:
PE10QE10 + PE85QE85 + PBXQBX + PCQC +QZ = Y (2.21)
The first order conditions yield the following equations:
PE10 = φG[(α)(QE10)
1
























Combining equations (2.22) and (2.23) yields a more convenient equation relating





)1− 1σ ( 1
α
− 1) (A.3*)
I assume the fraction of ethanol in E10 is 10% for the purpose of calculating its
energy content. The energy-equivalence factor γ expresses the number of gallons of
E10 that have the same amount of energy as one gallon of E85. γ is a function of
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the fraction of ethanol in E85 FE85.
γ = gallons of E10gallon of E85
= BTU per gallon of E85BTU per gallon of E10
= BTUE0 + FE85(BTUE100 −BTUE0)
BTUE0 + FE10(BTUE100 −BTUE0)
= 5.253 + FE85(3.561− 5.253)5.253 + 0.1(3.561− 5.253)
= 1.03− .33FE85
The fraction of ethanol in E85 ranges from 51% to 85%, and the energy-equivalence
factor ranges from 0.86 to 0.75.
2.8.2.2 Blenders
Define the vectors ρ and PRIN such that they succinctly express the RFS compliance
cost for one gallon of nonrenewable fuel:
ρPRIN = ρ3PR3 + ρ4PR4 + ρ5PR5 + ρ6PR6
Gasoline Blenders For simplicity, the role of sugarcane ethanol was omitted from
the main text. The relationship among blender costs follows the same logic as for
ethanol and BOB; the blender cost of corn ethanol must equal the blender cost of
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(1− F SE100)(PE100 − PR6) + F SE100(P SE100 − PR5)
]




s.t. 0 ≤ FE10 ≤ 0.1
The E10 blender’s first order conditions:
PE10 =
[





PE100 − PR6 =(1 + νOBA)PE0 + ρPRIN or FE10 = 0 or FE10 = .1 (2.27)
P SE100 − PR5 =PE100 − PR6 or F SE100 = 0 or F SE100 = 1 (2.28)





PE85 − FE85(PE100 − PR6)




s.t. .51 ≤ FE85 ≤ .85
The E85 blender’s first order conditions:
PE85 =
[
FE85(PE100 − PR6) + (1− FE85)(PE0 + ρPRIN)
]
νG1 + νG2 (2.29)
PE100 − PR6 = PE0 + ρPRIN or FE85 = .51 or FE85 = .85 (2.30)
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PBX − FBX(PB100 − PR4)




The diesel blender’s first order conditions:
PBX =
[
FBX(PB100 − PR4) + (1− FBX)(PB0 + ρPRIN)
]
νB1 + νB2 (2.31)
PB100 − PR4 = PB0 + ρPRIN (2.32)
2.8.2.3 Producers
Ethanol and nonfuel corn The corn producer’s maximization problem:
max
QC ,QE100






The corn producer’s first order conditions:
PC = θC(QC + µQE100)
1
ηC (2.33)
PE100 − νC = θCµ(QC + µQE100)
1
ηC (2.34)
Combining equations (2.33) and (2.35) yields a more convenient equation relating
the price of ethanol and nonfuel corn.
PE100 = µPC + νC (13a)
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The interepretation of QSE100 is the net imports of Brazilian sugarcane ethanol. If
the price of advanced RINs exceeds the price of renewable RINs by more than the
cost of transporting ethanol to and from Brazil, then an arbitrageur could export
corn ethanol and import sugarcane ethanol. The model permits such trade but does
not keep track of gross flows. Knowing domestic corn ethanol production and net
sugarcane imports is sufficient for determining the effect on the market for blended
fuels. The sugarcane ethanol importer’s first order condition:
P SE100 = νS + θS(QSE100)
1
ηS (2.35)
Biodiesel The biodiesel refiner’s maximization problem:
max
QB0







The biodiesel refiner’s first order condition:



































2.8.2.4 Market clearing conditions
The market clearing condition for ethanol:
FE10QE10 + FE85QE85 = QE100 +QSE100 (2.39)
The market clearing condition for BOB:
(1− FE10)QE10 + (1− FE85)QE85 = QE0 (2.40)
The market clearing condition for biodiesel:
FBXQBX = QB100 (2.41)
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The market clearing condition for petroleum diesel:
(1− FBX)QBX = QB0 (2.42)
The market clearing condition for renewable RINs:
QE100 +QSE100 + 1.5QB100 = ∆R4 + ∆R5 + ∆R6 + (QE0 +QB0)(ρ3 + ρ4 + ρ5 + ρ6)
(2.43)
Recall that QSE100 is net imports of sugarcane ethanol. The market clearing condition
for advanced RINs:
QSE100 + 1.5QB100 = ∆R4 + ∆R5 + (QE0 +QB0)(ρ3 + ρ4 + ρ5) (2.44)
The preceding condition is slack does not need to hold if the price of advanced RINs
exceeds the price of renewable RINs by a sufficient margin. The market clearing
condition for biodiesel RINs:
1.5QB100 ≥ ∆R4 + (QE0 +QB0)(ρ4) (2.45)
2.8.3 Empirics
This appendix extends the E10 analysis in Section 2.4 to E85 and blended diesel. I
use the convention ∆Xt = Xt −Xt−1.
2.8.3.1 Price and blender cost of diesel
The model predicts that the retail price of blended diesel will equal the blender cost
(BC) of components.
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Figure 2.9 plots diesel retail price and blender cost of components. Like E10,
the two series track each other closely and the retail price exceeds blender cost by
a substantial margin, which I attribute to transportation costs and taxes. When I
simulate the model, I add a wedge between the retail price and the blender cost. I
allow the wedge to include an ad valorem component νB1 and a per unit component
νB2 because some taxes are ad valorem and others are expressed per unit volume.
The equation is RPBX = BCBXνB1 + νB2. I estimate both components empirically,
and use the estimates for calibrating the model.







Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: This table reports regression results of retail price on blender cost of blended diesel using monthly data. See
note on Figure 2.9.







Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: This table reports regression results of a change in retail price on a distributed lag of blender cost of blended
diesel using monthly data. See note on Figure 2.9.
The parameter νB2 expresses a constant markup per gallon. To estimate the
constant markup per gallon νB2, I regress the retail price of blended diesel on the
blender cost of components.39 Table 2.8 shows that the retail price exceeds the
39The equation is: RPBX,t = νB2 + β1BCBX,t + u.
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blender cost of components by about 81 cents. I use this estimate for the parameter
νB2 in simulations.
The parameter νB1 expresses the passthrough of blender costs to the retail price
of blended diesel. As with E10, I regress retail price on a distributed lag of the
blender cost. Table 2.9 shows the results of the regression.40 A price change in the
blender cost of components is followed by a price change in the retail price of blended
diesel. I use the five-month estimate that 107% of a change to the blender cost of
components is reflected in the retail price for the parameter νB1 in simulations.
The model predicts that the blender cost of biodiesel will equal the blender cost
of petroleum-based diesel whenever the blend fraction is interior, i.e. between 0%
and 5%. Figure 2.9 shows that the prices of the two components track each other
closely.
2.8.3.2 Price and blender cost of E85
The model predicts that the retail price of E85 will equal the blender cost (BC) of
components:
BCE85 = FE85(PE100 − PR6) + (1− FE85)(PE0 + ρPRIN)
Whereas the model was augmented with octane-boosting additives for the empirical
analysis of E10, there is no need to do that for E85 because E85 has high octane
content without additives.
Figure 2.10 shows that the retail price of E85 exceeds the blender cost of compo-
nents. As with E10, I regress the retail price of E85 on the blender cost of compo-
nents.41 Table 2.10 shows that the retail price exceeds the blender cost of components
40The regression equation is ∆RPBX,t = β0 +
∑2
i=0 βi−1∆∆BCBX,t−i + νB1∆BCBX,t−3 + u.
41The equation is: RPE85,t = νG2 + β1BCE85,t + u.
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by about $1.75. However, the sample period is short, so in simulations I use the E10
estimate of markup per gallon (νG2 = 0.72).







Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: This table reports regression results of retail price on blender cost of E85 using monthly data. See note on
Figure 2.10.
As with E10, I regress retail price on a distributed lag of the blender cost. Table
2.11 shows the results of the regression.42 These estimates are not precise, so in
simulations I use the E10 estimate of passthrough of blender costs (νG1 = 1.09).













Standard errors in parentheses
*** p < 0.01, ** p < 0.05, * p < 0.1
Note: This table reports regression results of a change in retail price on a distributed lag of blender cost of E85 using
monthly data. See note on Figure 2.10.
2.8.4 Calibration
The two parameters that determine demand for E85 are the elasticity of substitution
σ
1−σ and the E10 demand share α. The main results are reported for an elasticity
42The regression equation is ∆RPE85,t = β0 +
∑2
i=0 βi−1∆∆BCE85,t−i + νG1∆BCE85,t−3 + u.
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of -7.6, and results are calculated for elasticities 50% higher and lower as well, -3.8
and -11.4. For each elasticity, α is calculated such that the E85 demand curve passes
through 300 million gallons at a price of $3.50. For elasticities of -3.8, -7.6, and -11.4,
the demand shares are .95, .80, and .59. Holding fixed the ethanol fraction in E85
and the quantity and price of E10, the implied demand curves for E85 at various
elasticities of substitution are shown in Figure 2.11.
Pouliot and Babcock (2014) estimate E85 demand with various assumptions
about the convenience cost of E85 and the strength of consumer preferences for
regular gasoline. When the price of E85 is at the energy-equivalent parity price of
E10, their estimates of E85 quantity demanded range from about 0.5 to 6.0 billion
gallons, with the main cases near 2 billion gallons at parity.43 Under nearly all pre-
ference assumptions, Pouliot and Babcock (2014) estimate that FFV drivers would
be willing to consume as much as 8 billion gallons of E85 at a sufficiently large dis-
count relative to E10. However, even though drivers might be willing to consume
E85, Pouliot and Babcock find that the capacity constraints of existing E85 fueling
stations could limit distribution to about 1.5 billion gallons. In other words, their
estimates imply the binding constraint on consumption of E85 is the capacity of E85
fueling stations, not consumer demand or the number of FFVs.
My constant-elasticity-of-substitution specification of E85 demand is different
from Pouliot and Babcock’s, but the implications for E85 demand are largely con-
sistent. In my base case with an elasticity of substitution equal to -7.6, the E85
quantity demanded at the energy-equivalent parity price of E10 is 1.3 billion gallons.
This is a bit lower than most of Pouliot and Babcock’s estimates of consumer de-
mand but still within their estimates of fueling station capacity. In my high elasticity
alternative case, the E85 quantity demanded at the energy-equivalent parity price of
43Pouliot and Babcock (2014) figures 4 through 7.
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E10 is 2.7 billion gallons. This would be appropriate to consider if willingness to pay
for E85 is relatively high and investment in new fueling stations is very responsive
to the mandate. In my low elasticity alternative case, the E85 quantity demanded
at the energy-equivalent parity price of E10 is 0.6 billion gallons. This would be
appropriate to consider if willingness to pay for E85 was very low.
One shortcoming of my specification is that it does not capture the upper limit
on E85 consumption. Even for very large price discounts, there would be some limit
on the ability of FFVs to consume E85. The CES specification implies that greater
price discounts will always lead to more consumption. However, this shortcoming is
not empirically relevant in my simulations because E85 consumption remains below
1.5 billion gallons in all of the scenarios considered.
Table 2.12: Net imports of ethanol from Brazil to the United States
Million gallons
Year Imports Exports Net imports
2010 0 23 -23
2011 101 396 -295
2012 404 86 318
2013 242 47 195
Source: Energy Information Administration
http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm.
To estimate the response to a change in the RFS fraction, I must make some
assumption about the supply of sugarcane ethanol and biodiesel. The supply of
sugarcane ethanol probably has a smaller impact because its price is tied to the price
of corn ethanol. Recall that the different treatment by the RFS of corn ethanol
and sugarcane ethanol creates a potential arbitrage opportunity. If the price of an
advanced RIN is high enough relative to the price of a renewable RIN, an arbitrageur
will export corn ethanol from the United States to Brazil and import sugarcane
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ethanol from Brazil to the United States. Table 11 shows net imports of ethanol
from Brazil in 2012 and 2013 were 318 million gallons and 195 million gallons.
2.8.5 Sensitivity analysis
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Figure 2.4: Simulation for three values of gasoline demand elasticity of substition
Note: These graphs depict the results of numerically solving the system of equations for many values for
the renewable fuel mandate (14 to 16.5 billion ethanol equivalent gallons) and three values for the gasoline
demand elasticity of substitution (-3.8, -7.6, -11.4).
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Figure 2.5: Emissions and welfare
Note: Total emissions equal consumption volume times life cycle emissions, by blending component.
Figure 2.6: Flow of fuel and feedstocks






















Note: The treatment of a gallon of ethanol under the RFS depends on the
feedstock used to produce that gallon even though the performance of ethanol
as a fuel does not depend on the feedstock.
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Note: Light circles are sets. Dark ovals are the most common elements. The
eligibility requirements for cellulosic fuel are more stringent than the eligibility
requirements for advanced fuel; all fuel that qualifies as cellulosic also contributes
to meeting the advanced requirement. Cellulosic and biodiesel are mutually
exclusive subsets of advanced, and advanced is a subset of renewable.
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Source: AEO 2006, AEO 2013, Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.
Note: Ethanol volume is calculated as total renewable minus biomass-based diesel and cellulosic.
Figure 1










Source: AEO 2006, AEO 2013, Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007.
Note: Ethanol volume is calculated as total renewable minus biomass-based diesel and cellulosic.
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Figure 2.9: Diesel retail price and blender cost
Note: The left graph compares the retail price of diesel with the blender cost of diesel. The right
graph compares the blender cost of biodiesel with the blender cost of petroleum-based diesel. Retail
price is diesel fuel retail price including taxes, U.S. average, from EIA’s Short Term Energy Outlook.
Blender cost (BC) is calculated according to the following equation: BCBX = FBX(PB100 − PR4) +
(1−FBX)(PB0 +ρPRIN ). Biodiesel fraction FBX is computed from the biodiesel quantity and diesel
quantity reported in EIA’s Short Term Energy Outlook. Biodiesel price PB100 is B-100 frieght on
board at Illinois, Indiana and Ohio, from U.S. Bioenergy Statistics. The vector of RIN prices PRIN
includes renewable PR6, advanced PR5, and biodiesel PR4 RIN prices, from Bloomberg. Petroleum-
based diesel price PB0 is Los Angeles ultra-low sulfur CARB diesel spot price, from EIA. The vector
of RFS fractions ρ is from past EPA rules.
Figure 2.10: E85 retail price and blender cost
Note: The left graph compares the retail price of E85 with the blender cost of E85. The right
graph compares the blender cost of ethanol with the blender cost of BOB. Retail price is the U.S.
city average retail price of unleaded regular gasoline, from EIA. Blender cost (BC) is calculated
according to the following equation: BCE85 = FE85(PE100 − PR6) + (1 − FE85)(PE0 + ρPRIN ). I
assume the ethanol fraction FE85 is 71%, the average blend reported by EIA. Ethanol price PE100 is
blender cost of ethanol with credit, from U.S. Bioenergy Statistics. The vector of RIN prices PRIN
includes renewable PR6, advanced PR5, and biodiesel PR4 RIN prices, from Bloomberg. BOB price
PE0 is generic RBOB gasoline (XB1), from Bloomberg. The vector of RFS fractions ρ is from past
EPA rules.
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Note: Supply is estimated. Demand is derived from substitution with petroleum-based diesel.
price of petroleum diesel
+ cost of RFS compliance per gallon
+ price of adanced RIN
Supply margin 
elasticity = 0.91
Note: These graphs depict alternative assumptions about biofuel supply and demand elasticities. For E85,
the elasticity of substitution with E10 takes on the values -3.8, -7.6, and -11.4. In each case, the demand
share is adjusted such that the demand for E85 is 300 million gallons at $3.40 per gallon. For sugarcane
ethanol, the elasticity of supply takes on the values 18, 35, and 70, and the supply intercept is adjusted such
that the supply of sugarcane ethanol is 280 million gallons at $3.30 per gallon. For biodiesel, the elasticity of
supply takes on the values 0.91, 1.37, and 2.05, and the demand intercept is adjusted such that the supply of
biodiesel is 1.28 billion gallons at $4.44 per gallon.
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Figure 2.12: Simulation for three values of gasoline elasticity of demand
Note: These graphs depict the results of numerically solving the system of equations for many values for the
renewable fuel mandate (14 to 16.5 billion ethanol equivalent gallons) and three values of gasoline elasticity
of demand.
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Figure 2.13: Emissions and welfare for three values of gasoline elasticity of demand
Note: To calculate total emissions, I multiply the consumption volume of the various blending
components by their life cycle emissions. The change in total surplus is calculated using the model
supply and demand curves.
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Figure 2.14: Simulation for three values of BOB elasticity of supply
Note: These graphs depict the results of numerically solving the system of equations for many values for the
renewable fuel mandate (14 to 16.5 billion ethanol equivalent gallons) and three values of BOB elasticity of
supply.
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Figure 2.15: Emissions and welfare for three values of BOB elasticity of supply
Note: To calculate total emissions, I multiply the consumption volume of the various blending
components by their life cycle emissions. The change in total surplus is calculated using the model
supply and demand curves.
115
Figure 2.16: Simulation for three values of biodiesel elasticity of supply
Note: These graphs depict the results of numerically solving the system of equations for many values for the
renewable fuel mandate (14 to 16.5 billion ethanol equivalent gallons) and three values of biodiesel elasticity
of supply.
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Figure 2.17: Emissions and welfare for three values of biodiesel elasticity of supply
Note: To calculate total emissions, I multiply the consumption volume of the various blending
components by their life cycle emissions. The change in total surplus is calculated using the model
supply and demand curves.
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Figure 2.18: Simulation for three values of sugarcane ethanol elasticity of supply
Note: These graphs depict the results of numerically solving the system of equations for many values for the
renewable fuel mandate (14 to 16.5 billion ethanol equivalent gallons) and three values of sugarcane ethanol
elasticity of supply.
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Figure 2.19: Emissions and welfare for three values of sugarcane ethanol elasticity of
supply
Note: To calculate total emissions, I multiply the consumption volume of the various blending
components by their life cycle emissions. The change in total surplus is calculated using the model
supply and demand curves.
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Figure 2.20: Ethanol as a fraction of gasoline, 2003-2011
Note: States are shaded in proportion to the fraction of ethanol in blended gasoline from 2003 to
2011. Source data from Energy Information Agency State Energy Data System.
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CHAPTER III
How does systematic risk affect optimal bank
capital?
3.1 Introduction
There is a consensus among bank regulators that leverage (the ratio of debt to equity)
contributes to systematic risk—the risk that the financial system will fail. Leverage
requirements are an important tool for managing systematic risk. However, existing
models of leverage requirements do not consider the contribution of leverage to the
probability of a crisis. So, how does bank leverage contribute to systematic risk?
This paper argues that optimal bank leverage trades off between two forces. On
one hand, bank leverage exacerbates systematic risk by lowering the threshold at
which a shock to risky bank assets becomes a financial crisis. On the other hand,
bank leverage creates liquidity. I characterize socially optimal capital requirements
in a model that compares the benefit of liquidity provision with the cost of more
frequent crises. I calibrate the model and show how sensitive the optimal capital
ratio is to alternative parameterizations. I show that other policy tools—taxes and
government bonds—can attain better outcomes than a capital ratio.
The intuition in my model is simple: a regulator (social planner) chooses a le-
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verage requirement to balance the tradeoff between liquidity creation and systematic
risk. Bank debt is liquid because a household that owns bank debt is able to avoid
transaction costs. However, bank debt also raises systematic risk. Risky bank as-
sets are subject to an aggregate shock, and when that aggregate shock exceeds some
threshold there is a financial crisis.
I define systematic risk as the probability of a crisis triggered by the insolvency
of the banking sector. This is distinct from other analyses of bank failure in two
ways. First, failure is the consequence of being insolvent; this is not an analysis
of bank runs triggered by sunspots. Bank runs arise in models with demandable
debt—specifically fixed-value, first-come first-served, short-term debt—and sunspot
equilibria. However, a sunspot equilibrium does not have a well defined probability.
In contrast, the probability of a crisis in my model is well-defined because a crisis is
based on fundamentals. Second, failure occurs on the level of the banking sector, not
an individual bank. An environment that features the failure of the banking sector
is more appropriate for examining financial crises.
This paper avoids common pitfalls in the debate about leverage requirements by
articulating that the social value of bank debt is liquidity, which raises real con-
sumption. Chief among the pitfalls, which are skillfully elucidated by Admati et al.
(2011), are misunderstanding what constitutes “capital” and confusion between pri-
vate cost and social cost. The liquidity of bank debt is supported by Gorton and
Pennacchi (1990), who articulate the argument that bank debt is valuable because
it is informationally insensitive. That bank debt raises real output is supported by
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996). In my model, the social value of bank debt is clear:
bank debt raises real output by creating liquidity, which permits households to avoid
transaction costs.
I focus on aggregate shocks to risky bank assets because this paper is about finan-
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cial crises not individual bank failures. Many discussions of leverage requirements
are concerned with the failure of an individual bank, but the cost of a financial crisis
is more than the sum of its parts. The probability of a financial crisis is determined
by an interaction between aggregate bank leverage and an aggregate shock to risky
bank assets. The aggregate shock in my model is the depreciation rate of capital
assets. It would be reasonable to add other shocks as well but not meaningful for
examining the probability of a crisis. A productivity shock, for instance, would have
no bearing on the the probability of a crisis in this model.
My model suggests that current international capital standards are too low. Ca-
pital standards are a single tool that serves multiple purposes, so there are other
factors to consider in setting them, but I argue that the tradeoff between liquidity
and systematic risk is more important than the others.
The rest of the paper has the following structure: Section 3.2 explains how the
key tradeoff in the model corresponds to banking institutions and how the model
fits into the literature, Section 3.3 describes the model and presents the criterion for
the optimal capital ratio, Section 3.4 derives properties of the optimal capital ratio
analytically, Section 3.5 analyzes the sensitivity of the optimal capital ratio to model
parameters numerically, and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Background
This section describes institutions and prior literature that motivate the key tradeoff
in my model: bank debt has social value because it is liquid, and financial crises are
costly. Then I compare my approach to finding the optimal mix of debt and equity
with the standard approach for industrial firms, with prior approaches to capital
requirements for banks specifically, and to alternative macroprudential policies that
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address the cost of crises.
To highlight the tradeoff between liquidity and the cost of crises, the model in
this paper expresses financial crises very simply, but it is reasonable to think of the
simple, “reduced form” expression of financial crises in this model as corresponding
to more complex, “micro founded” mechanisms. For example, an aggregate shock
leads to a crisis in this model if the shock leads to an insolvent banking sector. In a
more complex model, an aggregate shock could instead trigger a crisis by crossing a
global games threshold for a bank run on an illiquid banking sector, along the lines
of Morris and Shin (2001). Indeed, what is called bank debt in the model is meant to
represent demandable liabilities with guaranteed value of any financial institutions,
including bank deposits and money market mutual funds. Instruments with these
properties are subject to runs, so an extension of the model featuring runs would be
natural.
The literature supports this paper’s assumption that bank debt has social value
because it is liquid. The value of debt to households is expressed in a simple form—
similar to a cash-in-advance constraint—which is intended to be a reduced form of
the informational insensitivity of debt (Gorton and Pennacchi 1990). In my model,
liquidity is provided exclusively on the liability side of a bank’s balance sheet—banks
hold assets simply because they need to do something with the financing they’ve
raised through liquidity provision. Previous work has stressed that liquidity creation
occurs on both sides of the balance sheet (Kashyap, Rajan, and Stein 2002). The
liquidity of bank debt enhances welfare by raising output and consumption. The
connection between financial intermediation and output is supported empirically by
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996).
Just as the model’s trigger for a crisis is a simplification, the model also expresses
the cost of crises simply. A crisis in this model is assumed to impose a negative
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externality with a direct utility cost. In a more elaborate model, a financial crisis
could disrupt other explicitly-modeled financial intermediation by the same banking
institutions. Indeed, the literature explores many mechanisms for motivating the cost
of financial crises. The externality imposed by a financial crisis in the model is thus
intended to reflect the direct cost of individual bank failure (James 1991), as well as
costs of fire sales (Diamond and Rajan (2011), Shleifer and Vishny (2011)) and non-
relationship-specific disruption to financial intermediation (Campello, Graham, and
Harvey (2010), Ivashina and Scharfstein (2010), Duchin, Ozbas, and Sensoy (2010)).
The tradeoff I consider between liquidity and the cost of crises is different from
the standard tradeoff between debt and equity in the finance literature. The bench-
mark result for industrial firms is that any mix of debt and equity is equally good
because investors can obtain any risk profile by borrowing or lending at a risk-free
rate (Modigliani and Miller 1958). The benchmark of debt-equity neutrality is of-
ten broken by principal-agent problems that arise if inside equity provided by the
firm’s manager is insufficient to fund all positive net present value projects (Shleifer
and Vishny 1997). Outside equity encourages a manager to direct firm resources for
her private benefit at the expense of maximizing firm value, and debt encourages
a manager to invest in excessively risky projects (Jensen and Meckling 1976). This
paper considers the optimal mix of debt and equity for banks without principal-agent
problems; banks are assumed to act in the interest of shareholders, and debtholders
know in advance the riskiness of banks’ asset portfolios. The neutrality of the debt-
equity mix is instead broken by the social value of bank debt as a source of liquidity
and by the externality of bank debt contributing to the probability of a crisis.
Some prior literature uses the equity capital ratio to address other tradeoffs. The
standard approach regards bank failure as the consequence of a multiple-equilibrium
bank run. Demandable debt fulfills a need for liquidity insurance but also makes
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possible equilibrium bank runs, which can be eliminated by deposit insurance (Di-
amond and Dybvig 1983). Although deposit insurance solves the problem of bank
runs, it also creates the problem of risk-shifting. This is the starting point for many
explorations of optimal capital: bank runs are solved, so capital is a tool for dealing
with risk shifting. This risk shifting is analyzed by Nguyen (2013) and Begenau
(2015). This is also the welfare cost setup adopted by Van den Heuvel (2008).
Other prior literature uses other policy tools to address the tension between
liquidity and the cost of crises. Section 3.3.7 considers one of the suggestions in Co-
chrane (2014) that government bonds could obviate the need for a tradeoff. Hanson,
Kashyap, and Stein (2011) suggest remedies including time varying capital requi-
rements, quality capital, corrective action, and contingent capital. Acharya et al.
(2017) present a model of risky banking in which they obtain an efficient outcome
by imposing a tax on a bank’s contribution to systemic risk. Section 3.3.6 considers
taxes.
3.3 Model
This section presents a two-period model in which bank debt makes crises more
frequent and raises real output. The model will be used to characterize the optimal
capital ratio (equity/assets). There are two agents in the model: households and
banks.1
The key features of the model are the aggregate depreciation rate of capital assets,
the use of debt to avoid transaction costs, and the cost of a crisis. Banks own risky
capital assets, and the aggregate depreciation rate on capital assets δ is a random
1The word “capital” is used widely both for productive durable assets and for equity-like bank
liabilities. I have found that both uses are indispensable, but wherever possible I will use “capital
assets” for the productive durables and “equity capital” for the bank liabilities.
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variable. Households pay transaction costs on transactions in excess of their holdings
of bank debt. If banks are levered, then a high draw of the aggregate depreciation
rate δ leaves banks with insufficient funds to pay their debt to households, which
triggers a crisis.
3.3.1 Households
This section describes how households purchase capital assets for use in production
and avoid transaction costs by holding bank debt.
Households use capital assets to produce output. Households purchase capital
assets from banks at the beginning of the first period and sell it back to banks at
the end of the first period. Before production, capital assets are freely convertible
with the consumption good at parity, so the pre-production price of capital assets
is 1. After production, households sell capital assets to banks, which bear the risk
of an uncertain depreciation rate from the first period to the second period. The
post-production price of capital P may be less than one.
Households face transaction costs for capital asset purchases. Transaction costs
are quadratic in the volume of capital assets used by households. However, hou-
seholds also hold bank debt. Bank debt is liquid, so households do not need to
pay transaction costs on capital that can be covered using holdings of bank debt.
Transaction costs are only incurred on capital assets in excess of bank debt.
Events within the first period occur in the following sequence: (1) Households
purchase debt and equity from banks, (2) Households purchase capital assets from
banks, (3) Households use capital assets to produce output, (4) Households sell
capital assets to banks, (5) Households consume. Households have the ability to
hold capital assets from the first period to the second period rather than selling
them to a bank, but in equilibrium they choose not to do so because the expected
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return on bank equity exceeds the expected return on capital assets.
Households maximize expected utility subject to a budget constraint:
max
C1,C2,E,D,K
U(C1) + βE[U(C2)]− βξP[crisis] (3.1)
s.t. C1 + E +D +K +H(K,D) ≤ F (K) + PK +W (3.2)
E[C2] ≤ E[π]E + E[r]D (3.3)
U(Ct) = Ct, H(K,D) =
γ
2 (K −D)
2, F (K) = Kα
where Ct is consumption in period t, ξ is the utility cost of a crisis, E is bank equity,
D is bank debt, K is capital assets, P is the end-of-period price of capital assets, W
is the initial stock of wealth, π is the return on equity, r is the return on bank debt,
U(·) is a utility function, H(·) is a transaction cost function, F (·) is a production
function, E[·] is the expectation operator, and P[crisis] is the probability of a crisis.
From now on I use the convention X ≡ E[X].
The household first order conditions2 imply:
βπ = 1 (3.4)
βr = 1− γ(K −D) (3.5)
F ′(K) = (1− P) + γ(K −D) (3.6)
A household pays a cost ξ in a financial crisis. The cost of a crisis and the
probability of a crisis are outside the control of an individual household, so they
have no impact on any household decisions. I will discuss crises in more detail in a
later section.
2See appendix for first order conditions.
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3.3.2 Banks
This section describes how banks choose whether to borrow in order to finance risky
assets. If debt is cheap, banks borrow as much as they are permitted by the capital
ratio.
Banks receive income from owning capital assets. Banks purchase capital assets
at the end of the first period for the post-production price P . Banks earn a risky
rate of return on capital assets because capital assets depreciate stochastically. The
aggregate depreciation rate on the stock of capital assets K becomes known at the
beginning of the second period: δ. The surviving capital assets owned by the bank,
(1−δ)K, are available for banks to distribute to debtholders and shareholders. Recall
that, before production, capital assets are freely convertible with the consumption
good at parity, so the pre-production price of capital assets is 1.
Banks issue debt and equity, and debt receives payment priority over equity.
The cash balance constraint requires that the value of capital assets equal liabilities,
PK = D+E. Bank debt claims D are issued with a promised interest rate r∗. Whe-
never banks are able to pay the promised interest rate, they do so and remit whatever





are unable to pay the promised interest rate, returns to shareholders are zero and





The bank’s problem is to maximize the expected second-period return on equity
subject to budget constraints and a capital requirement. The capital requirement is
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expected return on equity
(3.8)
φPK ≤ E (3.9)
where δ is the expected depreciation rate of capital, r is the expected return on bank
debt, π is the expected return on bank equity, and φ is the required capital ratio.3
The capital ratio can also be understood as a limit on debt. Combining equations
3.7 and 3.9 yields an equivalent expression of the capital ratio in terms of debt:
(1− φ)PK ≥ D (3.10)
The bank problem is essentially a question of whether to expand the balance
sheet by borrowing. If debt is cheaper than the return on assets, r < (1−δ)
P
, then
banks borrow as much as they are permitted to finance assets, and the capital ratio
in equation 3.9 is binding. If debt is more expensive than the return on assets,
r > (1−δ)
P
, then banks do not borrow to finance assets and bank debt is zero. If the
return on debt is equal to the return on assets, then any level of debt is consistent
with bank optimization. Figure 3.1 shows that equilibrium in the market for bank
3Using λ, µ, and ψ as the Lagrange multipliers, a bank has the following first order conditions:
λP = µ(1− δ) + ψφP
λ = µr
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1 − 𝛿
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Note: This figure shows that in the competitive equilibrium the expected interest rate r and the
quantity of debt D satisfy the household first order conditions and the bank capital ratio.
debt requires that either the expected return on debt equal the expected return on
assets or the capital ratio binds.
3.3.3 Competitive equilibrium
This section defines a competitive equilibrium and characterizes the competitive
equilibrium for an exogenous capital ratio φ ∈ [0, 1]. Later, I will consider the
Ramsey problem for φ: how the capital ratio would be chosen by a social planner to
maximize household utility.
Definition III.1. A competitive equilibrium is a set of prices {P, π, r} and quan-
tities {C1, C2, E,D,K} that satisfy the household and bank resource constraints and
first order conditions in equations 3.2 through 3.9.
We obtain an intuitive relationship between the weighted average cost of bank






φ+ (1− φ)(1− γ(K −D))
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
weighted average cost of bank finance
= 1− δ
P︸ ︷︷ ︸
expected return on assets
(3.11)
Proposition 1. If transaction costs are positive, γ > 0, then there is a unique com-
petitive equilibrium for each capital ratio φ ∈ [0, 1]. The competitive equilibrium can
be expressed as a system of three equations (3.6, 3.10, and 3.11) with three endoge-
nous variables (debt, capital assets, and post-production price), or as one equation





+ γ(K −D(K))︸ ︷︷ ︸
transaction cost
= F ′(K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal product
+ β(1− δ)
φ+ (1− φ)(1− γ(K −D(K)))︸ ︷︷ ︸
end-of-period price
(3.12)
We are interested in how the capital ratio affects the competitive equilibrium.
When the capital ratio requires total equity finance, φ = 1, debt is zero, so tran-
saction costs are high, so households choose less capital. When the capital ratio
permits total debt finance, φ = 0, debt is high, so transaction costs are low, so hou-
seholds choose more capital. Figure 3.2 shows conceptually that capital assets and
debt are both decreasing as a function of φ.
3.3.4 Crisis
This section explains the cause, consequence, and probability of a crisis. A crisis
occurs endogenously when the depreciation rate is so high that the banking sector
cannot pay its debt. The consequence is that households suffer a utility penalty.
Households and banks do not consider the impact their choices have on the proba-
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Figure 3.2: Competitive equilibria
Note: This figure shows that among competitive equilibria, both capital assets and debt decrease
as a function of the capital ratio φ.
bility of a crisis, but the social planner does consider the probability of a crisis when
choosing policies.
A crisis occurs when the banking sector is insolvent. The solvency of the banking
sector is determined at the beginning of the second period when the aggregate de-
preciation rate of capital is realized. The aggregate depreciation rate is between zero
and one, distributed according to the cumulative distribution function G(δ), with
mean δ and variance σ2. Banks’ only assets are capital assets, and the beginning-of-
period price of capital assets is one, so the resources available for banks to distribute
as returns on equity and debt are the surviving stock of capital assets: (1− δ)K. A
crisis occurs when banks cannot pay the interest rate that was promised in the first
period: (1− δ)K < r∗D.
Definition III.2. The crisis threshold δ∗ is the depreciation rate at which banks
can pay the promised interest rate but the return on equity is zero: r = r∗ and
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π = 0.
In a crisis, households suffer a utility penalty ξ.4 Households are small in the
sense that their individual choices of debt do not influence the probability of a crisis.
However, in the aggregate, household choices do determine the probability of a crisis,
so the expected cost of a crisis ξP[crisis] is endogenous.
Definition III.3. The probability of a crisis is the probability that the deprecia-
tion rate δ exceeds the crisis threshold δ∗. The probability of a crisis can be expressed
as 1−G(δ∗). The probability of a crisis can also be expressed as an implicit function











Recall the expression for the return on equity: πE = max
{
0, (1 − δ)K − r∗D
}
.
The expression for the probability of a crisis as an implicit function of capital assets
is derived by taking expectations of the return on equity and substituting for bank
debt obligations, r∗D = (1− δ∗)K:
πE = G(δ∗)E[δ∗ − δ|δ < δ∗]K (3.13)
The probability of a crisis relates naturally to the return on equity. When the
expected return on equity equals zero, πE = 0, the crisis threshold must be zero,
so the probability of a crisis is one, J(0) = 1. When the expected return on equity
equals the expected survival of capital, πE = (1− δ)K, the crisis threshold must be
one, so the probability of a crisis is zero, J(1− δ) = 0.
In the following sections I will consider a social planner with a variety of po-
licy instruments, including a capital ratio (φ), taxes on capital, debt, and equity
(τK , τD, τE), lump sum taxes (T ), government bonds (B), and direct choices of prices
4As noted earlier, the externality imposed by a crisis could be modeled in a more elaborate
model as a disruption to other financial services performed by banks such as making loans.
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(P, π, r) and quantities (C1, E,D,K). In all cases, the social planner will maximize
expected consumption with consideration given to the probability of a crisis. The
social planner’s objective function is the same as for households in Equation 3.1,
except that the social planner behaves in a way to control the cost of a crisis and
households do not:






3.3.5 Social planner with capital ratio
This section describes the Ramsey problem when the social planner’s policy instru-
ment is the equity capital ratio φ. Banks and households behave competitively, so
the social planner uses φ to choose from the set of competitive equilibria.
When the social planner’s policy instrument is the capital ratio, the social plan-
ner must choose from the set of competitive equilibria. The social planner chooses
the capital ratio to maximize household expected utility, subject to the household
and bank resource constraints and first order conditions. In other words, the social
planner chooses the competitive equilibrium that maximizes expected utility from
the set of competitive equilibria. Figure 3.3 shows the intuition for the social plan-
ner’s solution. Relative to the constrained optimum, the social planner would prefer
to have more capital assets and less debt, but competitive behavior by banks and
households makes that infeasible.
The social planner’s problem can be restated in a simple form. Define the function
K(φ) as the capital assets K chosen in the competitive equilibrium, conditional on
the capital ratio φ. Define E(φ), D(φ), and P (φ) similarly as equity, debt, and
the post-production price of capital assets in the competitive equilibrium. Define
J(φ) = J(πE(φ)
K(φ) ) as the probability of a crisis. Then the social planner’s problem can
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Figure 3.3: Social planner with capital ratio
Note: Relative to the constrained optimum, the social planner would prefer to have more capital








+ β(1− δ)K(φ)− βξJ(φ) (3.15)
Proposition 2. When the social planner’s policy instrument is a capital ratio, the
solution is to equate the marginal benefit of liquidity with the marginal cost of crisis











P (φ)− β(1− δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
external cost of assets
)
K ′(φ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
(–)
(3.16)
The quantities {C1, C2, E,D,K} that result from the optimal capital ratio are the
constrained optimum.
The benefit of leverage is expressed on the left side of equation 3.16. As the equity
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capital ratio φ increases, debt decreases, which reduces the benefit of liquidity. The
cost of leverage is expressed on the right side of equation 3.16. As the equity capital
ratio φ increases, the probability of a crisis decreases, which reduces the cost of a
crisis. The second expression on the righthand side, which uses a substitution from
equation 3.6, expresses the external cost of assets—a household values a capital asset
more than the social planner to the extent that the end-of-period price exceeds the
social value of the capital asset.
3.3.6 Social planner with taxes
This section describes the Ramsey problem when the social planner chooses a vector
of tax instruments. The social planner is constrained to a competitive equilibrium,
but the household and bank resource constraints and first order conditions are diffe-
rent from equations 3.2 through 3.9. The solution for a social planner with taxes is
an intuitive criterion for the tradeoff between liquidity and crises.
The social planner’s vector of tax instruments affects the first period household
budget constraint. The social planner can choose four taxes: lump sum taxes, and
taxes on household choices of capital assets, debt, and equity, τ ≡ {T, τE, τD, τK}.
Any of these taxes may be negative, in which case we would call them transfers
or subsidies. Thus, the social planner with taxes operates in a slightly different
environment from the social planner with a capital ratio. The objective functions of
households and banks remain the same as described previously, as do most resource
constraints. The exception is the household first-period budget constraint becomes:
C1 + E(1 + τE) +D(1 + τD) +K(1 + τK) +H(K,D) + T ≤ F (K) + PK (3.2b)
The social planner with taxes faces two noteworthy constraints that were ignored
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in the preceding discussion of the capital ratio. The first constraint is that the post-
production price of capital must be less than one, P ≤ 1, because capital is freely
convertible at parity with the consumption good before production. This constraint
will bind because a higher price permits both more debt (to defray transaction costs)
and more equity (to reduce the probability of a crisis) for a given level of capital.
The second constraint is the condition under which banks have a perfectly elastic
supply of bank debt, rP = 1 − δ, which must be met if both debt and equity are
positive. Together, these constraints imply r = 1− δ.
Before stating the main result, we need to introduce some notation. For exami-
ning the social planner with taxes, it will be convenient to express the probability of





















where the first equality holds by equation 3.8 and the second equality holds because
r = 1−δ. The social planner can independently controlK andD as implicit functions
of τ , and I write Ji(K(τ), D(τ)) to indicate the partial derivative of J with respect
to argument i.
Proposition 3. When the social planner’s policy instrument is a vector of taxes
and subsidies τ , the optimal regime equates the marginal benefit of liquid debt with
the marginal contribution of debt to the expected cost of a crisis. The optimal tax
regime also equates the marginal benefit of capital assets with their marginal cost. The
















+ γ(K(τ)−D(τ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
transaction cost
= F ′(K(τ))︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal product











Figure 3.4 shows that the partially constrained optimum can be interpreted as the
intersection of equation 3.18, which describes the optimal choice of debt conditional
on capital assets, and equation 3.19, which describes the optimal choice of capital
assets conditional on debt.
As expected, the social planner can achieve a better equilibrium when she has
more policy levers. The intuition is that the social planner uses a tax on debt
to control the choice of debt, a subsidy for capital assets to control the choice of
capital assets, a subsidy for equity to ensure that banks are willing to issue debt,
and lump sum taxes to achieve budget balance. Compare the social planner’s optimal
debt condition in equation 3.18 to the household’s first order condition for debt in
equation 3.5. Both the social planner and the household care about the marginal
benefit of liquidity in the expression on the right. The social planner weighs the
benefit of liquidity against the marginal effect of debt on the cost of a crisis. The
household weighs the benefit of liquidity against the price of debt and the return on
debt.
There are two differences between the condition for optimal capital assets in
equation 3.19 and the household’s first order condition for capital assets in equation
3.6. First, the optimal choice of assets consider the discounted value of surviving
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Figure 3.4: Social planner with taxes
Note: The partially constrained optimum can be interpreted as the intersection of Equation 3.18,
which describes the optimal choice of debt conditional on capital assets, and Equation 3.19, which
describes the optimal choice of capital assets conditional on debt.
capital β(1−δ) rather than the price P . Second, the optimal choice of assets includes
a term for the positive externality of capital assets on the probability of a crisis;
holding debt fixed, raising the level of capital assets reduces the probability of a
crisis.
3.3.7 Social planner with government bonds
This section describes the Ramsey problem when the social planner issues govern-
ment bonds. As was the case with taxes, the social planner with government bonds
is constrained to a competitive equilibrium with modified household resource con-
straints and first order conditions. The solution for a social planner with government
bonds entirely avoids transaction costs with zero probability of a crisis.
Government bonds are liquid, which enables households to avoid transaction
costs. Specifically, government bonds are perfectly substitutable with bank debt
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from the perspective of households. Government bonds have the same liquidity pro-
perties as bank debt.
The availability of government bonds affects the household budget constraint
in both periods. The social planner chooses to issue some quantity of government
bonds B, on which interest is paid in the second period. Government budget balance
is achieved by lump sum transfers in the first period and lump sum taxes in the
second period. The objective functions of households and banks remain the same
as described previously, as do most resource constraints. The exceptions are the
household budget constraints in the first and second period:
C1 + E +D +B +K +H(K,D +B) + T1 ≤ F (K) + PK (3.2c)
C2 + T2 ≤ πE + rD + rBB (3.3c)
Proposition 4. When the social planner’s policy instrument is government bonds B,
the optimal policy is to equate the quantity of government bonds with the quantity of
capital assets. The quantities {C1, C2, E,D,K} that result from the optimal tax re-
gime are the unconstrained optimum. In the unconstrained optimum, transaction
costs are zero and the probability of a crisis is zero.
1︸︷︷︸
price
= F ′(K)︸ ︷︷ ︸
marginal product
+ β(1− δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
discounted value
(3.20)
Equation 3.20 describes the choice of capital assets in the unconstrained optimum.
Compare equation 3.20 to equations 3.6 and 3.19. The transaction cost term drops
out because government bonds are abundant. The post-production price of capital
assets in the unconstrained optimum is equal to the social value, the discounted
value of expected surviving capital assets, P = β(1 − δ). Figure 3.5 illustrates the
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unconstrained optimum relative to the constrained optimum and the the partially
constrained optimum.
3.4 Analytical Results
The optimal capital ratio is an implicit function of the model parameters. This
section explains how the optimal capital ratio reacts to parameter changes. I examine
special cases for transaction costs γ, the utility cost of a crisis ξ, and the distribution
of the aggregate depreciation rate G(δ).5 The standard assumptions will be positive
transaction costs, positive utility cost, and positive variance, and these will be relaxed
individually.
3.4.1 No transaction costs, γ = 0
Suppose that capital assets can be purchased by households for use in production
without incurring transaction costs. In this case, households are indifferent between
equity and debt at a rate of return equal to 1
β
. The post-production price of capital
assets is β(1− δ), so banks are also willing to borrow. Any mix of equity and debt is
an equilibrium in this case, even though equilibria with debt will expose households
to the cost of a crisis. The optimal capital ratio with zero transaction costs is one,
because there is no benefit to liquid debt.
For γ near zero, the optimal capital ratio may still be one. This could be true if
the utility cost of a crisis is high and the distribution of the aggregate default rate is
concentrated around δ = 1. Define γ as the lowest value of gamma at which a capital
ratio of one is optimal. Now we see what happens to the optimal capital ratio as γ
5In the following analysis, I will denote the optimal capital ratio as φ∗. The optimal ratio is
an implicit function of all of the model parameters, φ∗ = φ∗(α, β, γ, δ, δσ, ξ). When considering a
particular parameter like γ, I will suppress the full notation and write simply φ∗(γ).
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Figure 3.5: Social planner with government bonds
Note: Households avoid transaction costs in the unconstrained optimum by holding government
debt rather than bank debt.
increases past γ by linearizing the system around γ = γ. All endogenous variables
{E,D,K, P, r, π} are treated as functions of φ∗(γ) and γ. So K = K(φ∗(γ), γ).
Proposition 5. The optimal capital ratio is a monotonically decreasing function of
transaction costs γ. Near γ = γ, a small increase in transaction costs γ reduces the



















3.4.2 No utility cost of crisis, ξ = 0
Suppose that there is no consequence of an insolvent banking sector. For a depre-
ciation rate that exceeds the crisis threshold such that the realized interest rate on
bank debt is below the promised interest rate, there is still no utility cost. Assuming
transaction costs are positive, the optimal capital ratio with zero utility cost of a
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crisis is zero, because there is no benefit to avoiding an insolvent banking sector.
Proposition 6. The optimal capital ratio is a monotonically increasing function of
the utility cost of a crisis ξ. Near ξ = 0, a small increase in the utility cost of a



















3.4.3 The distribution of depreciation draws, G(δ)
If depreciation is known in advance, then the expected interest rate on debt will
equal the promised interest rate on debt and the realized interest rate, so there will
be no crisis. In this context a capital ratio of zero is optimal.
If depreciation can take on one of two possible values, for example δ ∈ {δL, δH},
then there are two candidates for the optimal capital ratio. At a capital ratio of
zero, there is a crisis for a high draw of the depreciation rate but not for the low
draw. There is some other capital ratio that depends on δH and δσ at which there
is no crisis for either draw of the depreciation rate. Either of these two candidate
depreciation rates could be optimal, depending on the probability of δL and the cost
of a crisis ξ.
3.5 Empirical illustration
This section calibrates the model, calculates the optimal capital ratio numerically,
and examines the sensitivity of the optimal ratio to alternative parameterizations.
In this stylized model of liquidity and crises, the goal of a calibration exercise is to
explore how sensitive the optimal capital ratio is to the model parameters. Table 3.1
summarizes the parameters calibrated for the United States at an annual frequency.
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Table 3.1: Calibrated parameters
Parameter Symbol Value Source/Target
Capital scale α 0.54 bank risk-weighted assets $9.3 trillion
Discount factor β 0.93 return on bank equity 8%
Transaction cost γ 0.02 return on bank debt 3%
Depreciation mean δ 0.10
Depreciation stdev δσ 0.10
Capital ratio φ 0.13 aggr. risk-weighted capital ratio 13%
Utility cost of crisis ξ 0.30 one third of average consumption
This table shows the model parameters and their values at the calibrated point.
The policy tool of interest is the capital ratio φ, which I calibrate using the
observed aggregate ratio of equity to assets in the U.S. commercial banking sector.
This is similar to several policy tools in the Basel III regulatory framework: the
leverage ratio and the risk-weighted capital ratio. Precisely matching a real-world
policy tool is not essential; commercial banks are rarely at the exact minimum in any
case because banks maintain a buffer above the regulatory minimum. The purpose of
the exercise is to identify a real-world aggregate moment which regulators have the
capability of targeting with existing policy tools, and that moment is the aggregate
ratio of equity to assets. For U.S. commercial banks the actual ratio of equity to
assets is 13%, which I use for φ in the baseline calibration.6
For the purpose of targeting the capital scale parameter α, I use aggregate assets
in the U.S. commercial banking sector. This is important because the size of the
banking sector determines how much liquid debt is being provided by banks. Using
only commercial banks may be too small if other financial intermediaries perform
6The aggregate capital ratio and other moments from the commercial banking sector are con-
structed from Call Reports—regulatory filings with the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. The
process of constructing data from Call Reports is discussed by Kashyap and Stein (2000) and Den
Haan, Sumner, and Yamashiro (2002). I obtain commercial bank data from www.chicagofed.org
and documentation from www.federalreserve.gov/apps/mdrm. I use item numbers 3210 for equity
and 2170 for assets to construct the aggregate capital ratio.
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the same functions—selling liquid debt and buying risky assets. If the crisis-relevant
financial sector is larger than the commercial banking sector, then the capital scale
parameter should be larger than in the baseline calibration. The volume of commer-
cial bank assets used in calibration is aggregated from Call Reports.
The discount factor β and the transaction cost parameter γ are closely related
to two prices in the model: the expected return on equity and the expected return
on debt. The discount factor is simply the inverse of the expected return on equity,
which I take to be 8%. The wedge between the expected return on equity and the
expected return on debt is a liquidity premium. The liquidity premium depends on
the transaction cost parameter.
Recalling that this is an empirical illustration of how to implement this model
empirically, the optimal capital ratio at the calibrated point is 19%. Table 3.2 sum-
marizes how the optimal capital ratio changes for alternative parameter values.
3.6 Conclusion
Macroprudential bank regulation should depend on the tradeoff between liquidity
creation and the contribution of bank debt to systematic risk. This paper presents
a simple model featuring that tradeoff. It articulates a criterion for optimal leverage
requirements and considers alternative policy tools and what they could achieve.
The empirical illustration demonstrates how this tradeoff could be applied in a more
elaborate model. Natural extensions to this paper would be to embed explicit micro
foundations for the cost of a crisis and to alter the definition of a crisis from bank
sector insolvency to illiquidity through a global games mechanism.
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Table 3.2: Optimal capital ratios for alternative parameter values
Alpha (α) Beta (β) Gamma (γ) Xi (ξ) Deltabar (δ) Deltasig (δσ)
Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal Optimal
capital capital capital capital capital capital
Value ratio Value ratio Value ratio Value ratio Value ratio Value ratio
0.29 0.39 0.79 0.31 2x10−9 0.90 3.0x10−2 0.16 0.04 0.06 0.02 0.06
0.34 0.35 0.81 0.29 2x10−8 0.86 9.5x10−2 0.17 0.06 0.13 0.04 0.11
0.39 0.31 0.83 0.28 2x10−7 0.80 3.0x10−1 0.19 0.08 0.17 0.06 0.15
0.44 0.27 0.85 0.26 2x10−6 0.72 9.5x10−1 0.24 0.10 0.19 0.08 0.17
0.49 0.23 0.87 0.24 2x10−5 0.60 3.0x100 0.33 0.12 0.21 0.10 0.19
0.54 0.19 0.89 0.23 2x10−4 0.45 9.5x100 0.42 0.14 0.23 0.12 0.20
0.59 0.16 0.91 0.21 2x10−3 0.30 3.0x101 0.51 0.16 0.25 0.14 0.20
0.64 0.13 0.93 0.19 2x10−2 0.19 9.5x101 0.59 0.18 0.27 0.16 0.20
0.69 0.09 0.95 0.18 2x10−1 0.12 3.0x102 0.66 0.20 0.29 0.18 0.18
0.74 0.07 0.97 0.16 2x100 0.00 9.5x102 0.71 0.22 0.31 0.20 0.15
0.79 0.06 0.99 0.15 2x101 0.00 3.0x103 0.76 0.24 0.32 0.22 0.13
This table reports optimal capital ratios for alternative parameter values. The first column reports the values of
the production scale parameter α that were considered, from 0.29 to 0.79. For each value of α, the second column
reports the optimal capital ratio, holding all other parameters at their calibrated values as reported in Table 3.1. The
value of the production scale parameter α at the calibrated point, 0.54, and the corresponding optimal capital ratio,
0.19, are highlighted. Similarly, columns 3 and 4 report the value of the discount parameter β and the corresponding
optimal capital ratios. Columns 5 and 6 report optimal ratios for alternative values of the transaction cost parameter
γ, columns 7 and 8 report for the utility cost of crises ξ, columns 9 and 10 report for the mean depreciation rate δ,
and columns 11 and 12 report for the variance of the depreciation rate δσ.
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3.7 Appendix
3.7.1 Household first order conditions
Section 3.3.1 describes the household problem, to which sections 3.3.6 and 3.3.7
add taxes and government bonds. Using λ and µ as the Lagrange multipliers on
equations 3.2 and 3.2—modified to include taxes and bonds as in equations 3.2b,
3.2c, and 3.3c—households have the following first order conditions:
1− λ = 0
β − µ = 0
µπ − λ = 0
µr − λ+ γ(K −D −B) = 0
µrB − λ+ γ(K −D −B) = 0
λF ′(K) + P − 1− γ(K −D −B) = 0
Equations 3.4, 3.5, and 3.6 assume taxes and government bonds equal zero.
3.7.2 Proof of proposition 1
The competitive equilibrium, if it exists, is described by a system of two equations
in debt and capital assets:
D = [1 +H1(K,D)− F ′(K)](1− φ)K (3.23)
β(1− δ)
1 + (1− φ)H2(K,D)
= [1 +H1(K,D)− F ′(K)] (3.24)
Where 3.23 follows from equations 3.10 and 3.11 and 3.24 follows from equations 3.6
and 3.11. The expression [1+H1(K,D)−F ′(K)] appears in both equations. For any
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D ≥ 0, this expression goes from −∞ to ∞ as K goes from 0 to ∞. Consider K as
an implicit function of D in both equations. In equation 3.23, K(0) = 0, K(∞) =∞
and K is strictly increasing in D because H11 > 0, H12 < 0 and F ′′(K) < 0. In
equation 3.23, K(0) > 0 and K is strictly decreasing in D because H12 < 0, H22 > 0,
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